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SUMMARY 
 
 
This dissertation examines organizational influences on gender and racial salary 
equity among tenured and tenure-track faculty in science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) disciplines. The study argues that traditional individual and 
disciplinary explanations for salary inequities fail to capture the institutional variations in 
conditions among women and underrepresented minority faculty in STEM disciplines. A 
better understanding of these institutional variations is important for theory and practice 
as scholars continue to attempt to explain the unexplained salary gaps and policymakers 
target organizational change to resolve persistent gaps. The results show that individual 
characteristics and discipline do explain salary gaps among STEM faculty broadly; 
however, those results vary across organizational settings. Comparisons of gender and 
racial salary gaps among institutional types show that organizational mission, resources, 
and power influence the extent of salary parity. The results validate the importance of 
emphasizing and rethinking institutional categorizations to understand pay disparities 
among women and underrepresented minority STEM faculty.  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Dissertation Overview 
This dissertation examines how gender and racial pay gaps vary across institutional 
settings—exploring how the identity, resources, and decision-making structure of an 
institution influence pay equity for women and underrepresented minority science, 
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) faculty. Within academia, white and Asian 
male faculty earn more than women and underrepresented minorities in STEM 
disciplines, on average (National Science Foundation, 2015a). Experience and 
productivity explain a substantial portion of the salary gaps by gender and race, with 
unexplained gaps among male and female STEM faculty ranging from zero to 5.5 percent 
in recent studies (Ceci, Williams, Ginther, & Kahn, 2014; Corley & Sabharwal, 2007; 
DesRoches, Zinner, Rao, Iezzoni, & Campbell, 2010; Ginther, 2004; National Research 
Council, 2010; Porter, Toutkoushian, & Moore, 2008). Research on STEM faculty pay, 
and faculty pay more generally, typically concentrates on those individual-level 
characteristics as primary explanations for pay gaps, yet policies and programs often aim 
at institutional change. Further, gender has been the prominent focus of the faculty pay 
literature, while racial pay conditions have received less attention. This dissertation 
contributes to the faculty pay literature and science policy literature by incorporating 
organizational theories into the traditional human capital and disciplinary framework in 
order to explore how salary disparities differ across organizational settings. Further, the 
results offer more recent salary data and more detailed analysis of racial groups than prior 
studies.  
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1.2 Background on Faculty Pay Disparities 
Female academics earn less than comparable male academics—a finding consistent in all 
but a few pay equity studies from the 1970s to today (Barbezat, 2002; Perna 2003; 
Toutkoushian 2008). Racial pay gaps are less consistent and understudied due to the 
small number of minority faculty in academia (Perna, 2003). Higher education 
administrators sought to rationalize faculty pay beginning in the 1970s, in part due to 
anti-discrimination requirements in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which were 
extended to academia in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Barbezat, 
2002). These Acts provided the impetus for the initial faculty salary studies, which set a 
baseline from which future reward systems could be judged (Barbezat, 2002). Institution-
specific pay equity studies gave way to national studies in the 1980s, exploring gender 
and racial pay gaps primarily through human capital and structural frameworks (Barbezat, 
2002). Although scholars have studied gender pay equity broadly across higher education 
for several decades, their research provides little evidence on pay equity for minorities, 
recent years, or specific disciplines such as STEM where concerns over career disparities 
are long-standing.  
The National Academies (2010) noted the relevance of pay equity studies for 
STEM faculty, in particular, given the federal funding and initiatives for women in 
science and outcomes for female students related to the presence of female faculty. In 
addition to the broad federal pay guidelines, the Congress has recognized the particular 
need to encourage equal opportunity in the sciences. The Science and Technology Equal 
Opportunities Act of 1980 acknowledged the need to promote women and minority 
STEM careers as part of the national interest (Public Law 96-516).  The Act authorized 
3 
 
the National Science Foundation (NSF) to construct programs aimed at increasing 
participation and encouraging opportunity for women and minorities in STEM disciplines. 
Within the STEM workforce, the condition of women and minorities in academia has 
been of particular interest given the role of academics in influencing rising scientists and 
engineers (National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, & Institute 
of Medicine, 2011; National Science Foundation, 2012).   
Women and underrepresented minority faculty have gained ground in STEM 
disciplines, as in other fields; however, their representation and rewards continue to fall 
below that of white and Asian male academics on many measures, including median 
salary (Table 1.1). In 2013, male faculty at four-year institutions earned higher median 
salaries than female faculty at every rank (full, associate, and assistant) in science, 
engineering, and health (SEH) disciplines combined (National Science Foundation, 
2015a).
1
 Asian and white SEH full professors earned more than underrepresented 
minorities (African Americans, Hispanics, and American Indian/Alaskan) at the median, 
while Asian associate and assistant professors held the highest median salaries (National 
Science Foundation, 2015a). Controlling for productivity, education, and discipline, 
among other factors, the National Research Council (2001; 2010) has offered conflicting 
accounts of the gender pay gap within STEM disciplines, and little evidence on pay 
equity by race beyond basic comparisons of means.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The data in Table 1.1 come from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients, which is a longitudinal survey of individuals 
who hold SEH doctoral degrees from U.S. institutions. This table includes faculty in the health disciplines; however, 
the remainder of the dissertation does not include health faculty. When possible, the specific fields included in the data 
will be identified. 
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Table 1.1 Representation and Median Salary of Science and Engineering Faculty in 
Four-Year Academic Institutions by Sex, Race, Ethnicity, and Faculty Rank, 2013 
  Full Professor Associate Professor Assistant Professor 
  Share Median Salary Share Median Salary Share Median Salary 
Female 21%         $109,000  34%        $80,000  43%        $70,000  
Male 79%         122,000  66%        88,000  57%        75,000  
White 81%         120,000  75%        84,000  67%        70,000  
Asian 12%         120,000  14%        89,000  22%        79,000  
Black 2%         106,000  5%        79,000  5%        68,000  
Hispanic 3%         106,000  5%        79,000  5%        70,000  
Am. Indian/Alaskan D           94,000  D        79,000  D D 
Other D         112,000  D        83,000  D        75,000  
Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Survey of 
Doctorate Recipients, 2013. 
Notes: Includes faculty in science, engineering, and health fields. For representation, faculty are in S&E 
related occupations within four-year academic institutions. D = suppressed to avoid disclosure of 
confidential information.  
 
 
1.3 Research Motivation and Research Questions 
In both the higher education literature and the science and technology policy literature, 
human capital and structural theories are prevalent frameworks for studying faculty 
salaries. Human capital theory provides the rational economic labor market perspective, 
in which pay follows performance, whereas structural theory offers the sociological labor 
market perspective, in which pay follows gendered disciplines. Scholars within the higher 
education literature tacitly acknowledge organizational influences by controlling for 
institutional type, when possible; however, they have not sufficiently tested 
organizational theories of institutions and power due to data limitations. The importance 
of organizational context was well described by Pfeffer and Ross (1990, pg. 58): 
Indeed, we believe that evidence on the existence of sex discrimination in at least 
some instances is now overwhelming. The challenge which researchers currently 
face is to move beyond the mere demonstration of occupational or positional 
segregation and gender-based wage discrimination within jobs, and to begin to 
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explore the conditions under which these processes are more or less likely to 
occur. We need to know, in other words, not only that women are paid less than 
men…, even with numerous factors controlled, but also the organizational 
contexts in which such gender effects are stronger or weaker… 
This dissertation seeks to address that gap in the literature by exploring the institutional 
contexts within which female and underrepresented minority STEM faculty fare better in 
pay equity. The institutional focus is important given past research on the benefits of 
institutionally-focused rather than individually-focused programs for women in science, 
as well as policy proposals and programs aimed at organizational change (Fox, Sonnert, 
& Nikiforova, 2009; National Science Foundation, 2009). 
  The primary focus of this dissertation is the influence of place—organizational 
setting—on faculty pay equity in STEM disciplines. While controlling for human capital 
and disciplinary factors, the dissertation will address the following research questions: 
1. Institutional identity: Do certain institutions have an identity or mission that 
leads them to exhibit greater pay equity compared to other institutions? 
2. Organizational resources: Does the size and composition of resources 
influence pay disparities by gender and race/ethnicity? 
3. Organizational power: Does the decentralization of budgetary decision-
making influence gender and racial pay disparities? 
1.4 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Few studies have compared faculty salary gaps across institutional types, and those that 
have were restricted to research, doctoral, comprehensive, and liberal arts classifications. 
The data employed here expand institutional types to include women’s colleges and 
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historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), which this dissertation will 
examine as institutions serving underrepresented groups. Variation in their reward 
structures compared to other institutions could further our understanding of whether 
institutional identity influences pay equity within an organization. The dissertation also 
moves resource dependency theory from the departmental to the institutional level—
exploring whether slack resources and decentralized decision-making structures open the 
door for discrimination. 
Additionally, the dissertation relies on more recent data than prior studies, which 
offers an opportunity to observe whether pay gaps are changing. Although findings are 
fairly consistent in observing an unexplained gender pay gap among STEM faculty, that 
gap has been shrinking (National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, 
2001). Thus, it is important to study these questions of faculty pay equity with new data 
to determine whether progress towards pay parity continued. Finally, the dissertation 
provides a more detailed view of STEM faculty issues, especially under-represented 
minorities, whose outcomes are often neglected in the higher education literature on pay 
equity.  
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
This chapter offered an introduction to the issue of salary equity among STEM faculty, 
along with the research questions and implications of the dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews 
the theoretical underpinnings and empirical findings on salary equity, with attention to 
academic faculty broadly and STEM faculty in particular when possible. The chapter lays 
out common explanations for gender and racial gaps in salary at the individual and 
disciplinary level then offers hypotheses at the institutional level. Chapter 3 describes the 
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primary data source—the NETWISE II Survey, a large-scale survey of tenured and 
tenure-track STEM faculty—as well as secondary data sources, variable 
operationalization, descriptive statistics and methodology. Chapter 4 reports results from 
OLS regression analysis on traditional explanations for salary gaps and the hypothesized 
institutional influences. Chapter 5 offers discussion on the theoretical and policy 
implications of these results and concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
Organizational setting contributes to career disparities among STEM faculty through such 
factors as varied access to resources, workplace climates, and tenure and evaluation 
policies (reviewed in Fox, 2008). With these dissimilarities in setting come pay 
differentials across different groups of academics (Curtis & Thornton, 2014), yet the 
primary explanations for gender and racial pay disparities are individual and disciplinary 
factors rather than organizational. Economists have explained pay gaps in the general 
labor market through employees’ human capital differences (Becker, 1993), employers’ 
taste for discrimination (Becker, 1957), and employers’ statistical discrimination (Aigner 
& Cain, 1977). More recently, Goldin (2014) theorizes pay gaps among “winner-take-all” 
professions, including academia, as a tension between women’s greater desire for 
flexibility and the prominence of number of hours worked in reward structures. In 
contrast, sociologists point to stratification of groups (such as by gender) into different 
occupations or disciplines, which then become valued according to the dominant group 
(Baron & Hannan, 1994; Bellas, 1994; Fox, 1981, 2008; Reskin & Bielby, 2005). 
This dissertation argues that, in addition to the individual and disciplinary 
determinants of salary found in traditional models, organizational setting influences pay 
equity among women and underrepresented minority STEM faculty in a number of ways. 
As Stainback and colleagues argue in stratification research: 
An organizational perspective on inequality suggests that a theoretical account 
should be built at the intersection of (a) organizational structure, logic, and 
practice; (b) the relative power of actors within workplaces; and (c) organizations’ 
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institutional and competitive environments. (Stainback, Tomaskovic-Devey, & 
Skaggs, 2010, p. 242). 
This dissertation seeks to understand that intersection by applying organizational theories 
of institutions, resources, and power to explain pay inequity among women and 
underrepresented minority STEM faculty across institutions.  
 This chapter reviews theoretical foundations and empirical findings on pay 
disparities and offers hypotheses on such disparities among STEM faculty. In addition to 
this introduction, the chapter has three sections. Section 2.2 presents the common 
individual and disciplinary explanations for salary gaps among academics, and STEM 
faculty in particular where possible, in order to establish the foundation for the model 
presented later in the chapter. Section 2.2 reviews the “explained” portion of the salary 
gap—variation in achievements or human capital attributes—and then provides the most 
recent data on the unexplained portion of salary gaps among women and 
underrepresented minorities. The discussion situates STEM faculty pay within the higher 
education literature on pay equity among all academics given the more robust evidence in 
the higher education literature; however, the broader findings across academia may not 
always reflect the experiences in STEM given the greater gender imbalance and higher 
salaries found in most STEM disciplines. Then Section 2.2 attends to sources of salary 
variation often noted in the literature including marriage and family, negotiation ability, 
social capital, and discipline. Each of these salary predictors will be modeled in the 
dissertation; however, the hypotheses focus on institutional-level explanations of pay 
disparities among women and underrepresented minority STEM faculty. 
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Section 2.3 provides the theoretical basis for organizational influence on faculty 
pay and offers hypotheses on institutional-level determinants of pay disparities among 
STEM faculty. The dissertation hypothesizes that an institutional mission of diversity and 
access will lead to smaller pay disparities among STEM faculty, whereas competition 
among institutions will result in larger pay gaps. With regards to power, decentralization 
of salary-setting into the hands of autonomous department chairs will open the way for 
greater pay disparity among women and underrepresented minority faculty. Finally, 
Section 2.4 offers a summary model that incorporates these institutional determinants into 
the traditional pay equity models for three levels of salary determinants: 1) individual 
level factors (personal characteristics, human capital, and career advancement), 2) 
structural factors (gender composition of discipline), and 3) institutional level factors 
(mission, resources, and power). 
2.2 Foundations of Faculty Pay Disparities 
2.2.1 Human Capital Theory and Findings: Explained Salary Gaps 
Human capital refers to the skills and knowledge individuals possess due to education 
and training (Becker, 2008). According to human capital theory, earnings depend, in part, 
on education, training, and experience as these lead to increased productivity (Becker, 
1993). Workers invest in education and training in a rational manner, according to the 
theory, with an eye towards the rates of return to such investments. For example, older 
workers are less likely to engage in additional schooling compared with younger workers 
because the years of benefits from such additional schooling will be less for older 
workers. Likewise, the theory says, women will make lower human capital investments 
because of their more tenuous attachment to the labor market and will be rewarded less 
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than men accordingly. Thus, human capital theory arises from neoclassical economic 
theory in which the individual rationally attempts to maximize utility (Tan, 2014). Becker, 
Schultz, and Mincer in the 1960s and 1970s defined and explored the theory, examining 
the influence of years of education (formal training) and years of experience (informal 
training) on individual earnings as well as national economic growth (Sweetland, 1996). 
As expected in human capital theory, education, experience, and productivity 
influence faculty earnings in academia overall and in STEM disciplines. With increases 
in level of degree earned and years of experience, salaries rise among comparable faculty 
(Barbezat & Hughes, 2005; National Research Council, 2010; Perna, 2005; Toutkoushian, 
Bellas, & Moore, 2007; Tuckman, 1976; Umbach, 2007). Seniority or job tenure within 
one’s current institution also has positive effects on salary, albeit at a diminishing rate; 
however, this finding is less consistent in the literature than years of experience overall 
(Barbezat, 2004). Productivity as measured by higher levels of publications and 
administrative responsibilities increases salary, while the links between teaching and pay 
are consistently weaker if they exist at all (Barbezat & Hughes, 2001, 2005; National 
Research Council, 2010; Perna, 2005; Toutkoushian, et al., 2007; Tuckman, 1976; 
Umbach, 2007). Ability to attract grant funding, which can be viewed as a productivity 
measure, enhances salary as well (National Research Council, 2010; Umbach, 2007). 
Although human capital theory posits mobility as a benefit to earnings, Barbezat and 
Hughes (2001) found mobility in terms of number of positions to matter very little for 
faculty salaries in academia overall.  
Human capital attributes are generally agreed to be legitimate or acceptable 
factors for determining faculty pay (Ferber & Loeb, 2002; Fox, 1981). In scientific fields, 
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productivity, accompanied by originality and creativity, has long been exalted as defining 
worth (Cole & Cole, 1967; Merton, 1957), although more recent research has shown that 
determinations of productivity and merit themselves can be vague or biased (Fox, 2015). 
If faculty systematically vary in their human capital by gender and/or race, then their pay 
will vary systematically as well. This variation in salary among male and female faculty 
and by race due to human capital attributes is often termed the explained variation in 
salaries.  
Variations in human capital do explain a portion of the salary gaps between male 
and female faculty, as well as by race/ethnicity, in academia broadly. From the 1993 
National Study of Postsecondary Faculty, male faculty were more likely to be full 
professors or tenured, have more years of experience, and spend less time teaching and 
more time in administration (Nettles, Perna, & Bradburn, 2000). Each of those 
characteristics is positively related to salary. Asian and white faculty were more likely to 
be tenured or full professors, as well as more experienced (Nettles, et al., 2000). African-
American faculty devoted less time to research and were less likely to hold PhDs than 
white and Asian faculty. Hispanic faculty were more likely to work in two-year 
institutions, to be younger, and to have been in their current position for less time than 
white faculty. 
In STEM, white and Asian male faculty have a salary advantage, on average 
(National Science Foundation, 2015a); however, human capital variables explain a 
substantial portion of that advantage, similar to faculty in other disciplines. Women 
faculty in STEM are younger, less likely to hold top ranks, and more likely to spend 
longer times in lower ranks (National Research Council, 2010). Women in STEM have 
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traditionally trailed men in journal publications, though not in citation counts per article 
(reviewed in Ceci, et al., 2014). However, more recent data show no significant 
difference in productivity (Feeney & Welch, 2015). Grant-getting ability favors men in 
some instances, with women applying less frequently and men receiving larger grants 
(reviewed in Ceci, et al., 2014). 
Among underrepresented minorities, black faculty in STEM have proportionally 
more teaching positions, have smaller numbers of publications and patents, and are more 
often in historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) (National Science 
Foundation, 2015a, 2015b).  Black and Hispanic STEM faculty hold administrative 
positions in smaller proportions than whites, receive federal support in smaller 
proportions than both white and Asian faculty in S&E occupations, and achieve full 
professor rank in smaller proportions than white faculty (National Science Foundation, 
2015a). These lower levels of experience and productivity among women and 
underrepresented minorities explain a portion of the salary gap in STEM disciplines; 
however, as discussed below, some studies find gaps even after controlling for these 
human capital attributes. 
2.2.2 Limits of Human Capital Theory: Unexplained Salary Gaps 
Although human capital and productivity factors explain a portion of the variation in 
faculty salaries, the theory is not without criticism, especially as it relates to gender 
equity.  In the economic models of human capital theory, discrimination should not exist 
in the long-term since women would be substituted for men if their pay was lower 
(Toutkoushian, 2003). Pay would eventually equalize. However, such market forces have 
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not eliminated the earnings gap between male and female faculty, with few exceptions in 
the literature (Perna, 2003). As Toutkoushian (2003, p. 312) notes: 
The theories of labor economics have not adequately accounted for the fact that 
seemingly comparable men and women often receive different wages in academia. 
Is this due to the limitations of the model, or insufficient data on human capital 
attributes, or both? 
Perna (2003) notes that even if human capital factors explain salaries, such investments 
themselves may be discriminatory. For example, organizations may invest less in 
women’s training rather than women choosing to make lower investments. Academic 
rank and administrative experience—both human capital variables of experience—have 
been controversial as a legitimate explanatory variable, given that promotion policies and 
practices themselves may favor men (Ferber & Loeb, 2002). Further, these models rest on 
economic assumptions of perfect knowledge on the costs and benefits of additional 
education and training, carrying the limitations of those assumptions into the models (Tan, 
2014). Finally, although human capital attributes are considered legitimate factors, 
measuring those attributes can be subjective (Benschop & Brouns, 2003; Bridges & 
Nelson, 1989; Fox, 2015). 
For scientists, in particular, the human capital model of education, years of 
experience, and publication productivity fails to account for key individual and social 
aspects of scientific knowledge production (Bozeman, Dietz, & Gaughan, 2001). 
Bozeman and colleagues (2001) offer the scientific and technical human capital (S&T 
human capital) model as an expanded version of the traditional human capital model to 
better capture the experience of scientists. S&T human capital incorporates productivity 
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beyond publications (e.g., grants) and moves analysis to the group and network levels in 
recognition of the social, collaborative nature of scientific work. Thus, while traditional 
human capital and productivity are rewarded in faculty pay systems, including for STEM 
faculty, the traditional models do not fully explain the capabilities of faculty or the 
variation in their salaries. 
With few exceptions, scholars have found that male faculty have an unexplained 
salary advantage over comparable female faculty in academia overall (Barbezat, 2002; 
Nettles, et al., 2000; Perna, 2003; Toutkoushian, et al., 2007). Although the total average 
salary gap has remained around 20 percent, the unexplained or discriminatory gap has 
decreased from around 6 to 8 percentage points in the 1990s to 4 to 5 percentage points in 
more recent studies (Barbezat, 2002; Barbezat & Hughes, 2005). Controlling for human 
capital and disciplinary differences, Umbach (2007) observed a 6.8 percent or $5,400 
unexplained gender gap among faculty in Research I and II institutions. In one of the 
most recent single equation models, Toutkoushian and colleagues (2007) found a 3.9 
percent unexplained salary advantage for male faculty, controlling for race, marital status, 
human capital factors, and discipline. Again, these findings are for postsecondary 
education overall, and it is unclear whether the same level of disparities would be present 
in STEM disciplines given the greater gender imbalance. Additionally, the findings are 
dated due to the federal government ending the National Study of Postsecondary Faculty 
in 2004.  
While gender pay disparities are well-established in the higher education literature, 
our knowledge of racial pay disparities in academia is limited since the low minority 
representation makes statistical analysis difficult. In the few early institution-specific 
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studies relying on 1960s and 1970s data, African-American faculty were consistently 
found to have an average salary advantage, on the order of 7 to 13 percent (reviewed in 
Barbezat, 2002). The salary advantage was attributed to the small population of minority 
faculty, coupled with high demand due to the implementation of federal and institutional-
level anti-discrimination policies (Barbezat, 2002). Barbezat and Ashraf separately 
examined the changing racial pay gaps using national surveys across three decades and 
provide comparable results (reviewed in Barbezat, 2002). Their findings show a white 
salary advantage in the 1960s shifting to an insignificant difference or minority salary 
advantage in the 1970s and 1980s. 
These early studies relied on either African-American as the minority subgroup or 
“nonwhite” as an aggregate group, whereas more recent studies disaggregate 
race/ethnicity to offer mixed results. Using the 1993 National Study of Postsecondary 
Faculty (NSOPF:93), Nettles and colleagues (2000) disaggregated minorities and found 
no significant difference in salaries among white, black, Hispanic, and Asian faculty 
when controlling for other factors. However, Toutkoushian (1998) found mixed results 
using the same data by further disaggregating by gender. Compared to similar white 
female faculty, African-American women enjoyed an unexplained salary advantage. 
Hispanic and “other race” men experienced a salary disadvantage compared to white men. 
All other groups (black men, Hispanic women, Asian men and women, and other race 
women) did not have significantly different salaries than white faculty of the same gender. 
Using the NSOPF:99, Toutkoushian and colleagues (2007) found a 4.3 percent 
unexplained salary advantage for Asian faculty over white faculty and insignificant 
differences for African-American and Hispanic faculty compared to whites. Porter and 
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colleagues (2008) found a salary advantage for African American and Latino junior 
faculty in comprehensive institutions, yet not in other institutions; whereas white faculty 
combined (junior and senior) had an advantage in liberal arts colleges. Thus, among the 
few studies of racial pay gaps in postsecondary education overall, the findings vary 
considerably depending on the controls and aggregations.   
When controlling for human capital and productivity, the unexplained salary gap 
among men and women in STEM disciplines ranges from nonexistent to 5.5 percent in 
studies using data from 2001 to 2008 (Ceci, et al., 2014; Corley & Sabharwal, 2007; 
DesRoches, et al., 2010; Ginther, 2004; National Research Council, 2010; Porter, et al., 
2008). From the 1970s through the 1990s, male faculty held a persistent, but shrinking 
unexplained salary advantage over comparable STEM female faculty (National Academy 
of Sciences - National Research Council, 2001). Since the 1990s, the evidence is mixed 
and difficult to compare given the range of years, control variables, fields, and 
populations (Table 2.1). In a 2004 survey in Research I universities, the National 
Research Council (2010) found that men earn more than comparable women at the full 
professor rank in simple models controlling for academic age and discipline. However, 
when factors such as productivity, institutional prestige and type, and grant funding are 
included, the salary advantage loses its significance. Even in the simple models, assistant 
and associate professors demonstrate salary parity (National Research Council, 2010). 
Porter and colleagues (2008) observe an unexplained gender gap of 5.5 percent among 
STEM faculty—somewhat higher than the gap among arts, humanities, and social science 
faculty. However, among junior STEM faculty (those within the first three years of hire), 
the authors did not find a gender pay gap (Porter, et al., 2008). Focusing solely on life 
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sciences faculty, DesRoches and colleagues (2010) found an unexplained gender gap of 
more than $13,000 after controlling for productivity and other professional characteristics. 
Ginther (2004) finds an unexplained male salary advantage among STEM faculty, but 
more so at the full professor level. The ability of “observable characteristics” and 
productivity to explain some of the gap is sizeable, lowering the total pay gap from 
roughly 12 percent to an unexplained gender gap of 3.5 percent for full professors. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of Gender Salary Gaps in STEM 
Article Data 
years 
Fields Specific 
population 
Unexplained 
male 
advantage 
Data 
source 
Controls 
Ginther 
(2004) 
1986-
2001 
STEM Assistant 
and 
associate 
Less than 1% SDR "Observable 
characteristics" (Does 
not include 
productivity) 
2001 STEM All 2.0% SDR Same as above 
2001 STEM Full 3.5% SDR "Observable 
characteristics" and 
productivity 
Corley and 
Sabharwal 
(2007) 
2001 STEM All full-
time 
academics 
(includes 
adjunct) 
$2,833 SDR Citizenship status, 
institutional type, 
productivity, 
discipline, experience, 
rank, primary work 
activity 
Porter et al 
(2008) 
2004 Natural 
sciences 
and 
engineer-
ing 
 
All 5.5% NSOPF Citizenship status, 
race, education, 
experience, rank, 
productivity, 
institutional type 
Recently 
Hired 
Insignificant NSOPF Same as above 
National 
Research 
Council of 
the National 
Academies. 
(2010) 
2005 
 
Biology, 
engineer-
ing, math, 
chemistry
, physics 
 
Assistant 
and 
associate, 
R1 
Insignificant Survey Discipline, age 
Full, R1 8% Survey Same as above 
All, R1 Insignificant Survey Discipline, age, 
institutional prestige, 
grant funding, 
institutional type 
(public/private), rank, 
productivity 
DesRoches 
et al (2010) 
2007 Life 
sciences 
All $13,228 Survey  Productivity, rank, 
professional activities, 
race 
Kahn 
(2013) 
(reviewed in 
Ceci et al 
2014) 
2008 Engineeri
ng 
Tenure-
track 
2% SDR Unknown 
Kahn and 
Ginther 
(2012) 
1995-
2013 
Biomedic
ine 
Tenure-
track or 
tenured 
10.1% SDR PhD year, race, foreign 
born status, age at 
PhD, years since PhD, 
institutional ranking, 
funding in grad school 
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Although it is difficult to synthesize these findings given the varying populations 
and controls, the pattern of a greater gender salary gap at the full professor level seems 
clear. Porter and colleagues (2008) suggest that the finding may point to success in equity 
efforts in STEM, at least for new hires. Ginther (2004), however, notes the importance of 
years of experience in driving male/female salary differentials, which may help to explain 
the larger gap among full professors. Male full professors have more experience, which 
explains the largest portion of the salary gap between genders (Ginther 2004). 
Additionally, men receive higher rewards for each additional year of experience 
compared to women—meaning, variable rewards for experience helps drive men and 
women’s salaries further apart. Productivity, on the other hand, explained little of the 
salary gap among full professors. Ginther’s (2004) results echo earlier findings on 
“reward dualism,” wherein male and female academic scientists are both rewarded for 
achievements but at different rates (Fox, 1981).  
Similar studies of racial pay gaps for STEM faculty are scarce and typically fail to 
provide significant results given the small share of minority faculty. Basic data from the 
National Science Foundation (2015c) shows similar median salaries among racial groups 
for recent cohorts taking gender and academic age into account. The salary gap between 
Asian men and women in older cohorts is the most striking divergence. Scholarly 
research on minority STEM faculty often relate to issues of representation rather than 
salary equity and tend to offer qualitative accounts of experiences (Ginther & Kahn, 
2012). In reviewing 252 publications from 1988 to 2007 on faculty of color in all 
disciplines, Turner and colleagues (Turner, Gonzalez, & Wood, 2008) identify five 
related to salary equity, none of which directly speak to salaries among minority STEM 
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faculty. Since that time, three studies examined racial pay gaps among faculty in various 
STEM fields using data from 1995 to 2004 and found insignificant results (DesRoches, et 
al., 2010; Palepu, Carr, Friedman, Ash, & Moskowitz, 2000; Porter, et al., 2008). 
Foreign-born STEM faculty (including tenured, tenure-track, and adjunct) earned $1,188 
less than U.S.-born faculty on average, controlling for gender, experience, institutional 
type, primary work activity, discipline, rank, and productivity based on the 2001 SDR 
(Corley & Sabharwal, 2007).  
 In summary, human capital and productivity factors explain a portion of the salary 
gap among STEM faculty, similar to other faculty, but fail to account for the entire gap at 
least among male and female full professors. The following discussion reviews 
explanations for the salary gap not attributable to human capital, looking at additional 
individual characteristics, as well as disciplinary differences in pay.   
2.2.3 Alternative Individual Explanations to Human Capital 
Beyond human capital and productivity, individual characteristics purported to contribute 
to career disparities among faculty are marital status, family status, negotiating ability 
and social capital. These influences typically offer a gendered perspective, but can relate 
to race as well. If spouses and children place greater mobility and time constraints on 
women, then outcomes could vary by gender. If men negotiate better than women, then 
salary advantages can be cemented from the first job. If genders or racial groups have 
varied social capital through networks, then outcomes may vary as well. These concerns 
are prevalent in studies on gender representation in STEM given the potential link to 
preferences on entering and exiting the pipeline (Ceci, et al., 2014); however, such 
individual characteristics are less studied as they relate to salary among STEM faculty. 
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The following discussion reviews evidence on marriage, parenthood, negotiation and 
social capital on pay from the STEM literature. 
2.2.3.1 Marriage and Children 
Marriage and children are thought to influence salary in complex ways, through both 
premiums and penalties across genders (Kelly & Grant, 2012). Explanations of the role of 
marriage among academics in general, include: 1) men receive “family wages,” 2) 
women become geographically constrained, 3) colleges expect women’s income to be 
secondary, and 4) men receive support from marriage that increases productivity 
(Toutkoushian, et al., 2007). For women, having children may result in reduced work 
hours, further restricted mobility, or gaps in employment—all of which may contribute to 
lower salaries (National Research Council, 2010). Given these explanations, we would 
expect to see salary disadvantages for married females with children, in particular, along 
with salary advantages for married men. 
Although marriage and family are often cited as barriers to women in science 
(National Research Council, 2010; Williams & Ceci, 2012), the direct link to salaries 
appears tenuous. Broadly in higher education, marriage/cohabitation brings a salary 
advantage (Toutkoushian, et al., 2007). Toutkoushian and colleagues (2007) found a 
similar advantage for women and men in academia overall, which contradicts earlier 
findings of negative consequences for married women. Within STEM in the 1990s, 
Ginther (2003) found a marriage premium for men, as well as positive effects on salary 
from parenthood for both men and women. Ginther (2003) finds a 1.7 percent gap among 
full professors due to parenthood. She concludes: “Overall, I cannot attribute the gender 
salary gap to women’s preferences for children” (Ginther, 2003, p. 24). More recently, 
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Kelly and Grant (2012) find similar salaries for married mothers, single childless men, 
and single fathers compared to married fathers in STEM fields, due in part to controls for 
productivity. The greatest disparity identified was single childless women, who earn 9.2 
percent less than married fathers in STEM controlling for academic age, administrative 
duties, institutional type, and productivity (Kelly & Grant, 2012). These findings 
contradict women’s overall labor market experience wherein men and childless women 
out-earn comparable women with children (Goldin, 2014). 
An issue with these cross-sectional studies is that they capture the women who 
have persisted, and thus bias results towards women who did not leave academia due to 
family considerations (Feeney & Welch, 2015; Fox, 2005). Fox (2005, p. 142) notes the 
possibility that female STEM faculty in doctoral-granting universities who have young 
children may have “strong stamina for and commitment to research” and comprise a 
“super-select” group of academics wherein the presence of children increases 
productivity. Interestingly, female STEM faculty with preschool-aged children 
demonstrated the highest productivity, suggesting nuance in the relationship between 
productivity and family status beyond just the presence of children (Fox, 2005). Although 
marriage and parenthood appear to be working in the opposite (i.e., positive) direction 
than expected for female STEM faculty salaries, those statuses may yet contribute to the 
overall salary gap between genders. In a 1994 survey of full-time STEM faculty, Fox 
(2005) found that men were more likely to be married (86% compared to 62% of women) 
and to be a parent (79% compared to 48% of women). Thus, if marriage and parenthood 
bring greater rewards, perhaps through the increased productivity that Fox finds 
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associated with those statuses, then men are more likely to reap those rewards given their 
greater concentrations in marriage and parenthood.  
2.2.3.2 Negotiation Ability 
Academic salaries are negotiated agreements. If negotiation ability varies by gender or 
race, then such abilities may be contributing to the unexplained salary gap among 
academics. The concern around negotiation stems from the importance of starting salaries 
in the academic system, which often relies on incremental growth thereafter. One group 
of scholars provide the adage for academic salaries: “The intercept is negotiable, but the 
slope is fixed” (Warman, Woolley, & Worswick, 2010, p. 368). The common perception 
is that men are better negotiators than women. Personality traits, such as niceness versus 
antagonism, are said to be at play in negotiation with gender divides across traits (Bowles, 
Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Mueller & Plug, 2006). In recent popular culture, the “Lean In” 
phenomenon has advanced the notion that women have failed to be as aggressive or bold 
in career pursuits, including salary negotiations (Sandberg & Scovell, 2013). The 
American Association of University Women (2015) offers seminars in negotiating tactics 
for females, citing their belief that improving such skills will reduce the gender gap. 
Babcock and colleagues (2003) review several of their own studies as well as others 
employing varied groups outside of academia, which consistently show men negotiate 
more frequently and enjoy more benefits from negotiations than women do. Women ask 
less often, make smaller asks, and concede more quickly (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). 
Additionally, women may experience negative consequences or backlash from 
negotiating (Bowles, et al., 2007). 
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Although there is evidence of a male negotiating advantage broadly, other 
research has shown inconsistent results, leading negotiation scholars to argue for deeper 
contextual accounts (Small, Babcock, Gelfand, & Gettman, 2007). Information 
availability can influence the gender gap in negotiation, thus there may be industry 
differences given varying levels of salary transparency (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). 
For higher education, at least public institutions, salary information should be more 
readily available than in other industries. Thus, we might expect that male and female 
negotiation levels are more on par in academia. 
Female academics report similar rates of negotiation—and somewhat higher in at 
least one study—as their male colleagues across the few studies on the issue (Crothers et 
al., 2010; De Riemer, Quarles, & Temple, 1982; Feeney & Welch, 2015; Mitchell & 
Hesli, 2013). De Riemer and colleagues (1982) found female assistant professors attempt 
initial salary negotiations at a slightly lower rate than male faculty; however, they 
demonstrate similar rates for pursuing salary increases thereafter. Success rates among 
men and women faculty were similar for initial negotiations and somewhat higher for 
women in later salary increases. More recently, female STEM faculty in research 
intensive/extensive universities reported higher levels of negotiation on their first job 
offers, as well as higher rates of success in such negotiations (Feeney & Welch, 2015). 
Also in academia, outside offers can play an important role in salary renegotiations as 
faculty leverage offers to negotiate with their current institutions (Ceci, et al., 2014). The 
pursuit of outside offers may contribute to gender pay gaps in academia; however, the 
evidence is mixed. Blackaby and colleagues (2005) report that female economists in the 
UK pursue outside offers less frequently and generate lower pay-off from such offers. In 
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contrast, the National Research Council (2010) finds similar levels of self-reported 
outside offers among men and women in STEM disciplines. In summary, although 
negotiating ability is commonly thought to affect the gender pay gap, the evidence is less 
compelling in academia than in the labor market as a whole. 
2.2.3.3 Social Capital 
Human capital’s inability to explain fully the salary gaps among faculty opens the way 
for other forms of capital to aid in explanation. Like human capital’s returns from 
investment in education, social capital relates to “investment in social relations with 
expected returns” (N. Lin, 1999, p. 30).2 Social capital in the form of networks influences 
career outcomes such as job mobility, promotion, satisfaction, and earnings through 
access to resources and information (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Boxman, De Graaf, & Flap, 
1991; Granovetter, 1983; Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart, 2000). Thus, when networks vary by 
gender and/or race, they can contribute to cumulative advantage by presenting additional 
opportunities to certain groups (Belle, Smith-Doerr, & O'Brien, 2014). 
As mentioned in the discussion on human capital (Section 2.2.2), scholars 
recognize social capital as a fundamental component of scientific work and knowledge 
production (Bozeman, et al., 2001). Bozeman and Mangematin (2004, p. 565) highlight 
the importance of social capital and collaboration in the science and engineering fields, 
saying social networks and human capital are the “two pillars supporting scientists’ and 
engineers’ ability to contribute knowledge.” Networks are present in STEM faculty’s 
conferences, journals, grant awards, and career trajectories (Bozeman & Mangematin, 
                                                          
2
 The discussion here relies on the individual as an analytic approach, following on Lin (1999) and others; 
however, networks are studied from a variety of levels including organizational (see (Whittington & Smith-
Doerr, 2008)) for example of hierarchical versus networked structures and implications for women 
scientists’ productivity). 
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2004) and show some variation by race and gender (Belle, et al., 2014; Feeney & Welch, 
2009; Pinheiro & Melkers, 2011). 
STEM faculty with larger close collaboration networks and those with greater 
numbers of external collaborators in the network have higher levels of journal article 
publication (Feeney & Welch, 2009). Underrepresented minority STEM faculty have 
more external collaborators and produce fewer publications per internal tie than white 
male faculty, suggesting a need to find support outside their home institution (Pinheiro & 
Melkers, 2011). For STEM faculty in research intensive/extensive universities, women 
have larger networks that have more external ties, senior collaborators, and women 
(Feeney & Welch, 2015). Network structures did not significantly influence salary 
differences between men and women in a cross-section of their outcomes in one study; 
however, the network structures did influence salary change over time (Feeney & Welch, 
2015). Men’s social capital—such as network size and number of senior collaborators—
translates into higher rewards over time, while women do not experience the same salary 
increase over time from higher levels of social capital (Feeney & Welch, 2015). This 
preliminary work connecting STEM faculty networks to salary suggests that social ties 
may be an overlooked aspect explaining faculty salaries.  
2.2.4 The Discipline: Structural Theory and Findings 
Moving from the individual-level to the occupation-level, academic fields vary 
substantially in salaries, with STEM faculty being some of the top earners. In 2009-2010, 
for example, engineers at large public institutions earned an average salary 25 percent 
higher than the average salary of English professors at the full professor rank and 42 
percent higher at the assistant rank (American Association of University Professors, 
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2011). Disciplinary differences in pay contribute to the total salary gap between male and 
female faculty in academic overall given the concentration of women in lower-paying 
disciplines. 
Sociologists argue non-market forces exist that segment the labor market into 
more and less highly valued positions and tasks, with rewards following the value system 
and creating inequities (Perna, 2003). In higher education, segmentation occurs through 
the categorization of full-time and part-time faculty, as well as by discipline (Perna, 
2003). These segmentations can create inequities as movement between full-time and 
part-time positions or across fields is limited. Stratification or structural theory suggests, 
and empirical findings support, that such segmentation of the labor market creates 
gendered roles, with women filling lower status positions and disciplines (Bellas, 1997). 
This sex segregation of jobs has greater influence on certain career outcomes than an 
individual’s sex (Reskin & Bielby, 2005).  
Studies of disciplinary differences in academic salaries show an average pay 
advantage for both male and female faculty in low-female disciplines (Bellas, 1994, 1997; 
Umbach, 2007). Average salaries by discipline were 0.3 percent lower with each 
percentage point increase in female faculty among Research I and II institutions in 2004 
(Umbach, 2007). Similarly, the gender composition of institutions and  institutional units 
(teaching, administrative, and service units) can influence gender pay disparities (Fox, 
1985; Umbach, 2008). Although racial compositions have not been examined in 
academia, at least one study of state government employees attributed 21 percent of the 
racial pay gap to the racial composition of the job (Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993). 
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Whereas gender, race, marital status, and certain other individual characteristics 
are not seen as legitimate salary determinants, discipline has been viewed as a legitimate 
factor in salary differences by some researchers. Ferber and Loeb (2002) include 
discipline along with human capital and productivity factors as valid variables to include 
in an institutional salary equity study. The authors note that disciplines have different 
external labor market pressures that must be taken into account in such institution-
specific studies. However, such labor market forces do not fully account for the gender 
inequities across disciplines and can themselves draw in structural imbalances occurring 
outside academia (Bellas, 1994; Marschke, 2004). Acknowledging this, Ferber and Loeb 
(2002, p. 45) conclude: “Thus, while believing that academic discipline must be 
controlled in any salary-equity study, we also suggest that an institution that differentiates 
salaries according to discipline might examine in a separate study whether the degree of 
differentiation it practices is entirely justifiable.” Going further, advocates of comparable 
worth strategies argue for raising wages in female-dominated jobs through job 
evaluations that diminish bias arising from market forces (Bellas, 1994; England, 1999).  
Although studies focused on gender composition in academia offer insight into 
structural barriers, they do not fully address the labor market segmentation that occurs. 
They do not account for institutional variation that can offer another level of 
segmentation. Further, the existing literature does not provide comparison across STEM 
disciplines. There is a spectrum of representation within STEM. Women comprise 23.4 
percent of full professors in life sciences and only 7.5 percent in engineering (Table 9-23, 
Survey of Doctorate Recipients, 2013). Thus, the effect of gender composition on salary 
across STEM disciplines remains an outstanding question. 
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2.3 Explaining the Unexplained: Organizational Influences on Pay 
Institutional types offer another segmentation of the academic labor market that, similar 
to discipline, can be difficult to traverse and can contribute to pay gaps among faculty in 
concert with the individual-level human capital variations.
3
 Scholars include institutional 
variables to control for effects on salaries, finding salary advantages for faculty in 
research-oriented, private, unionized, and more prestigious institutions (Barbezat, 1989; 
Barbezat & Hughes, 2001; Rippner & Toutkoushian, 2015; Toutkoushian, et al., 2007; 
Tuckman, 1976). Women and underrepresented minorities are disproportionately located 
at less-research intensive institutions, thus explaining a portion of the total salary gap 
(National Research Council, 2010; National Science Foundation, 2015a). Although it is 
clear that research intensity of an institution brings a pay advantage, it is less clear how 
the pay disparities among institutional types compare. Further, are there meaningful 
categorizations of institutions beyond research intensity when it comes to pay equity 
among women and underrepresented minorities in STEM? 
This section offers three categorizations of institutions: 1) organizational identity, 
2) organizational resources, and 3) level of decentralization in salary setting. The section 
begins with an overview of the traditional categorization of institutions—the Carnegie 
classification based on research intensity. Then, the three alternative categorizations are 
discussed and hypothesized with regard to how each categorization may influence pay 
disparities among women and underrepresented minority faculty in STEM. 
  
                                                          
3
 This discussion is on public and nonprofit four year colleges and universities. Other categories, which will 
not be discussed, are community colleges and for-profit institutions. 
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2.3.1 Growth and Classification of U.S. Higher Education Institutions 
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education began its classification system of U.S. 
post-secondary institutions in the 1970s to provide scholars with a means of accounting 
for institutional diversity in higher education research (The Carnegie Classification of 
Institutions of Higher Education, n.d.). The basic Carnegie classification captures the 
varying levels of research intensity across higher education. Scholars within the pay 
equity literature typically rely on Research, Masters, and Baccalaureate levels. Among 
the more than 4,600 higher education institutions in the U.S., almost 40 percent of 
institutions fall within those three categories (297 research, 724 masters, and 810 
baccalaureate) (The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2010). 
Doctoral-granting or research institutions confer at least 20 research/scholarship doctoral 
degrees annually (The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2010). 
Masters colleges award at least 50 masters degrees annually, but fewer than 20 research 
doctorates. Finally, baccalaureate colleges award at least half of their degrees at the 
bachelor’s level, but confer fewer than 20 doctorates or 50 master’s degrees annually. 
Broadly, research universities are more selective, receive the majority of federal research 
support, and have larger budgets and endowments (Bok, 2013). Masters institutions are 
less selective, more diverse, and more often public (Bok, 2013). Baccalaureate 
institutions are often private with small student bodies. Liberal arts colleges—a subset of 
baccalaureate colleges—focus on undergraduate education in a residential setting 
(Oakley, 2005). 
The Carnegie classification captures the diversity of higher education institutions, 
which have evolved in the U.S. to serve varied, yet overlapping purposes. Bok (2013) 
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points to three main movements that advanced higher education beyond institutions 
focused on the moral and professional training of the elite—1) the advent of vocational 
training and degrees during the Industrial Revolution, 2) the establishment of a research 
orientation and PhD programs based on the German model at Johns Hopkins in 1876, and 
3) the push for a humanities focus through liberal arts education. Prior to WWII, some 
institutions focused on a single purpose; however, following the war, institutions began to 
assume multiple purposes among those three (professional/vocational education, research, 
and liberal arts education) (Bok, 2013; Weisbrod, Ballou, & Asch, 2008). Two additional 
aims in more recent years have been economic development and service or technical 
assistance (Bok, 2013). 
 Faculty life varies among the institutional types, even as the institutions now have 
overlapping purposes (Wolf-Wendel & Ward, 2006). Although research, teaching, and 
service are faculty roles across settings, the institutional types place different emphases 
on those roles. Generally, teaching loads at universities can be half the load found at four-
year colleges (Clark, 1987). In universities, faculty may teach or research exclusively, or 
do both, while also taking on consulting work and/or administrative work (Weisbrod, et 
al., 2008). A university professor can become “a professional man with his home office 
and basic retainer on the campus of the multiversity but with his clients scattered from 
coast to coast” (Kerr, 2001, p. 33). Faculty teaching at the university level may teach only 
graduates, while those in a four-year college may teach only undergraduates. Further, the 
university faculty can often shift a portion of the teaching duties—such as grading—to 
teaching assistants, thereby freeing more time for research (Clark, 1987). 
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Scientific fields contributed greatly to the divergent institutional types discussed 
above and offer clear evidence of variation in faculty life. The Morrill Act and the 
founding of the Department of Agriculture (both in 1862) began the land-grant college 
system that would become state universities and prompted agricultural and mechanical 
research at these institutions (Fox, 2008). Scientific fields led the way forward in 
specialization and graduate education and away from religious training of the original 
colleges (Fox, 2008). Following WWII, the federal funding of research further separated 
the work of universities and colleges, as universities (particularly the elite ones) shifted 
greater attention to research and graduate education (Weisbrod, et al., 2008). 
Although graduate education, specialization, and research funding are associated 
with universities, academic scientists reside in all institutional types. Sixty-five percent of 
science, engineering, and health (SEH) doctorate holders employed full-time in academia 
are in research universities, while about 28 percent are in master’s or baccalaureate 
institutions (National Science Foundation, 2015a).
4
 Ruscio (1987) finds deep connections 
between selective liberal arts colleges and research universities as students matriculate 
from the colleges to graduate education in STEM fields at universities. This connection 
demonstrates the teaching differences—preparation of undergraduates at selective liberal 
arts colleges and preparation of undergraduates and graduates at the university level. For 
research, scientists in universities are more likely to receive external funding, providing 
access to laboratories and equipment that are often out of reach for scientists in the liberal 
arts setting (Ruscio, 1987). Research universities include research centers with teams of 
scientists and an administrative arm, while research among liberal arts scientists is more 
                                                          
4
 These figures include all full-time employees in academia who hold doctorates in science, engineering, 
and health fields. It potentially overstates the share of faculty in research universities given that the figures 
include postdoctorates and research assistants. 
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individualized (Ruscio, 1987). Finally, scientists in liberal arts colleges frame research as 
being a part of their work for students. 
Among the few studies of pay disparities across institutional types, the gender pay 
gap is higher for research institutions than for liberal arts and master’s institutions 
(Barbezat & Hughes, 2005; Lee & Won, 2014; National Academy of Sciences - National 
Research Council, 2001; Tolbert, 1986; Toutkoushian, 1998b). Porter and colleagues 
(2008) stand out as finding similar unexplained gender pay gaps of around 5 percent 
across institutional types, except for junior faculty who experience a greater gender gap 
in Research I institutions. In the one study examining race, the research intensity pattern 
does not hold, with insignificant racial pay disparities at most institutional types (Porter, 
et al., 2008). The exceptions were African American and Latino junior faculty 
experiencing a salary advantage in comprehensive institutions, yet not in other 
institutions; and, white faculty combined (junior and senior) experiencing higher salaries 
in liberal arts colleges than comparable non-white faculty. For STEM disciplines, the 
gender pay gap was larger at doctoral and research institutions in the 1970s through 
1990s compared to liberal arts and master’s institutions (National Academy of Sciences - 
National Research Council, 2001). The more recent STEM faculty pay study by the 
National Research Council was confined to Research I institutions; and thus, we have a 
20 year gap since the 1995 findings. 
Pfeffer and Ross (1990) offer the explanation that institutional differences in 
salary setting among the Carnegie classification types are due to the increasing 
complexity of work as research intensity grows. Described as a “multiversity” by Kerr 
(2001), modern universities are comprised of many communities, many purposes, and 
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many constituencies, making performance measurement difficult (Weisbrod, et al., 2008). 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, liberal arts faculty demonstrate the most consensus 
on criteria for scholarship (Oakley, 2005). Thus building on Hickson’s (1971) conception 
of uncertainty and substitutability, the greater task uncertainty at research institutions 
brings more complexity to performance evaluation, perhaps allowing discrimination to 
occur. Since it has been well-established that pay disparities vary by research intensity, 
such institutional influences will not be re-hypothesized but will be taken into account in 
the dissertation models. 
The argument of this dissertation is that other institutional factors may influence 
pay disparities among women and minority STEM faculty beyond the traditional 
Carnegie classification. The Carnegie Classification offers the rational organizational 
logic of higher education institutions based on their activities, but fails to cover fully the 
breadth of organizational differences. The Carnegie Foundation itself notes that the 
Carnegie Classification “was not intended to be the last word on institutional 
differentiation” and, further, that “the host of intangibles that constitute institutional 
identity could not possibly be incorporated into an empirically based classification system” 
(McCormick & Zhao, 2005). 
2.3.2 Institutional Identity 
Academic reward structures may be formed under institutional pressures that cross 
Carnegie classification boundaries. Institutional theory explains the structure of 
organizations—and higher education institutions, in particular, given their unclear 
goals—as expressions of legitimacy, myth, ceremony, and mimicry (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Isomorphism occurs as organizations appropriate 
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practices from the institutional environment, thus moving organizations to a similar 
structure regardless of purpose (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Higher education institutions 
falling into a particular Carnegie category might still implement policies and practices 
that mimic other institutional types. For example, certain comprehensive or masters 
institutions are called “striving” as they push faculty to publish in hopes the institution 
will become a research university (Bok, 2013; Gardner, 2013; O'Meara, 2007; Wolf-
Wendel & Ward, 2006). Fairweather (1993) found all institutional types to mimic the 
research university in valuing research over teaching in reward structures. 
Although institutions may mimic research universities in rewarding research, it is 
unclear whether institutional pressures also work in the opposite direction. Do certain 
organizational identities lead institutions to seek pay equity? Organizational identity has 
been defined as the “central, distinctive, and enduring” features of the organization 
(Albert & Whetten, 1985, p. 265). In the labor market broadly, an organization’s identity 
can influence the conditions within the organization, including conditions between 
genders (Fagenson, 1990). In conceiving of an organizational identity that would relate to 
treatment of women and underrepresented minorities in higher education, the mission to 
serve those populations offers a core, stable, and distinctive identity compared to other 
institutions.  
Women’s colleges and historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) have 
distinct mission-driven identities compared to other institutions. Women’s colleges 
originated in the mid-1800s and have had a continued, albeit shrinking presence since 
that time (Women's College Coalition, 2015). The U.S. has 43 women’s colleges, down 
from 230 institutions in 1960 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2015a; Women's 
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College Coalition, 2015). These are all private institutions with undergraduate 
enrollments generally under 3,000 students (National Center for Education Statistics, 
2015a). Although there are not studies comparing pay disparities at women’s colleges to 
other institutions, one study examined salary data for a single women’s college over 29 
years (Berheide, Christenson, Linden, & Bray, 2013). The data displayed a persistent 
male salary advantage; however, the gender gap remained only for full professors in 2013 
after equity raises resolved the disparity at the assistant and associate ranks. The authors 
speculate the remaining gap for full professors is due in part to women’s slower progress 
to promotion to full professor. 
HBCUs offer another mission-driven identity based on opening access to higher 
education and have been of particular interest to STEM scholars due to the institutions’ 
contributions to the STEM pipeline (Stage, Lundy-Wagner, & John, 2013). By definition, 
HBCUs are institutions created between the Civil War and 1964 with the principle 
mission of serving African American students (Gasman, 2013). These institutions 
remained the only option for black students, for the most part, until the 1960s (Gasman, 
2013). In 2014, more than 300,000 students attended 106 HBCUs (Toldson & Cooper, 
2014). The mission is consistent across HBCUs as attested by their inclusion in the 
institutional category; however, the institutions differ substantially in several ways. 
Thirty-one HBCUs enrolled fewer than 1,000 students in 2013, while three institutions 
enrolled more than 10,000 students (Toldson & Cooper, 2014). About two-thirds of 
HBCUs have selective admissions, while one-third have open admissions. In comparing 
pay gaps at HBCUs and predominately white institutions (PWIs), Renzulli and colleagues 
(2006) argue that HBCUs should demonstrate greater equity based on their historical 
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focus on inclusion. They find a smaller gender pay gap for associate professors; however, 
elite HBCUs show greater similarity to PWIs than non-elite HBCUs (Renzulli, et al., 
2006). 
Whereas women’s colleges and HBCUs have a mission identity associated with a 
particular underserved population, other institutional categories serve minority 
populations without the mission-driven designation. Hispanic-Serving Institutions (HSI) 
and Predominately-Black Institutions (PBI) are defined in federal law based on 
composition (25 percent Hispanic and 40 percent black, respectively) (National Center 
for Education Statistics, 2015b). Institutions can gain or lose HSI or PBI designation 
depending on enrollment changes, thus making the group less cohesive than mission-
driven minority-serving institutions (Contreras, Malcom, & Bensimon, 2008). Contreras 
and colleagues (2008, p. 74) point to the “unplanned and unstable nature” and 
“manufactured identity” of HSIs, leading the scholars to examine whether HSI missions 
reflect the designation. In examining mission statements of 10 HSIs, the authors found 
that while none explicitly mention HSI status, they all included at least one of following 
keywords: “diversity/diverse, culture/multicultural, and access” (Contreras, et al., 2008, p. 
76). Actual mention of HSI designation appeared on institutional websites in discussing 
Title V programs and initiatives.  
Although HSI and PBI institutions offer categorizations of minority-serving 
institutions and thus show some similarities to women’s colleges and HBCUs, the 
question of interest here is the influence of an organization’s history and identity of 
inclusion on pay equity.
5
 Thus, the dissertation focuses on mission-driven focus on 
                                                          
5
 Tribal Colleges are another category of institutions; however, they are predominately two-year institutions. 
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inclusion in keeping with institutional theory rather than gender or racial composition of 
the institutions, which would follow structural theory. The hypothesis is:   
H1a: Pay disparities among STEM faculty will be lower in institutions with a 
mission of serving underrepresented groups. 
The categorization of public and private institutions offers another lens of 
institutional culture, history, and policies that goes beyond the Carnegie classification of 
research intensity. In examining higher education mission statements, Morphew and 
Hartley (2006) found that institutional control (i.e., public/private status) mattered more 
than research intensity. Public institutions were more similar to each other in their 
espoused purposes regardless of institutional type, and likewise private institutions to 
other private institutions. Mission statements for public institutions more frequently 
included diversity and service to local communities, while private institutions more 
frequently noted religious affiliation and liberal arts education. Public institutions have a 
mission of access; however, the decline in public funding has led some public institutions 
to move toward a private model, wherein tuition and selectivity are more highly regarded 
(Benefits of Institutional Diversity, 2013).  
The public/private dichotomy has a long history in the organizational and public 
administration literature (Rainey & Bozeman, 2000). Generally, the public sector has 
been characterized as more egalitarian, transparent, and regulated in terms of hiring, 
promotion and rewards (Goodsell, 2015; Mandel & Semyonov, 2014). While studies 
have shown differences between public and private organizations, those differences are 
subject to the sector (Rainey, 2011)—meaning, they may or may not be generalizable to 
higher education. In the labor market broadly, the gender pay gap is lower in the public 
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sector; however, the public sector’s shrinking gap stagnated in 2000 while the private 
sector’s gap continued to lessen (Mandel & Semyonov, 2014). In academia, Tolbert 
(1986) found greater gender pay disparity in private institutions, arguing that private 
institutions are insulated and therefore can discriminate. It is unclear whether Tolbert’s 
findings in the 1980s will continue to hold today, particularly in the STEM disciplines. 
Recent research has shown benefits to women scientists’ productivity from being in 
private organizations that use a team-based or network approach compared to a more 
formalized, bureaucratic public organization (Whittington & Smith-Doerr, 2008). 
However, the comparison for this dissertation will be public to private, nonprofit 
institutions within a single industry—higher education—rather than public organizations 
to private industry. Thus, the hypothesis will rely on traditional conceptions of public 
sector organizations as more equitable. While this hypothesis draws on organizational 
mission of access, it should be noted that another explanation could be the greater 
personnel constraints generally found in the public sector (Rainey, 2011): 
H1b: Pay disparities among STEM faculty will be greater in private institutions 
than in public institutions. 
2.3.3 Organizational Budgeting 
Reward structures may vary across institution types due to research complexity and 
institutional identity, but salary-setting is also part of an organizational budgetary 
decision-making process. Thus, organizational resources, as well as power to employ 
those resources, may also explain a portion of salary inequality. In decision-making 
processes, organizations cope with uncertainty and instability, as problems, participants, 
and solutions shift in and out of the process (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). In addition, 
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participants bring conflicting goals and priorities, thus making rational decision-making 
difficult (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). The uncertainty and 
instability in decision-making processes creates the opportunity for other factors—such 
as power—to enter into budgetary processes. Resource dependency theory states that 
organizations are open systems dependent on flows of resources (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1974). Organizational subunits derive their power through their ability to generate 
external resources, and in turn, use that power to acquire additional internal resources. 
Findings at the disciplinary, departmental, and individual level show that the acquisition 
of external resources (e.g., grant-getting ability) influences resource allocation (National 
Research Council, 2010; Umbach, 2007; Volk, Slaughter, & Thomas, 2001). 
The concern over resources has been a dominant theme in higher education 
discussions in recent decades. State and local support for higher education per full-time 
equivalent peaked in 2001 in constant dollars (State Higher Education Executive Officers 
Association, 2014). State and local support in FY 2014 remained below levels in FY 
2009, in nominal dollars. Looking to the past 25 years, inflation-adjusted state and local 
support per FTE declined by 24 percent. Tuition has bridged that gap, with 107 percent 
growth in public institutions’ tuition in constant dollars over the 25 year period. Even for 
private institutions, which are less reliant on state and local support, funding concerns are 
prevalent given pressures for affordable or competitive tuitions and recessionary-hits to 
endowments and giving (Ehrenberg, 2011). The following discussion offers hypotheses 
on the influence of organizational resources and power on faculty pay at the institutional-
level. 
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2.3.3.1 Organizational Resources 
Institutions compete for prestige in order to garner resources—in part to attract star 
faculty and further bolster their reputation (Bok, 2013; Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002). 
Research universities receiving the lion’s share of federal grant support have been called 
“Federal Grant Universities” (Kerr, 2001; Thelin, 2013), while selective and financially-
stable liberal arts have been termed “medallion colleges” (Lapovsky, 2005). Masters 
institutions also demonstrate this division, with certain institutions being termed “striving 
institutions” as they attempt to move to the research university level through such means 
as faculty recruitment (O'Meara, 2007). In contrast, the regional or metropolitan masters 
institutions are less concerned with prestige (Bok, 2013; Wolf-Wendel & Ward, 2006). 
Thus, within each Carnegie classification institutional type there exists a range of 
institutions that are competing for prestige and top faculty both within and across 
institutional types. These well-funded institutions are aggressive in faculty recruitment, 
leading less-resourced institutions to increase salaries to keep top faculty (Duderstadt, 
2000). 
Categorizing institutions by their financial resources is another grouping that 
might help identify the span of inequity across institutional types. Ehrenberg (2011, p. 15) 
argues that wealth sets certain institutions into “a world of their own,” given their ability 
to hire and retain tenured faculty. Endowment size explains more than 75 percent of the 
variance in average faculty salaries in private research universities and more than 80 
percent in private liberal arts institutions (Ehrenberg, 2003). Within public universities, 
endowment size matters as well to average salary; however, the level of state 
appropriations per student influences average salaries more (Ehrenberg, 2003). Ehrenberg 
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and Smith (2003) further find that those institutions with the largest endowments per 
student receive larger private gifts and invest such gifts back into the endowment at a 
higher rate, possibly creating an escalating gap between institutions in terms of 
endowment resources in coming years and thus ability to pay faculty. 
Tolbert (1986) examined the influence of total institutional resources as a measure 
of slack resources, hypothesizing that slack resources would allow an institution to 
discriminate in faculty salary-setting due to the insulation and security those slack 
resources provided. Indeed, she found that wealthier institutions, as measured by 
revenues per student, demonstrated a larger gender gap in earnings. Pfeffer and Ross 
(1990) measured resources through factors constructed from several ratios—faculty per 
student, budget per student, staff per student, budget per faculty, and staff per faculty—
but did not find significant impacts of resources on gender equity among college 
administrators in cross-sectional models. However, in longitudinal analysis, faculty 
resources (budget per faculty and staff per faculty) contributed to male salary advantage, 
leading the authors to assert a slack resources argument. The hypothesis is: 
H2a: Pay disparities among STEM faculty will be higher in institutions with 
greater institutional resources. 
Alexander (2001) argues that competition for top faculty relies on an institution’s 
ability to raise private funds from which they can provide competitive salaries. Thus, it 
may not be only the level of wealth but also the mix of resources that influences faculty 
salaries. Again, certain institutions are pulling away from each other in private funding, 
leading Kerr (2001, p. 188) to prophesize that the “federal research grant university” will 
one day be the “private grant university.” This issue of private resources is particularly 
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relevant at research-oriented institutions, given their history of larger endowments, 
greater ability to raise tuition, and stronger links with government and industry research 
support (Geiger, 2009). 
Higher education institutions are characterized as public or private; however, both 
types of institutions rely on public and private support (Geiger, 2009). At public, four-
year institutions, the revenue composition is 22 percent from tuition, 4 percent from 
investments, 38 percent from government sources, and 36 percent from other sources 
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2015c). At private, nonprofit four-year 
institutions, those breakdowns are 32 percent from tuition, 19 percent from investments, 
13 percent from government sources, and 36 percent from other sources. As Duderstadt 
(2000, p. 45) notes: “In summary, public and private universities are becoming 
remarkably similar in the way that they are financed. In fact, there are many private 
institutions that receive far greater public subsidies—particularly when tax exemptions on 
gifts or endowment appreciation are included—than some public universities!” 
The previous hypothesis (H1b) focused on the influence of public/private status, 
which captures institutional ownership but fails to address dimensional “publicness”—the 
spectrum of public reliance among organizations (Bozeman, 1987; Bozeman & 
Bretschneider, 1994; Rainey, 2011).  Research distinguishing the public sector and 
dimensional publicness demonstrates that the two constructs are distinct and lead to 
different outcomes (Rainey, 2011). In relation to pay disparities, we can conceive of 
publicness as having two effects through competition and accountability. If, as Alexander 
(2001) contends, private funds aid in competition for faculty, then lower levels of 
resource publicness (or conversely, higher levels of privatization) may mean prestige 
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rather than equity motivates salary decisions. In contrast, resource publicness has been 
associated with government accountability requirements (Rainey, Pandey, & Bozeman, 
1995), thereby raising the possibility of greater pay equity given higher accountability. 
The hypothesis is: 
H2b: Pay disparities will be higher in institutions that rely less on public funding. 
2.3.3.2 Organizational Power and Formalization 
The power to distribute resources offers a final organizational mechanism for pay 
inequity. Pay systems can be more or less formalized, granting varying levels of 
discretion to managers in setting salaries. Based on Weber’s conceptualization, 
bureaucratic models should lower unequal outcomes by limiting managerial discretion, 
although there is some recent evidence that certain reforms to limit managers can have 
adverse effects (Dobbin, Schrage, & Kalev, 2015; Reskin, 2003). Discretion introduces 
bias by allowing individual level characteristics, such as negotiation skills and additional 
job offers, to influence salary—characteristics that are often purported to be at play but 
rarely studied (Pfeffer & Ross, 1990). Formalization of human resource practices for pay 
and promotion can reduce bias and inequality, although the effects can be sensitive to the 
organizational context (Blau & Kahn, 1999; Doucet, Smith, & Durand, 2012; Elvira & 
Graham, 2002; Stainback, et al., 2010; Warman, et al., 2010; Wharton, 2015; Whittington 
& Smith-Doerr, 2008). 
For universities, decentralized decision-making has been a hallmark of the 
importance of faculty (Fox, 2008). Fox (2008) notes that science and engineering faculty, 
in particular, can command autonomy, given their vital role in securing external funding 
and contributing to the prestige of the institution, drawing on the resource dependence 
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framework. Although universities have long valued decentralized decision-making—
particularly in light of the rise of the research university (Geiger, 2009)—they are not 
fully decentralized, at least on budgetary matters. Only 6 percent of STEM department 
chairs report full authority in granting salary increases to job candidates (Bozeman, Fay, 
& Gaughan, 2013). More than 85 percent of university CFOs report using incremental or 
formula-based budget models for their institutions, while 14 percent cite Revenue 
Centered Management (RCM)—a decentralized budgeting model that provides more 
autonomy to subunits (Green, 2011). 
Thus, budgetary discretion varies across institutions, providing the opportunity to 
test the relationship between discretion and pay equity observed in the broader labor 
market. Within universities, the power and discretion of the department head is of 
particular concern. Wharton (2015, p. 13) claims the department chair is the “most 
critical” leader for faculty, given the chair’s influence on practices, relationships, and job 
satisfaction, among others. Chairs manage resources, hire and evaluate faculty, guide 
departmental goals and cultures, and do this often without training or experience in 
administrative roles and while still identifying as faculty rather than administrators 
(Carroll & Wolverton, 2004; Gmelch, 2004; Schuh & Kuh, 2005). The power of the 
department head as a potential source of inequity has not been tested, but rather 
suggested by those in the field: 
The only truly effective remedy for inequity is the adoption of more standardized 
(and open) methods of determining initial salaries, increases, and special awards. 
As long as salaries are determined primarily by private individual negotiation or 
administrative discretion, inequities will reemerge. (Curtis, 2010) 
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The hypothesis is: 
H3: Pay disparities among STEM faculty will be greater in institutions with more 
autonomous department heads. 
2.4 Summary and Conceptual Model 
The dissertation incorporates organizational influences on pay equity into the traditional 
human capital and disciplinary frameworks of faculty salary studies. Umbach (2008) 
offers a similar framework in studying the influence of female representation at the 
institutional and disciplinary level on salaries. The dissertation offers a modification of 
Umbach’s model given the institutional factors of interest (Figure 2.1). The three levels 
of predictors of faculty salaries are: 1) individual characteristics typically found in the 
human capital models reviewed in Section 2.2, 2) structural characteristics relating to 
discipline and unit size also reviewed in Section 2.2, and 3) organizational characteristics 
of mission, resources, and power hypothesized in Section 2.3. Gender and race/ethnicity 
are purported to influence each of these levels.  
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual Model of Factors Affecting STEM Faculty Salary 
 
 
 
The hypotheses, summarized in Table 2.2, argue that organizational setting 
influences pay disparities among women and underrepresented minority STEM faculty. 
Drawing on institutional theory, hypotheses 1a and 1b suggest that organizational identity 
will lead certain institutions to focus on equity more so than other institutions, and this 
identity will influence salary-setting. These institutions with a mission or identity of 
access are women’s colleges, HBCUs, and public institutions. Competition rather than 
equity will drive certain institutions in their salary-setting activities, according to 
hypotheses 2a and 2b. Slack resources in the form of greater institutional resources and 
private resources provide the means for institutions to pull away from other institutions in 
their ability to attract and retain faculty. Thus, the dissertation hypothesizes that gender 
and racial pay disparities among STEM faculty will be greater in wealthy institutions, as 
well as those more reliant on private funds. Finally, decentralization of salary decision-
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making has led to greater pay disparities in other industries, yet has not been studied 
within higher education.  Hypothesis 3 argues that institutions providing more autonomy 
to department chairs in salary-setting will have greater pay disparities among women and 
underrepresented minority STEM faculty. 
 
Table 2.2 Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
Mission H1a: Pay disparities among STEM faculty will be lower in institutions 
with a mission of serving underrepresented groups. 
H1b: Pay disparities among STEM faculty will be greater in private 
institutions than in public institutions. 
Resources H2a: Pay disparities among STEM faculty will be higher in 
institutions with greater institutional resources. 
H2b: Pay disparities will be higher in institutions that rely less on 
public funding. 
Power H3: Pay disparities among STEM faculty will be greater in institutions 
with more autonomous department heads. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
This dissertation argues that institutional factors, in combination with human capital and 
disciplinary factors, influence pay equity among STEM faculty. The hypotheses 
presented in the previous chapter posit that institutional mission, resources, and power 
contribute to pay disparities among women and underrepresented minority STEM faculty. 
This chapter explains the data sources, variable operationalization, descriptive statistics, 
and methodology used to examine those relationships. 
3.2 Data Sources 
3.2.1 NETWISE II Survey 
The primary data source is the 2011 NETWISE II Phase I Survey, conducted under a 
grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF Grant # DRL-0910191).
6
 The purpose 
of the survey was to advance understanding of network structures and career outcomes 
for academic scientists and engineers, with particular attention to women and 
underrepresented minorities. The survey offers several advantages, including the 
concentration on STEM faculty, a sampling strategy focused on underrepresented groups 
and institutions targeting those groups, and more recent salary data than other surveys. 
The population for the survey was tenured and tenure-track faculty in U.S. institutions in 
four disciplines demonstrating varying levels of female representation: biochemistry 
(high female), biology (high female), civil engineering (low female), and mathematics 
(medium female). The administrators drew a sampling list of 25,928 faculty from the 
following institutional types: Research Extensive and Intensive institutions, women’s 
                                                          
6
 NETWISE II Phase One Codebook v3, March 2014. For more information on the project team and project 
publications, see http://NETWISE.gatech.edu/overview.php. 
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colleges that house the four disciplines of interest, all Hispanic-serving institutions 
(HSI),
7
 HBCUs identified in the White House Initiative,
8
 Oberlin 50 baccalaureate 
institutions,
9
 and a 15 percent sample of Master’s I/II institutions.10 The survey designers 
focused on the Oberlin 50 baccalaureate institutions, since they are more selective 
institutions and contribute disproportionately to the STEM pipeline (Burrelli, Rapoport, 
& Lenming, 2008). The Masters institutions were limited to a 15 percent sample due to 
the number of institutions (611). In total, there were 527 institutions represented in the 
sample consisting of 149 Research Extensive, 110 Research Intensive, 96 Master’s, 50 
Oberlin, 49 HSI, 43 HBCU, and 19 women’s colleges.11 
In addition to institutional type, the sampling strategy focused on gender, race, 
and discipline, with fields selected based on high, low, and transitioning proportions of 
women. Survey administrators identified the 25,928 faculty as male or female based on 
name and online photos, when available, as well as potentially nonwhite based on 
photos.
12
 The faculty list was divided among 112 cells for combinations of the seven 
institutional types, four departmental types, two genders, and two racial categories 
(minority/nonminority). To increase minority representation in the survey, the 
administrators also relied on a snowball technique. Self-identified under-represented 
minority respondents from the original random sample provided names of other faculty of 
                                                          
7
 Hispanic-serving institutions are defined as institutions in which Hispanic students comprise at least 25 
percent of the full-time undergraduate student body. (See U.S. Department of Education definition here: 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/idueshsi/definition.html.) 
8
 White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities, List of Schools. 
http://sites.ed.gov/whhbcu/one-hundred-and-five-historically-black-colleges-and-universities/. 
9
 Burrelli, Joan, et al. (2008). Baccalaureate Origins of S&E Doctorate Recipients. NSF 08-311. 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf08311/#fn5 . (See Note 5 for list of colleges.) 
10
 The administrators relied on the 2000 Carnegie-classification, which has the four categories of Research 
Extensive, Research Intensive, Masters, and Baccalaureate based on research intensity. For further 
explanation of institutional classifications, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
11
 The 527 institutions in the sampling frame represent 48 percent of the overall institutions in the 
categories of research, masters, and liberal arts institutions from the 2000 Carnegie-classification. 
12
 NETWISE II Phase One Codebook v3, March 2014 
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the same race, which allowed administrators to identify additional minority faculty for a 
second round of the survey. The final stratified random sample included 9,925 faculty 
from 527 institutions, stratified by institutional type, departmental type, gender, and 
minority status. A total of 4,313 faculty from 487 institutions completed or partially 
completed the online survey; however, survey administrators removed 117 of those 
responses due to ineligible discipline or rank. Thus, there are 4,195 completed or partially 
completed responses, and 3,559 complete responses. The response rate is 40.4 percent.  
Given the centrality of race to this dissertation, it is important to clarify the 
NETWISE survey’s treatment of race/ethnicity. The data rely on self-reported 
race/ethnicity based on two questions. The first question asked for a yes/no response to: 
“Do you consider yourself to be of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?” The second 
question asked the respondent’s race and provided the options of White, Black or African 
American, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, and Other. For respondents 
indicating “Other,” the survey provided an open-ended option for respondents to explain 
further. The survey administrators created a dummy variable for each racial category. 
Thus, a respondent answering White and Black to the “Other” category was coded as 
White, Black, and Other. Additionally, the administrators created a single race variable 
with mutually exclusive categories. For this variable, that same respondent would be 
coded as Other. There were 74 missing responses (1.8%) for race/ethnicity. For gender, 
54 respondents did not provide an answer. The survey administrators coded those 54 
missing cases for gender based on the sampling population file, photos, and respondent 
self-identification as male or female. 
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Table 3.1 NETWISE II Survey Respondent Characteristics  
Characteristic Percent 
Gender  
Male 56.8 
Female 43.2 
Race/Ethnicity  
White 61.0 
Asian 23.1 
African American 7.1 
Hispanic 5.6 
Other 1.1 
Native American/Alaskan 0.4 
Unknown 1.8 
Institutional Type  
Research Extensive 29.6 
Research Intensive 21.0 
Masters 31.5 
Liberal Arts 17.6 
HIS 11.1 
HBCU 8.7 
Women’s colleges 4.7 
Discipline  
Biology 33.9 
Math 28.1 
Civil Engineering 19.1 
Biochemistry 17.1 
Other STEM 1.7 
N = 4,195  
Note: The institutional types based on Carnegie-classification research intensity (Research Extensive, 
Research Intensive, Masters, and Liberal Arts) are mutually exclusive and add to 100 percent. However, the 
three other institutional types are not mutually exclusively. All HBCU, women’s colleges, and HSIs are 
also categorized among Research Extensive, Research Intensive, Masters, and Liberal Arts. Women’s 
colleges have 13 Liberal Arts institutions and 6 Masters institutions. HBCUs are 1 Research Extensive, 6 
Research Intensive, 25 Masters, and 11 Liberal Arts. HSIs are 3 Research Extensive, 4 Research Intensive, 
40 Masters, and 2 Liberal Arts. Among the three institutional types (HBCU, HSI, and women’s college), 
there is one institution that is both an HBCU and women’s college. There are no institutional overlap with 
HSIs, however. The disciplines are the departments in which faculty work. Data are not weighted. 
 
3.2.2 Additional Data Sources 
In addition to the survey data, several other data sources provide useful institutional and 
budget data critical for the analysis. National Center for Education Statistics Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Delta Cost Project provides data on 
institutional resources (i.e., total revenue and public revenue) for Hypotheses 2a-b 
54 
 
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2015b). The Delta Cost Project revises 
financial data institutions report using FASB and GASB standards. These revisions make 
comparisons possible between the two reporting types. The data are for 2012. The 
analysis links the institutional resources data from the IPEDS Delta Cost Project to the 
individual survey response data from NETWISE II based on institution. 
The 2010 Survey of Academic Chairs/Heads provides data on the influence of 
department head power on salary-setting.
13
 The sampling population (1,832) was 
department chairs of STEM disciplines at Carnegie Extensive universities. The survey 
had 765 responses for a response rate of 43 percent. Given that the Chairs Survey   
focused on Research Extensive universities only, the sample size for models testing the 
organizational power hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) are much smaller than other models. The 
analysis creates an institutional-level power measure, as described in the variable 
operationalization, based on the average power measures of department heads within the 
institution who participated in the survey. The analysis links the institutional-level power 
measure to faculty from the NETWISE II Survey. Thus, faculty from the NETWISE II 
Survey who do not have a match are removed from the portion of the analysis dealing 
with decision-making autonomy.  
3.2.3 Missing Data and Final Samples for Analyses 
Missing data—a common occurrence in survey collection—can lead to a loss of 
statistical power or biased estimates (Wooldridge, 2003, p. 317). The key concern for this 
dissertation is missing data for the question of interest—salary. The NETWISE II Survey 
asked for salary information as one of the final questions. The majority of respondents 
                                                          
13
 Survey of Department Chairs/Heads Codebook. July 1, 2011. The Chair Survey was supported by NSF 
#0710836 under the lead of Principal Investigator Monica Gaughan, University of Georgia. The Survey 
was conducted in spring and summer of 2010. 
55 
 
who partially completed the survey stopped long before the salary question. Of the 4,195 
respondents at least partially completing the survey, 931 respondents (22.2%) did not 
answer the salary question. Of the 3,559 respondents completing the survey, 295 
respondents (8.3%) did not answer the salary question. The 8.3 percent non-response rate 
among those completing the survey is better than recent NSF non-response rates on 
salary for biology, civil engineering, and math faculty in research institutions (12.4% to 
20.6%) (National Research Council, 2010). Table 3.2 displays the percentage of each 
group who did not answer the salary question for both the total respondents (partially and 
fully completed surveys) and the respondents who fully completed the survey. 
Additional respondents lacked responses to other questions of interest and were 
removed. The final sample for models testing hypotheses 1 and 2 is 2,352 respondents. 
The final subsample for models testing hypothesis 3 is 736 respondents. The analysis 
weights the final samples using probability weights. The weighted full sample is 29 
percent female and 8 percent underrepresented minority. Females comprise a slightly 
lower share of the subsample (27% compared to 29% in the full sample), but the share of 
underrepresented minorities remains the same (8%). As shown in Table 3.3, these shares 
are consistent with NSF data of 27 percent female and 8 percent underrepresented 
minority tenured or tenure-track professors in biology, math, and engineering (National 
Science Foundation, 2015a). 
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Table 3.2 Percentage of NETWISE II Respondents Who Did Not Provide Salary 
Data 
Characteristic Percent of Total 
Respondents 
Percent of Respondents 
with Completed 
Surveys 
Total Missing Salary 22% (N=931) 8.3% (N=295) 
Gender   
Male 23 9 
Female 21 7 
Race/Ethnicity   
White 18 6 
African American 23 8 
Native American/Alaskan 17 6 
Asian 32 15 
Hispanic 17 3 
Other race 25 13 
Institutional Type   
HBCU 29 13 
Women's colleges 20 9 
Masters 19 6 
Research Intensive 22 8 
Research Extensive 26 10 
Liberal Arts 14 6 
HSI 23 7 
Discipline   
Biology 18 5 
Biochemistry 18 6 
Civil engineering 27 11 
Math 27 12 
Other STEM 25 8 
Note: Data are not weighted. 
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Table 3.3 Distribution of Respondents in Final Sample and STEM 
Characteristic Percent in 
Full Sample 
 
Weighted 
Percent in 
Full Sample 
Percent in 
Subsample 
Weighted 
Percent in 
Subsample 
Percent 
in STEM 
Overall 
Gender      
Male 56.1% 70.7% 50.5% 72.8% 73.5% 
Female 43.9 29.3 49.5 27.2 26.6 
Race/Ethnicity      
White 68.9 79.5 60.5 78.8 73.2 
African American 5.6 2.9 5.4 2.3 2.4 
Native American/Alaskan 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.7 -- 
Asian 18.9 12.1 25.1 12.6 18.7 
Hispanic 5.4 4.4 7.9 5.1 4.1 
Other race 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.5 -- 
Observations Full Sample N=2,352 Subsample N=736    
Note: Percentages in STEM overall are based on faculty in four-year institutions in the fields of biology, 
mathematics, and engineering at the full, associate, and assistant rank. Source: Author’s calculations using 
National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Survey of Doctorate 
Recipients, 2013, Tables 17 and 19. 
  
 
3.3 Variable Operationalization 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for all models in this analysis is self-reported salary. Salary 
studies often rely on the natural logarithm of salary to account for the nonlinear 
relationship between salary and independent variables such as education, allowing a 
percentage change rather than constant dollar change in salary given changes in the 
independent variables (Wooldridge, 2003, pp. 43-44). An analysis of the model fit with 
salary and the natural log of salary, however, demonstrated that salary was a better fit for 
the models in this dissertation. Data on salary come from the NETWISE II Survey 
question: “What is your approximate annual salary excluding summer appointments?” 
There are some limitations to this question. Academic salaries are comprised of base 
contracts (9-month), extended contracts (11 or 12-month), extended pay (e.g. additional 
teaching load), and external pay (e.g. consulting contracts) (Bowen and Schuster 1986 in 
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Park, 2011). The models include a dummy variable for 12 month contract to account for 
this variation in contract length that may affect salary. 
3.3.2 Key Independent Variables 
The key independent variables are demographics, institutional identity, organizational 
resources, and organizational power. For demographics, the independent variables are 
gender and race/ethnicity, as described in Table 3.4, from the NETWISE II Survey. 
Gender is a dummy variable “Female,” coded 1 for female and 0 for male. Race is a 
dummy variable “Underrepresented Minority” (or URM) coded 1 by NETWISE Survey 
administrators for underrepresented minorities (African-American, Hispanic, or 
American Indian/Alaskan) and 0 for non-underrepresented minorities (White, Asian). 
This variable operationalization draws on NSF’s definition of underrepresented minority 
in science and engineering as African Americans/Blacks, Hispanics, and American 
Indians. These racial/ethnic groups are classified as underrepresented, along with women 
and persons with disabilities, because their science and engineering degrees and 
employment are lower than their population shares (National Science Foundation, 2013). 
In addition, the analysis tests separate models that disaggregate race/ethnicity into a set of 
dummy variables:  African-American/Black, Asian, Hispanic, White, and Other Race. 
White serves as the reference group. 
The two institutional identity variables are dummy variables based on institutional 
variables included by the NETWISE II Survey administrators from Carnegie-
classification. For Hypothesis 1a, institutions are classified as having a mission of serving 
underrepresented populations through a dummy variable “HBCU/Womens” coded 1 for 
faculty in  HBCU or women’s colleges institutions and 0 for faculty in all other 
59 
 
institutions. For Hypothesis 1b, all institutions are classified by their private or public 
status through the dummy variable “Private,” coded 1 for private institutions and 0 for 
public institutions. 
For organizational resources, Tolbert (1986) relies on per student total revenues. 
Similarly, the interval-level variable “Revenues per FTE” in H2a measures institutions’ 
stable operating revenue divided by total fall full-time equivalent (FTE) student 
enrollment from the IPEDS Delta Cost Project data.
14
 For the share of revenues from 
public sources in H2b, the variable “Percent of revenue from public sources” measures 
federal, state, and local funds from all sources (appropriations, grants, contracts) divided 
by total revenues.
15
 
To measure organizational power, the dissertation relies on a power-index created 
by Bozeman, Fay, and Gaughan (2013) based on the ability of department heads to offer 
additional incentives to job candidates. The authors created the index based on responses 
to 12 questions regarding various available incentives—additional salary, course 
reductions, teaching assistants, summer money, research money, research assistants, start-
up money, spousal hiring assistance, computing software, laboratory space, laboratory 
supplies, moving expenses, and travel funds. The department chair respondents described 
their ability to offer these incentives as “1) no outside involvement needed, 2) requires 
                                                          
14
 Stable operating revenue includes: “Total revenue including revenue from auxiliary, hospitals, and other independent 
operations. Includes the sum of tuition; federal, state, and local appropriations, grants, and contracts; auxiliaries; 
hospitals; and other independent operations; excludes revenues from affiliated entities, private gifts, grants, and 
contracts; investment return; endowment earnings.” IPEDS Delta Cost defines total fall FTE student enrollment 
(“fte_count”) as: “Full-time equivalent enrollments are derived from the enrollment by race/ethnicity section of the fall 
enrollment survey. The full-time equivalent of an institution's part-time enrollment is estimated by multiplying part-
time enrollment by factors that vary by control and level of institution and level of student; the estimated full-time 
equivalent of part-time enrollment is then added to the full-time enrollment of the institution.  This formula is used by 
the U.S. Department of Education to produce the full-time equivalent enrollment data published annually in the Digest 
of Education Statistics.” (Source: Delta Cost Project Data Dictionary, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/deltacostproject/) 
15 The measure comes from IPEDS Delta Cost Project “govt_reliance_a” variable, defined as: “The federal, state, and 
local appropriations, grants, and contracts share of operating revenue (net tuition; federal, state, and local 
appropriations, grants, and contracts; and private gifts, grants, and contracts).” (Source: Delta Cost Project Data 
Dictionary, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/deltacostproject/) 
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Dean’s involvement, 3) requires Provost/VP involvement, 4) requires President’s 
involvement, or 5) not available” (Gaughan, 2011, p. 17). The index measures how many 
of those incentives a department head can offer with “no outside involvement needed”—
meaning, the department head has full power to offer the incentive. 
The analysis converts those individual power indices in the Chair Survey database 
to an average power index by institution since individual department chair respondents 
cannot be matched directly to NETWISE II Survey responses of faculty. The dissertation 
averages the Power Index from the Survey of Department Chair respondents for each 
institution, then links the institutional-level average power index to faculty in the 
NETWISE II Survey in the continuous variable “Department head discretion.” Thus, the 
independent variable “Department head discretion” measures whether a faculty member 
from the NETWISE II Survey works in an institution that offers higher or lower power to 
STEM department chairs with regards to independently negotiating with job candidates. 
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Table 3.4 Hypotheses and Operationalization of Dependent and Key Independent Variables 
Hypotheses Variable Operationalized Variable 
Institutional Identity   
H1a: Pay disparities among STEM 
faculty will be lower in institutions 
with a mission of serving 
underrepresented groups than in 
other institutions. 
 
H1b: Pay disparities among STEM 
faculty will be greater in private 
institutions than in public 
institutions. 
Salary (dependent variable for all 
hypotheses) 
[C] Salary 
Female (independent variable for all 
hypotheses) 
[0,1] Coded as 1 for female, 0 for male 
 
Underrepresented Minority (URM) 
(independent variable for all 
hypotheses) 
[0,1] Coded as 1 for Underrepresented Minority (African 
American/Black, Hispanic, and American Indian/Alaskan), 0 
otherwise 
Models also test disaggregated race/ethnicity with a set of dummy 
variables: African American/Black, Asian, Hispanic, White, and 
Other Race. 
HBCU/Women’s [0,1] Coded as 1 for women’s college or HBCU, 0 otherwise 
Private [0,1] Coded as 1 for Private institution, 0 for Public institution 
Resources   
H2a: Pay disparities among STEM 
faculty will be higher in institutions 
with greater institutional resources. 
 
H2b: Pay disparities will be higher 
in institutions that rely less on 
public funding. 
Revenues per FTE [C] Total revenue (with auxiliary, hospital, independent operations, 
and other sources) / Total fall FTE student enrollment 
 
 
Percent of revenue from public 
sources 
[C] Revenue from federal, state, and local appropriations, grants, and 
contracts / Total revenue 
Power   
H3: Pay disparities among STEM 
faculty will be greater in institutions 
with more autonomous department 
heads. 
Department head discretion [C] Interval variable measuring the average discretion given to STEM 
department heads in the faculty’s institution. The power index for 
each institution is an average of individual power indices, which 
measure the ability of STEM department chairs in research 
universities to offer 12 job incentives to candidates without outside 
involvement. 
Note: [0,1] denotes a dummy variable or set of dummy variables. [C] denotes a continuous variable. 
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3.3.3 Control Variables 
In addition to the independent variables, the analysis includes control variables for 
personal/family characteristics, career advancement, human capital, department, and 
institutional type drawn from data in the NETWISE II Survey. Table 3.5 summarizes 
these control variables. 
3.3.3.1 Personal Characteristics 
As discussed in Chapter 2, marriage and family have complex influences on faculty pay. 
In academia overall, married male faculty earn higher salaries than comparable non-
married male faculty, while the findings are mixed for women (Toutkoushian, 1998a; 
Toutkoushian, et al., 2007). The control variable for marital status is a set of three 
dummy variables for relationship status: married or living in a marriage-like relationship; 
divorced, widowed, or separated; single. Parental status has been suggested as a penalty 
for female faculty, as female scientists and engineers cite “family responsibilities 
discrimination” (National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, & 
Institute of Medicine, 2006). Having dependents has been found to benefit male faculty 
in promotion, but did not influence female faculty promotion in academia overall (Perna, 
2005). The control variable for parental status is a dummy variable coded 1 for 
respondents who said they have cared for dependent children since being a faculty 
member at the institution. Given that the effects of marital status and parental status tend 
to vary by gender, the analysis includes interaction terms between those control variables 
and gender. Further, models are run with and without those controls. Finally, the analysis 
controls for nativity with a dummy variable “Foreign-born,” coded 1 for those responding 
they are foreign-born.  
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3.3.3.2 Human Capital 
For human capital factors, faculty salaries increase with education and experience 
(Barbezat & Hughes, 2005; National Research Council, 2010; Perna, 2005; Toutkoushian, 
et al., 2007; Umbach, 2007). Higher education scholars typically control for experience 
and on-the-job training through years since PhD receipt and years within current position 
(Perna, 2005). This analysis relies on years since PhD alone, given the high correlations 
between years since PhD and years within current position. Initial analysis included a 
variable measuring years of experience squared to test whether the relationship of 
experience to salary was nonlinear; however, the squared term did not improve the fit of 
the model and was excluded from further analysis. In addition, the analysis will include 
post-doctoral appointments and non-academic work experience, given the prevalence of 
those career paths among STEM faculty (M.-W. Lin & Bozeman, 2006; National Science 
Board, 2014). 
3.3.3.3 Career Advancement 
Career advancement variables capture the mobility, productivity, negotiation ability, and 
network aspects of faculty careers. As products of human capital, productivity and 
mobility contribute to earnings gaps in the labor market broadly. “Mobility” measures the 
number of tenure track positions held at other institutions. Productivity measures include 
five types—publication productivity, grant productivity, teaching productivity, service 
productivity, and overall hours worked. For publication productivity, the “Journal articles” 
variable is the number of peer-reviewed journal articles in the prior two years. The survey 
data do not provide career publications, which is a more typical productivity measure in 
faculty pay studies. Grant productivity is the total dollar amount of external research 
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grant awards. Teaching productivity, which typically decreases salary among faculty 
(Perna, 2003), is the percentage of time spent on teaching. Several measures of service 
productivity are included as dummy variables: current or past chair or dean, current 
director of a research center or institute, and current chaired professorship. Finally, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, Goldin (2014) suggests that number of hours worked contributes 
to gender salary gaps in academia, due to its effects on productivity. Thus, the final 
control for productivity is average weekly hours worked. 
In addition to the mobility and productivity controls, the analysis includes 
negotiation and network controls as possible contributors to career advancement. It has 
been suggested that male faculty have better negotiation skills than female faculty, 
contributing to the pay gap (American Association of University Women, 2014). The 
variable “Negotiation ability” is a dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who asked 
for additional salary in their first job offer and received all of the request.
16
 “Network ties” 
is a measure created by the NETWISE II Survey administrators based on the number of 
individuals identified by the survey respondent as being in their network. These ties are 
not just collaborators, and thus is not a proxy for productivity. Instead, the measure 
includes individuals identified as collaborators, as well as those individuals who 
respondents go to for advice and career mentorship. Networks can influence salary 
through collaborative effects, but also through access to career information, opportunities, 
and guidance (National Research Council, 2010).  
                                                          
16
 The analysis tested two additional operationalizations of the negotiation variable. First, it combined those who asked 
for more money and received some of it and those who received all of their request, coding those respondents as 1 for 
asking and receiving at least some of their request. The next option added respondents who asked for more money and 
did not receive it, also coding these individuals as 1 along with those who asked and received all or some of their 
request. These two alternative operationalizations measured willingness to negotiate, but not success in negotiation at 
the level of the “Negotiation ability” variable. The two lesser measures of negotiation did not have effects on salary, 
and thus were abandoned in favor of the negotiation variable measuring receipt of full request.   
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In contrast to networks and negotiation ability aiding salary, “stop-the-clock” 
policies might restrict salary given delayed promotion and have been found to have 
gendered effects (National Research Council, 2010). The analysis includes a dummy 
variable coded 1 for those who “Extended tenure clock.” Additionally, the dissertation 
will test models including and excluding academic rank, given findings on discrimination 
within the promotion process (Barbezat & Hughes, 2005; Hearn, 1999; National 
Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, 2001).  
3.3.3.4 Discipline 
Salaries vary across disciplines, and are therefore also included in the model as control 
variables (American Association of University Professors, 2011; Bellas, 1997; Umbach, 
2007). The four disciplines are biology, biochemistry, civil engineering, and mathematics, 
where civil engineering commands higher median salaries than the other three disciplines 
(National Science Foundation, 2015a). Civil engineering serves as the reference 
discipline.  
3.3.3.5 Additional Departmental and Institutional Factors 
Certain departmental and institutional characteristics are also known to matter for salary. 
Department size measures the number of faculty members in the respondent’s department 
and was drawn from the population file created by the NETWISE II Survey 
administrators. It is a count of the number of individuals in the department. Finally, based 
on salary variation related to institutional research intensity (Barbezat & Hughes, 2005; 
Lee & Won, 2014; National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, 2001; 
Tolbert, 1986; Toutkoushian, 1998b), the analysis includes dummy variables for the 
Carnegie classification of institutions: Research Extensive, Research Intensive, Masters, 
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and Liberal Arts. HSI designation is not among the control variables, but instead those 
institutions are grouped within their Carnegie-classification of research intensity. 
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Table 3.5 Control Variables  
Variable Operationalization 
Personal Characteristics  
Marital status [0,1] Three dummy variables coded 1 for each relationship status: Single; Divorced, 
widowed or separated; Married or living in a marriage-like relationship. 
Parental status [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for yes responses to “Since you have been a faculty 
member at your institution, have you cared for dependent children?” and coded 0 
otherwise. 
Foreign-born [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for foreign-born and coded 0 native-born U.S. citizen. 
Human Capital  
Years since PhD [C] Number of years since receipt of PhD 
Postdoctoral appointment [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for postdoctoral appointment and coded 0 otherwise. 
Worked in government [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for yes response to question: “Have you ever worked 
full time for a government agency?” Coded 0 otherwise. 
Worked in private industry [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for yes response to question: “Have you ever worked 
full time for private industry?” Coded 0 otherwise. 
Worked in nonprofit 
organization 
[0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for yes response to question: “Have you ever worked 
full time for a non-profit organization (non-academic)?” Coded 0 otherwise. 
Career Advancement  
Mobility [C] Interval variable to the question: “At how many universities have you had a 
position as a tenure track or tenured faculty member?” 
12 month contract [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for 12 month contract and coded 0 otherwise. 
Journal articles [C] Interval variable to the question: “During the past two academic years, how many 
of the following have you produced? Peer reviewed journal articles” 
Grant funds awarded [C] Interval variable to question: “What is the total dollar amount of those successful 
grants?” The question regards external research grants. 
Percent of time teaching [C] Interval variable to question: “What percentage of your work hours are allocated 
to these activities? Teaching.” 
Average weekly hours 
worked 
[C] Interval variable to question: “On average, how many hours do you work in a 
typical week?” 
Network ties [C] Interval variable measuring total number of network ties. 
Negotiation ability [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for “Negotiated for more money or resources, and 
received ALL of it” response to the question “Describe what happened when you 
were given the salary offer for your first academic position.” Coded 0 otherwise. 
Current or past chair/dean [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who currently hold or ever held the 
position of department chair, department head, or dean of a school or college and 
coded 0 otherwise. 
Chaired professorship [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who are currently in a chaired 
professorship and coded 0 otherwise. 
Research director [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who currently hold the position of 
Director of a Research Center or Institute and coded 0 otherwise. 
Extended tenure clock [0,1] Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who answered yes to the question: 
“Since you have been a faculty member at your institution, have you extended or 
reset your tenure clock?” 
Rank [0,1] Three dummy variables for: Assistant, Associate, Full 
Department  
Discipline [0,1] Four dummy variables coded 1 for each discipline: biology, biochemistry, civil 
engineering, mathematics. 
Department size [C] Interval variable measuring number of faculty in the department 
Institution  
Institutional Type [0,1] Four dummy variables for Carnegie classification: Research Extensive, 
Research Intensive, Masters, Liberal Arts 
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3.4 Weighted Descriptive Statistics on Gender, Race, and Salary 
To understand the NETWISE II Survey data in light of prior literature and data, the 
following discussion presents a comparison of weighted means of the control variables by 
gender and race. Table 3.6 displays descriptive statistics for all variables for the full 
sample, and tables displaying descriptive statistics by gender, by race, and for the 
subsample of faculty in research institutions can be found in Appendix Tables A.1-A.3. 
Table 3.6 Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample, Weighted 
 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable         
Salary $92,347  $34,355  $27,000  $300,000  
Independent variables 
    Female 29% 46% 0 1 
Underrepresented minority (URM) 8% 28% 0 1 
HBCU or women's college 5% 22% 0 1 
Private 32% 47% 0 1 
Revenue per FTE $42,621  $36,683  $10,702  $277,888  
Percent of revenue from public sources 42% 24% 0.48 91.09 
Control variables: Personal characteristics 
    Married or living in a marriage-like relationship 87% 34% 0 1 
Divorced, separated, widowed 6% 24% 0 1 
Single 7% 25% 0 1 
Cared for children 54% 50% 0 1 
Foreign-born 29% 45% 0 1 
Control variables: Human capital 
    Years since PhD 21.18 11.23 1 52 
Years since PhD squared 574.4 547.38 1 2,704 
Postdoctoral apt 66% 47% 0 1 
Worked in government 17% 38% 0 1 
Worked in private industry 21% 41% 0 1 
Worked in nonprofit organization 5% 23% 0 1 
Control variables: Career advancement 
    Mobility 1.36 0.87 0 30 
12 month contract 14% 35% 0 1 
Journal articles 5.04 7.62 0 150 
Grant funds awarded (‘000s) $477  $1,439  0 $30,150  
Percent of time on teaching 42% 22% 0 100 
Average weekly hours worked 54.29 11.27 5 100 
Network ties 9.51 3.95 1 26 
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Table 3.6 (continued)     
Negotiation ability 9% 29% 0 1 
Current or past chair/dean 25% 43% 0 1 
Chaired professorship 8% 27% 0 1 
Research director 7% 25% 0 1 
Assistant 21% 41% 0 1 
Associate 32% 47% 0 1 
Full 47% 50% 0 1 
Extended tenure clock 10% 29% 0 1 
Control variables: Department 
    Civil Engineering 18% 39% 0 1 
Biology 43% 49% 0 1 
Biochemistry 13% 33% 0 1 
Math 26% 44% 0 1 
Department size 26.11 19 1 139 
Control variables: Institutional/Carnegie 
    Research Extensive 52% 50% 0 1 
Research Intensive 18% 38% 0 1 
Liberal Arts 10% 29% 0 1 
Masters 21% 41% 0 1 
Observations 2352 
      
Women in both the full sample and subsample have characteristics that are 
typically associated with lower pay (Appendix A.2). Women have fewer years since PhD, 
are less likely to be full professors, are less mobile, produce fewer journal articles (full 
sample only), spend more time on teaching, work in high female fields, and are less likely 
to hold administrative and chaired positions. These gendered differences among STEM 
faculty are in keeping with NSF data on STEM faculty and the higher education literature 
of overall faculty (National Research Council, 2010; Nettles, et al., 2000).Women are 
more likely than men to have cared for children during their time as faculty and to have 
stopped the tenure clock. Contrary to expectations, women in the full sample successfully 
negotiated their first job offer more often than men. Additionally, more women had held 
postdoctoral appointments, while more men had worked in private industry. While these 
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descriptive statistics give a sense of gender differences in important characteristics, it 
should be noted that several of the characteristics are tied to age. Women are younger; 
thus, it is not surprising that they are, for example, less mobile as measured by number of 
positions and are less likely to have held or hold administrative positions. 
Whereas men and women differ significantly on most variables, racial groups do 
not. Underrepresented minority faculty do not differ significantly from white and Asian 
faculty on marital status, parental status, postdoctoral appointment, work in private 
industry, mobility, time spent on teaching, negotiation ability, use of stop-the-clock 
policies, field, or institutional types—whereas male and female faculty differ 
significantly on all of those characteristics (Appendix A.3). URM faculty do have less 
experience overall, less administrative experience, and lower rank than white and Asian 
faculty, similar to prior findings (National Science Foundation, 2015a, 2015b). URM 
faculty in the full sample published fewer journal articles on average in the last two years 
than white and Asian faculty, but were on par in publications in the subsample of 
research institution faculty. Almost half of URM faculty are foreign-born. 
Both women and URM faculty have lower mean salaries than male and white and 
Asian faculty. On average, faculty in the full sample earn about $92,000 in salary. Not 
surprisingly, average salary (about $102,000) is higher among faculty in the subsample 
given they are all located in research universities (Appendix A.1). These salary levels are 
consistent with NSF data, which show median salaries of $66,000 to $82,000 for assistant 
professors and $104,000 to $132,000 for full professors in biology, math, and engineering 
(National Science Foundation, 2015a, Table 59). Women earn $14,800 less, on average, 
than male STEM faculty in the full sample and $19,300 less in the subsample of research 
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institution faculty. URM faculty earn $11,400 less than white and Asian faculty in the full 
sample and $15,000 less in the subsample. 
Among the control variables, salary shares the strongest bivariate relationships 
with years since PhD, rank, percent of time teaching, administrative responsibilities, and 
research extensive institutions. Only one correlation coefficient raises concerns over 
multicollinearity—the coefficient for Private and Percent of Revenue from Public 
Sources. Given the strength of that relationship (-0.81), the regression analysis in Chapter 
4 runs separate models for public and private institutions when testing the influence of 
public funds on salary equity (H2b). None of the other variables demonstrate a 
correlation of 0.80 or above, the typical measure for multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2008, p. 
196). 
3.5 Data Analysis Methods 
This dissertation uses OLS regression with interaction terms to test the hypotheses of 
institutional influence on gender and racial pay gaps. The next chapter begins with OLS 
regression models based on traditional explanations of pay disparity—human capital, 
marital and parental status, negotiation ability, social capital, and discipline. Then, the 
analysis turns to the hypothesized relationships between institutional factors and pay gaps 
by gender and race.  
Common statistical techniques in national faculty salary studies are single 
equation OLS regression and multiple equation regression analyses that segregate models 
by gender (Perna, 2003; Toutkoushian & Hoffman, 2002). Scholars have used causal 
modeling and hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) in only a few cases (reviewed in Perna, 
2003), in spite of its potential benefits, given the combination of individual and 
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institution-level characteristics in these studies. Loeb (2003) provides a comparison of 
OLS and HLM, finding similar results from the two procedures. In reviewing single, two, 
and three equation analyses, Toutkoushian and Hoffman (2002) recommend the use of 
multiple methods where possible to understand the influence of methodology on results. 
They note, however, that for groups of small size, such as minority groups among faculty, 
single equation models may be the only option. 
Interaction terms are appropriate to this analysis given the conditional or 
contextual nature of the hypotheses (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). The hypotheses 
state that salary gaps between women and men and between racial groups depend on the 
institutional context. Thus, the interaction of institutional factors with gender and race 
allows the effects of gender and race on salary to vary across institutional settings. The 
models testing hypotheses interact the key institutional variables with gender, race, and 
all control variables. Interaction terms and all constitutive terms—those variables used to 
create the interaction term (Brambor, et al., 2006)—are included in the models. Thus, 
there are five primary models based on the key institutional variables: 1) 
HBCU/Women’s, 2) Private, 3) Revenue per FTE, 4) Percent public revenue, and 5) 
Department head discretion. Each of the five models follows the equation below. A 
preliminary model in Chapter 4 will test whether the control variables listed in Table 3.5 
should be included in all models. All models testing hypotheses will then include the 
same control variables, unless otherwise noted. Rank, marital status, and parental status, 
in particular, will only be included as controls in separate models in the Appendix given 
controversy over their legitimacy. 
Salary = β0 + β1Female + β2URM + β3Institutional Factor + β4Female*Institutional Factor + 
β5URM*Institutional Factor + βj Control Variables + βk Control Variables*Institutional Factor 
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For all models, the coefficients of interest are β4 and β5. (i.e. the interaction 
between gender and the key institutional variable and between race and the key 
institutional variable). The key institutional variables HBCU/Women’s and Private are 
dummy variables. The models focused on these independent variables display the factors 
influencing salary for each type (HBCU/Women’s vs. other institutions, Private vs. 
Public), as well as the interaction terms, which is the difference in returns to each 
characteristic between the two institutional categories. The other three independent 
variables—Revenue per FTE, Percent of public revenue, and Department head 
discretion—are continuous variables. For those three models, the analysis displays just 
the interaction terms between the independent variables and gender and race. (Full 
models are available in the Appendix.) The constitutive terms are not displayed in the 
text as they are meaningless, given that holding other terms to zero is not realistic. 
Instead, the analysis shows graphically how these institutional factors influence pay gaps. 
Additional models follow the same pattern as these five primary models but with 
disaggregated race/ethnicity dummy variables in place of the URM variable. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This dissertation tests three major hypotheses. First, public universities and those with 
institutional missions to serve underrepresented populations will pay women and 
underrepresented minority (URM) STEM faculty more similarly to white and Asian men 
than do private universities and those without that mission. Second, wealthier institutions 
and those less reliant on public funds will have a larger pay gap between women and men 
and between URM and non-URM faculty. Finally, institutions that give department 
chairs more autonomy to decide salary and incentive offers will have larger pay gaps 
between white and Asian men and comparable women and URM STEM faculty. 
These hypotheses argue that organizational setting influences pay equity, whereas 
traditional explanations focus on individual factors (primarily human capital, but also 
marital and parental status, social capital, and negotiation ability) and disciplinary 
differences. The chapter begins with an examination of the influence of human capital 
and disciplinary traits on faculty pay gaps by gender and race. The chapter then proceeds 
to the institutional-level analysis, first exploring descriptively how faculty characteristics 
vary across institutional groups and then testing models on the influence of institutional 
mission, organizational resources, and discretionary power on gender and racial pay gaps 
among STEM faculty.
17
 Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of findings. 
4.2 The Traditional Model: Human Capital and Discipline 
The leading explanations for pay gaps among faculty are human capital and disciplinary 
differences. Regression results confirm that these traits influence salary among STEM 
                                                          
17
 Given the number of control variables and size of the models, full models testing each hypothesis are in 
the appendices and condensed models are provided in this chapter. 
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faculty, with greater experience, mobility, administrative experience, grant-getting ability, 
and department size increasing pay (Table 4.1).
18
 Further, more time spent on teaching 
and extension of the tenure clock decrease salary. Civil engineering provides higher 
salaries, confirming structural theories of male-dominated fields out-earning female-
dominated fields. The one unexpectedly absent effect is from publications. An increase in 
journal articles over the two-year period does not significantly influence salary. Prior 
literature has examined career publications (see for example, Porter, et al., 2008; 
Toutkoushian, 1998b), which perhaps captures the variation in returns to productivity 
better than this near-term productivity of two year publication record. 
If these human capital and disciplinary traits vary systematically by race or gender, 
then they can explain a portion of the salary gaps among women and men and URM 
faculty and white and Asian faculty. As discussed in Chapter 3, the survey respondents 
here exhibit significant differences in human capital and disciplinary traits—with women 
and URM faculty holding traits often associated with lower pay (see Appendix A.2 and 
A.3). Table 4.1 provides regression results for the pay gap among STEM faculty with 
progressive controls for experience, departmental characteristics, and career advancement 
traits. These traits fully explain the salary gap between men and women and among racial 
groups, until institutional variables are included. 
In simple models of race and gender, male faculty earn $15,000 more than female 
faculty of the same minority status (Table 4.1). White and Asian faculty earn $10,300 
                                                          
18
 Five control variables do not significantly influence salary or improve the models. These variables are 
years since PhD squared, full-time employment in government, full-time employment in nonprofit 
organization, full-time employment in private industry, and average number of hours worked weekly. After 
testing these variables, they were excluded from all further models. All further models include the same 
control variables as Table 4.1, unless otherwise noted. (Higher rank increases salary, as expected, with 
effects on salary greater than most other characteristics (Appendix A.5). Since gender and race are not 
significant in Table 4.1, rank does not change the interpretation of the gender and racial salary gaps.) 
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more than underrepresented minority faculty of the same gender. Years of experience and 
field account for a large portion of that gap, however. Controlling for years since PhD 
and STEM field removes the significance of the gender pay gap and lowers the racial pay 
gap to $4,700. Years of experience, in particular, dramatically alters the results—
explaining $11,000 of the total $15,000 salary gap between men and women and almost 
half of the racial salary gap.
19
 Finally, the addition of career advancement traits removes 
the significance of the racial pay gap (Model 3 in Table 4.1). The one exception in pay 
equity based on individual and departmental characteristics is foreign-born faculty, who 
earn $4,300 less than native-born faculty based on career advancement traits.Table 4.1 
would lead to the conclusion that male and female STEM faculty are on par in pay once 
experience and field are taken into account. Likewise, URM faculty are in line with white 
and Asian faculty who do similar work. The results seem to confirm human capital and 
structural theories that experience, productivity, and gendered fields fully explain the pay 
gaps among STEM faculty. However, the inclusion of institutional variables (Model 5) 
calls into question the ability of human capital and structural theory to explain the 
conditions of STEM faculty adequately. When controlling for institutional research 
intensity, private status, HBCU/Women’s college status, revenue, and reliance on public 
revenue, the racial pay gap becomes significant again. Models, not shown here, adding 
the institutional variables separately shows that Carnegie-classification of research 
intensity and revenue per FTE student cause the racial pay gap to become significant.
20
  
                                                          
19
 A separate model, not shown here, tested the influence of years of experience and field on salary 
separately. 
20
 The model included all of the controls in Model 4 of Table 4.1. Another series of simpler models 
regressed each institutional variable on salary, along with gender, race, and foreign-born status. Thus, none 
of the disciplinary or human capital traits were included. In these simpler models, research intensity 
explained $400 of the gender salary gap and $650 of the racial salary gap. HBCU/Women’s college setting 
explained $300 of the gender salary gap and $1,700 of the racial salary gap. Reliance on public revenue 
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In addition to the human capital explanations of salary disparities, other 
prominent individual-level explanations, reviewed in Chapter 2, are marriage and 
parental status, network ties, and negotiation skills. As shown in Table 4.1, a larger 
network has positive impacts on salary; however, these effects do not vary significantly 
by gender or race (see Appendix A.6 and A.7). In contrast, negotiation ability, marital 
status, and parental status do not show significant influence on faculty salary (Table 4.1 
and Appendix A.6) and do not show gendered or racial differences in their effects 
(Appendix A.6 and A.7). These results do not suggest support for these alternative 
individual-level explanations for pay gaps among faculty.    
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
explained $650 of the gender salary gap. Private/public status did not alter the salary gaps substantially. 
Finally, revenue per FTE worked in the opposite direction of other institutional variables. Controlling for 
revenue increases the gender salary gap by $600 and the racial salary gap by $1,700. Women and minority 
faculty work in institutions with higher resources on average (Table A.1), thus those higher resources aid 
women and minority faculty salaries in total. These results are notable in that they explain a portion of the 
salary gaps according to where women and minorities work; however, they do not speak to the central 
question of this dissertation. The central argument of this dissertation is not how institutional variables 
explain the overall salary gaps, but rather how salary gaps and rewards vary across organizational settings. 
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Table 4.1 Influence of Individual, Departmental, and Institutional Characteristics on STEM Faculty Salary 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
VARIABLES Demographics Plus Experience 
& Field 
Plus Other Human 
Capital & Career 
Advancement 
Plus 
Departmental 
Plus 
Institutional 
      
Female -15,008*** -2,119 44.1 -36.6 -1,021 
 (-7.74) (-1.43) (0.037) (-0.031) (-0.88) 
Underrepresented minority -10,348*** -4,716** -2,772 -2,627 -3,725** 
 (-4.97) (-2.21) (-1.60) (-1.44) (-2.03) 
Foreign-born -3,354 1,248 -4,082** -4,295** -3,539** 
 (-1.24) (0.56) (-2.21) (-2.33) (-2.00) 
Years since PhD  1,779*** 1,187*** 1,153*** 1,187*** 
  (15.8) (11.6) (11.4) (12.1) 
Postdoctoral appointment   4,782** 4,782** 2,806 
   (2.38) (2.37) (1.38) 
Mobility   2,632*** 2,593*** 2,919*** 
   (2.80) (2.75) (3.01) 
12 month contract   8,745*** 9,118*** 8,827*** 
   (3.07) (3.24) (3.20) 
Journal articles   199 198 191 
   (1.01) (1.02) (1.11) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s)   1.90** 1.70* 1.87** 
   (2.00) (1.86) (2.08) 
Percent of time on teaching   -386*** -364*** -339*** 
   (-7.44) (-6.80) (-5.84) 
Network ties   530*** 506** 377* 
   (2.58) (2.43) (1.77) 
Negotiation ability   4,851 5,026* 5,576* 
   (1.64) (1.69) (1.83) 
Extended tenure clock   -3,718** -3,708** -4,309*** 
   (-2.43) (-2.42) (-2.97) 
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Table 4.1 (continued)      
Current or past chair/dean   10,266*** 11,434*** 9,898*** 
   (3.83) (4.10) (3.50) 
Chaired professorship   25,608*** 25,867*** 23,525*** 
   (5.89) (5.97) (5.53) 
Research director   10,106*** 10,378*** 9,811*** 
   (2.79) (2.84) (2.82) 
Biology  -19,030*** -18,847*** -18,600*** -16,467*** 
  (-7.14) (-8.44) (-8.27) (-6.89) 
Biochemistry  -9,718*** -11,559*** -10,726*** -9,851*** 
  (-3.23) (-4.46) (-4.16) (-3.70) 
Math  -19,745*** -12,220*** -12,121*** -12,037*** 
  (-7.72) (-5.50) (-5.47) (-5.22) 
Department size    118** 113** 
    (2.33) (2.00) 
Research Intensive     -4,237* 
     (-1.94) 
Liberal Arts     2,712 
     (0.94) 
Masters     -931 
     (-0.41) 
Private     -112 
     (-0.032) 
HBCU or Women's College     -895 
     (-0.51) 
Revenue per FTE     0.15*** 
     (3.74) 
Percent of revenue from public funds     -80.1 
     (-1.18) 
Constant 98,573*** 69,845*** 77,249*** 73,821*** 71,889*** 
 (51.1) (25.6) (18.6) (16.5) (12.5) 
Observations 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 
R-squared 0.048 0.387 0.590 0.594 0.623 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.3 The Institution 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The traditional models controlling for human capital, career advancement, and discipline 
suggest that the gender and racial pay gaps among STEM faculty are insignificant. 
However, the central claim of this dissertation is that organizational setting matters to 
faculty conditions, and such variations among organizations are not adequately captured 
in the traditional models. Some descriptive examples of the varied characteristics across 
institutional categories support that claim. For example, 39 percent of women in HBCU 
and women’s colleges (weighted full sample) have served or currently serve as 
department chairs or deans. That level of administrative experience is comparable to 
men’s experience in HBCUs and women’s colleges (34%) and far beyond the 
administrative experience of men and women in other institutions (27% and 16%, 
respectively). The same holds true for URM faculty, who are on par with white and Asian 
faculty in administrative experience in HBCU/Women’s colleges but fall well below their 
levels in other institutions. Further, women and URM faculty in HBCU/Women’s 
colleges have similar years of experience to men and white and Asian faculty—a key 
determinant of pay and a major contributor to salary disparities among faculty in other 
institutions. Women in the sample who work in public institutions produce more journal 
articles, are more likely to be civil engineers, and less likely to be assistant professors 
than women in private institutions. These are just a few examples of the variation in traits 
across institutional groups, but they demonstrate that key determinants of pay are not 
necessarily consistent across institutional categories. 
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Human capital and career advancement traits vary across institutional groups, but 
does the salary treatment of faculty vary? Table 4.2 provides mean salaries by 
institutional type.
21
 Faculty in HBCU/Women’s colleges earn less than faculty in other 
institutions, but do not have significant mean salary gaps by gender or race—suggesting 
support for Hypothesis 1a. URM faculty in private institutions with above average public 
resources show a significant difference in mean salary with white and Asian faculty, 
suggesting a lack of support for Hypothesis 2b, which states that public resources will 
diminish salary gaps. Additionally, Masters and Liberal Arts institutions do not have 
significant racial pay gaps at the mean. All other institutional groupings, however, 
demonstrate significant gender and racial pay gaps at the mean. The remainder of this 
chapter tests whether these gender and racial gaps remain once human capital and 
disciplinary differences are taken into account. 
  
 
  
                                                          
21
 Three of the hypothesized institutional influences—organizational resources, composition of resources, 
and discretionary authority—are continuous variables. For descriptive comparison purposes, Table 4.2 
shows mean salaries for faculty by dividing them into institutions with above and below average levels of 
resources, public resources, and department head discretion. Additionally, it should be noted that the 
sampling framework for the NETWISE II Survey was prestigious liberal arts institutions. Prior literature 
typically finds higher salaries associated with research intensity; however, the Liberal Arts institutions here 
demonstrate higher overall mean salaries than research intensive and masters institutions. 
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Table 4.2 Weighted Mean Salary by Institutional Category (in thousands) 
  N 
Overall 
Mean 
Salary   Male Female     White/Asian URM   
Mission 
          HBCU/Women's 267  $      77  
 
 $     76   $     79  
  
         $      78   $     76  
 Non-HBCU/Women's 2085 93 
 
98 82 ***  
 
94 83 *** 
           Private 976 93 
 
98 83 ***  
 
94 83 *** 
Public 1376 92   96 81 ***    93 82 *** 
Resources 
          Above average revenue per FTE 429 107 
 
113 95 ***  
 
110 88 *** 
Below average revenue per FTE 1923 87 
 
91 77 ***  
 
88 79 *** 
           
Above average public revenue (Private) 198 105 
 
112 90 ***  
 
109 85 *** 
Below average public revenue (Private) 778 86 
 
89 80 ***  
 
87 80   
Above average public revenue (Public) 647 98 
 
102 85 ***  
 
99 84 *** 
Below average public revenue (Public) 729 86   90 78 ***    87 79 ** 
Power 
          Above average discretion 352 101 
 
106 85 ***  
 
102 89 *** 
Below average discretion 384 102   108 90 ***    104 87 *** 
Research Intensity (Carnegie-classification) 
         Research Extensive 698 103 
 
108 88 ***  
 
104 89 *** 
Research Intensive 498 83 
 
87 76 ***  
 
84 71 *** 
Masters 656 76 
 
77 72 ***  
 
76 74 
 Liberal Arts 500 89   92 84 ***    89 82   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.3.2 Research Intensity 
When observing institutional differences, prior research typically focuses on the 
Carnegie-classification institutional type based on research intensity. Pfeffer and Ross 
(1990) argued that the research focus of research institutions brings complexity to 
evaluation, thus heightening the possibility of discrimination. Several studies find larger 
gender pay gaps at research institutions, while the racial pay gap is insignificant across 
institutional types (Barbezat & Hughes, 2005; Lee & Won, 2014; National Academy of 
Sciences - National Research Council, 2001; Tolbert, 1986; Toutkoushian, 1998b). 
Results here do not support those prior findings, as the gender salary gap is insignificant 
across all Carnegie-classification institutional types (Table 4.3). The coefficients point to 
negative relationships between women and pay at research institutions, but do not reach 
significance. Likewise, URM faculty do not show significant pay gaps among 
comparable white and Asian faculty across institutional types, except in research 
intensive institutions. Within these institutions, results show a $12,200 pay gap between 
URM faculty and white and Asian faculty. Further disaggregation by race reveals that 
faculty in the “other race” category drive that pay gap at research intensive institutions, 
while African American and Hispanic faculty have pay gaps with white faculty barely 
surpassing the 0.1 significance level. 
Thus, similar to human capital and disciplinary explanations, research intensity 
classifications seem to suggest that gender pay gaps are not significant among STEM 
faculty in any institutional type, while racial gaps are only significant in the research 
intensive settings. Again, the argument of this dissertation is that traditional models—
including the Carnegie-classification institutional type—do not fully account for the 
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organizational influences on pay gaps among STEM faculty. There are other 
categorizations of institutions that may lend insight into how women and 
underrepresented minorities are faring comparatively.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Salary Gaps by Carnegie-Classification Institutional Type (Abbreviated 
Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Research 
Extensive 
Research 
Intensive 
Masters Liberal 
Arts 
     
Female -1,688 -1,099 901 91 
 (-0.76) (-0.56) (0.68) (0.045) 
Underrepresented minority -3,321 -12,189*** 859 4,449 
 (-1.12) (-3.57) (0.54) (0.94) 
Foreign-born -5,235** -2,563 -2,894* -1,062 
 (-1.98) (-1.07) (-1.70) (-0.40) 
     
Observations 698 498 656 500 
R-squared 0.647 0.485 0.548 0.582 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same control variables as Model 4 in Table 4.1 plus private status. The Liberal Arts model does not 
control for private status since they are private. Full model in Appendix A.8. 
 
 
  
4.3.3 The Influence of Institutional Identity  
In the U.S. postsecondary system, certain institutions have missions that focus on 
populations formerly excluded from higher education. In particular, women’s colleges 
and HBCUs were established to provide access to underrepresented groups and continue 
with that mission today. Hypothesis 1a stated that institutions whose mission focuses on 
underrepresented populations (i.e., women and minorities) will have a smaller pay gap 
given their historical focus on inclusion. The results here show that female faculty 
working in HBCU and women’s colleges earn $5,800 more, on average, than comparable 
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male faculty.
22
 In institutions that are not mission-driven toward underrepresented 
populations, the gender pay gap is not significant. As noted in Chapter 3, the coefficient 
of most interest is the interaction of gender or race with the institutional variable. Here, 
the interaction term ($6,420) demonstrates that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the gender salary gap between institutions with and without a mission 
focused on underrepresented groups. 
The intent of the hypothesis is important here. HBCU/Women’s colleges have a 
larger gender pay gap than other institutions, disconfirming the hypothesis that pay gaps 
would be smaller in these institutions. However, the HBCU/Women’s colleges gender 
pay gap is in the opposite direction of prior literature on gender pay gaps among faculty. 
Women earn more than comparable men in these institutions—a result contrary to 
previous findings on faculty. Thus, while the gender pay gap is larger in 
HBCU/Women’s colleges, that gap is in the direction that conforms to the expectations of 
these institutions differing from other institutions in their attention to underrepresented 
populations. 
It is hard to know why women earn more than comparable men at 
HBCU/Women’s colleges—in part because the reward structure appears so similar to 
other institutions. Years of experience may matter less to salary at HBCU/Women’s 
colleges, but only at the 0.1 significance level. The returns to salary from other human 
capital, career advancement characteristics, and discipline do not show a significant 
                                                          
22
 There is some question of whether both institutional types—women’s colleges and HBCUs—would 
exhibit this favorable treatment toward women, or whether only women’s colleges would, given their 
mission of access to women. Separating women’s colleges and HBCUs suggests that combining the 
institutional types is acceptable. In each institutional type, the gender pay gap is not significant given 
smaller sample sizes; however, the female coefficient in both institutional types is positive and greater than 
$2,000. 
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difference across the two institutional types. Table 4.5 shows the progressive influence of 
control variables at HBCU/Women’s colleges. Women and men have similar salaries 
prior to controls, then women have the advantage in even simple models of experience 
and field.  
Turning to race, the results show that URM faculty do not earn significantly 
different salaries than comparable white and Asian faculty in either institutional setting. 
The interaction term ($2,425) fails to reach significance, and it is not possible to conclude 
whether minority faculty fare better or worse comparatively in HBCU/Women’s colleges 
or other institutions. Foreign-born faculty earn almost $3,800 less than comparable 
native-born faculty in the “other institutions” category and a statistically insignificant 
$900 more in HBCU/Women’s colleges, but the interaction term again falls short of 
statistical significance. 
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Table 4.4 Influence of Institutional Mission on STEM Faculty Salary 
 (Model 1) (Model 2)  
VARIABLES HBCU/Women's Other Difference 
    
Female 5,765** -655 6,420** 
 (2.01) (-0.53) (2.06) 
Underrepresented minority -832 -3,258 2,425 
 (-0.28) (-1.60) (0.68) 
Foreign-born 891 -3,788** 4,679 
 (0.33) (-2.03) (1.42) 
Years since PhD 829*** 1,160*** -331* 
 (5.76) (11.1) (-1.86) 
Postdoctoral appointment 2,647 3,686* -1,039 
 (0.98) (1.68) (-0.30) 
Mobility 2,963 2,784*** 178 
 (1.25) (2.78) (0.069) 
12 month contract 20,776** 8,379*** 12,397 
 (2.07) (2.90) (1.19) 
Journal articles 158 226 -67.5 
 (0.85) (1.14) (-0.25) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) -1.84 1.83** -3.67 
 (-0.80) (2.02) (-1.49) 
Percent of time on teaching -358*** -351*** -7.64 
 (-3.92) (-5.77) (-0.070) 
Network ties 340 434** -93.1 
 (0.87) (1.98) (-0.21) 
Negotiation ability 13,998 4,408 9,591 
 (1.56) (1.45) (1.01) 
Extended tenure clock 334 -4,616*** 4,951 
 (0.096) (-2.96) (1.30) 
Current or past chair/dean 7,946*** 11,101*** -3,155 
 (2.70) (3.76) (-0.76) 
Chaired professorship 25,031*** 24,319*** 712 
 (2.74) (5.37) (0.070) 
Research director 3,096 10,440*** -7,344 
 (0.49) (2.81) (-1.00) 
Biology -10,444*** -17,758*** 7,314 
 (-2.68) (-7.12) (1.58) 
Biochemistry -12,127** -10,708*** -1,419 
 (-2.41) (-3.82) (-0.25) 
Math -9,947*** -12,100*** 2,153 
 (-2.72) (-4.99) (0.49) 
Department size 335* 109* 225 
 (1.66) (1.86) (1.07) 
Research Intensive 2,686 -7,584*** 10,270 
 (0.36) (-3.48) (1.34) 
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Table 4.4 (continued)    
Liberal Arts 17,756** -1,913 19,669** 
 (2.34) (-0.64) (2.41) 
Masters 4,501 -4,900** 9,400 
 (0.62) (-2.11) (1.24) 
Private -1,350 6,832*** -8,182** 
 (-0.42) (2.90) (-2.04) 
Constant 61,033*** 74,898*** 74,898*** 
 (5.85) (15.0) (15.0) 
    
Observations 267 2,085 2,352 
R-squared 0.527 0.611 0.612 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 Salary Determinants in HBCU/Women’s Colleges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Demographics Plus 
Experience 
& Field 
Plus Other 
Human Capital 
& Career 
Advancement 
Plus 
Departmental 
Plus 
Institutional 
      
Female 2,160 6,217* 5,722* 5,737** 5,765** 
 (0.55) (1.72) (1.93) (1.99) (2.01) 
Underrepresented minority -1,729 -1,101 -2,978 -3,005 -832 
 (-0.40) (-0.30) (-1.16) (-1.14) (-0.28) 
Foreign-born -4,335 -47.7 -96.6 -123 891 
 (-1.24) (-0.016) (-0.034) (-0.044) (0.33) 
      
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.009 0.272 0.503 0.503 0.527 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same controls as Table 4.4. Full table available in Appendix A.10. 
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Public institutions should have smaller gender and racial pay gaps than private 
institutions given their identity of access and accountability (Goodsell, 2015; Mandel & 
Semyonov, 2014; Morphew & Hartley, 2006; Tolbert, 1986). Results show that female 
faculty in private institutions earn about $3,100 less than comparable male faculty in 
STEM disciplines (Table 4.6). In contrast, there is no discernible gender pay gap in 
public institutions. While these results seem to confirm expectations, the interaction of 
gender and private status does not show a significant difference in the gender pay gap 
between public and private institutions. 
Likewise, public and private institutions are not significantly different in their 
racial pay gaps with aggregate or disaggregate race/ethnicity. It is noteworthy, however, 
that while not significant, the coefficient for URM status in public institutions is negative. 
The variation in racial pay gaps across public and private institutions cannot be 
confirmed; however, the results suggest that public institutions are not exhibiting the 
salary equity expected for minority faculty. Foreign-born faculty are not experiencing a 
more equitable environment in public institutions, either. Foreign-born faculty earn 
$5,700 less than comparable native-born faculty in public institutions, while the pay gap 
is not significant at private institutions and in the positive direction.  
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Table 4.6 Influence of Public/Private Status on STEM Faculty Salary (Abbreviated 
Model) 
 (1) (2)  
VARIABLES Private Public Difference 
    
Female -3,131* 562 -3,693 
 (-1.68) (0.36) (-1.53) 
Underrepresented minority -4,374 -2,606 -1,768 
 (-1.41) (-1.22) (-0.47) 
Foreign-born 1,136 -5,702*** 6,838* 
 (0.41) (-2.65) (1.95) 
    
Observations 976 1,376 2,352 
R-squared 0.586 0.648 0.628 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same controls as Table 4.4. Private status does not act as a control in Table 4.6, but is used as the 
subpopulation institutional grouping here. Full table available in Appendix A.11. 
 
 
 
4.3.4 The Role of Organizational Resources on Pay Gaps 
While some institutions may have an identity of access and inclusion, other institutions 
may stand apart in their competition to attract and retain faculty. Organizational resources 
influence the ability of institutions to compete for faculty, and certain institutions—
regardless of Carnegie-classification institutional type—are better poised to compete 
based on their resources (Ehrenberg, 2011). Hypothesis 2a posits that organizational 
resources offer another categorization of institutions that might affect pay equity among 
women and underrepresented minorities. The results show an increasing gender pay gap 
associated with greater revenue per full-time equivalent student. In fact, the interaction of 
revenue and gender is the most significant interaction among the hypothesized gender 
relationships in this dissertation, reaching the significance level of 0.01. Based on the 
results in Table 4.7, URM faculty do not appear to have the same salary disadvantage 
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connected with revenues as women do. However, further disaggregation of race provides 
more complex results. Table 4.8 shows that the pay gap between African American and 
white faculty and between Hispanic and white faculty grows with increasing revenues per 
student. 
Since the models interact institutional resources with all variables, the 
interpretation of Tables 4.7 and 4.8 is somewhat difficult given that no schools have zero 
resources or several other characteristics at zero. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide a visual 
depiction of the rising pay gaps related to revenue, holding all variables to their means 
and observing the role of institutional resources up to $200,000 per FTE. The graphs 
display 95% confidence intervals around the estimated pay gap. The gender pay gap 
becomes significant between $40,000 and $45,000 per FTE (0.05 significance level), 
while the African American and white pay gap becomes significant at $55,000 per FTE 
(0.05 significance level). Few institutions have such resources. Ninety percent of faculty 
in the weighted survey work in institutions with less than $55,000 in revenues per FTE. 
Thus, the pay disparities identified in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 are significant in only the most 
well-resourced institutions.  
 
Table 4.7 Influence of Institutional Resources on STEM Faculty Salary 
(Abbreviated Model) 
VARIABLES  
Revenue per FTE*Female -0.12*** 
 (-2.63) 
Revenue per FTE*URM -0.073 
 (-1.46) 
Revenue per FTE*Foreign-born 0.051 
 (1.08) 
  
Observations 2,352 
R-squared 0.657 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same controls as Table 4.4. Full table available in Appendix A.12. 
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Table 4.8 Influence of Institutional Resources, Disaggregated by Race/Ethnicity 
VARIABLES  
Revenue per FTE*Female -0.12*** 
 (-2.63) 
Revenue per FTE*Asian -0.14 
 (-1.36) 
Revenue per FTE*African American -0.29** 
 (-2.39) 
Revenue per FTE*Hispanic -0.11* 
 (-1.86) 
Revenue per FTE*Other Race 0.14 
 (0.94) 
Revenue per FTE*Foreign-born 0.088 
 (1.60) 
  
Observations 2,352 
R-squared 0.661 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same controls as Table 4.4. Full table available in Appendix A.13. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Salary Gap Between Male and Female STEM Faculty Associated with 
Organizational Resources 
 
Note: The graph displays 95% confidence interval around the estimated salary gap. All other variables are 
held at their means. 
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Figure 4.2 Salary Gap Between African American and White Faculty Associated 
with Organizational Revenues  
 
Note: The graph displays 95% confidence interval around the estimated salary gap. All other variables are 
held at their means. 
 
 
 
 
 
The composition of revenues may also influence the pay conditions within 
organizations. Similar to overall resources, private funds may enable institutions to 
compete for faculty (Alexander, 2001), while public funds may require greater 
transparency and accountability (Rainey, et al., 1995). Hypothesis 2b states that pay 
equity will be greater as reliance on public funds grows. 
As mentioned previously, private status and public revenues are highly correlated. 
Thus, models displayed in Table 4.9 test the influence of rising shares of public funds on 
pay equity for faculty in private and public institutions separately. For private institutions, 
the results show that greater reliance on public funds brings larger gaps in pay for both 
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women and underrepresented minorities—contrary to expectations. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 
display the gender and racial pay gaps for faculty in private institutions with a reliance on 
public funds ranging from zero to 20 percent, holding all other variables to their means. 
The gender pay gap becomes significant between 10 and 15 percent of revenues from 
public sources, while the racial pay gap reaches significance around 20 percent of 
revenue from public sources (0.05 significance level). Similar to overall resources, very 
few private institutions reach this level of reliance on public resources. In the weighted 
sample, 155 faculty work in private institutions with public revenue greater than 20 
percent. 
In contrast to faculty in private institutions, men and women in public institutions 
do not experience pay gaps associated with the institution’s reliance on public funds. 
Further, the salary gap between underrepresented minority faculty and white and Asian 
STEM faculty is in the opposite direction in public as compared to private institutions. As 
reliance on public funds increases in public institutions, the gap between URM and non-
URM faculty decreases, as hypothesized (Figure 4.5). The racial pay gap in public 
institutions starts off as significant, then narrows to an insignificant pay gap as share of 
public funds reaches 60 percent.  What this shows is that the racial pay gap is significant 
in more “privatized” public institutions. 
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Table 4.9 Influence of Public Revenue on Salary Equity (Abbreviated Models) 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
VARIABLES Private Public 
   
Percent of revenue from public sources*Female -335** -59.2 
 (-2.22) (-0.57) 
Percent of revenue from public sources*URM -451** 292** 
 (-2.08) (2.34) 
Percent of revenue from public sources*Foreign-born -32.7 21.3 
 (-0.21) (0.16) 
   
Observations 976 1,370 
R-squared 0.642 0.681 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same controls at Table 4.4. Full table available in Appendix A.14. Public Institutions column does 
not include Liberal Arts control as there are no Liberal Arts faculty in public institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Gender Pay Gap in Private Institutions with Greater Reliance on Public 
Revenues 
 
Note: The graph displays 95% confidence interval around the estimated salary gap. All other variables are 
held at their means. 
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Figure 4.4 Racial Pay Gap in Private Institutions with Greater Reliance on Public 
Revenues 
 
Note: The graph displays 95% confidence interval around the estimated salary gap. All other variables are 
held at their means. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Racial Pay Gap in Public Institutions with Greater Reliance on Public 
Revenues 
 
Note: The graph displays 95% confidence interval around the estimated salary gap. All other variables are 
held at their means. 
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In summary, the influence of public funds on salary gaps differs notably between 
public and private institutions and offers conflicting support for the hypothesis. In public 
institutions, the composition of funds acts as hypothesized for racial groups—narrowing 
the pay gap as public funds increase. The effects of public funds on gender are not 
significant in public institutions. In private institutions, the results disconfirm the 
hypothesis for both gender and race. The results in Table 4.9 do not distinguish between 
type of public funding—federal, state, or local. Public funds in private institutions are 
primarily federal funds, while there is a greater mix of federal and state funds within 
public institutions. Thus, the conflicting results may point to distinctions between the 
influence of federal and state public funds.  
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 draw out federal and state funds to observe their effects 
separately.
23
 When controlling for years of experience, field, and Carnegie-institutional 
type, pay gaps grow for women, underrepresented minorities, and foreign-born faculty as 
reliance on federal funds grows in private institutions. Those effects become insignificant 
with the addition of career advancement controls, but the signs remain in the negative 
direction, and do so in public institutions as well. State appropriations, on the other hand, 
are uniformly positive, but insignificant, in interactions.  Although most of these 
interactions with federal and state funds are insignificant or weak, results are suggestive 
that federal and state funds influence pay gaps in opposing ways. Federal funds seem to 
act as private funds were expected to act—driving salaries apart—while state funds 
appear to act as the hypothesized “public” funds. 
                                                          
23
 The classification of federal and state funds comes from the IPEDS Delta Cost Project—the same 
database as all other institutional resource data in this dissertation. Federal funds are federal grants, 
contracts, and appropriations net of Pell Grants. State funds are state appropriations, excluding grants, 
contracts, and capital appropriations. The analysis divides these two types of funds by stable operating 
revenue to get a share of revenues coming from each source. 
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Table 4.10 Influence of State Appropriations as Share of Operating Revenues in 
Public Institutions 
VARIABLES  
Percent of revenue from state funds*Female 160 
 (0.99) 
Percent of revenue from state funds * URM 206 
 (1.03) 
Percent of revenue from state funds * Foreign-born 0.33 
 (0.0019) 
  
Observations  1,350 
R-squared 0.680 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same controls at Table 4.4. Full table available in Appendix A.15. Public Institutions does not 
include Liberal Arts control as there are no Liberal Arts faculty in public institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.11 Influence of Federal Funds as Share of Operating Revenues 
 Private Public 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 1) (Model 2) 
VARIABLES Years of 
experience, 
Field, and 
Institutional 
Type 
Plus 
career 
advance-
ment 
traits 
Years of 
experience, 
Field, and 
Institutional 
Type 
Public 
plus 
career 
advance-
ment 
     
Pct. of revenue from federal funds*Female -424* -288 -79.0 -53.1 
 (-1.93) (-1.41) (-0.42) (-0.32) 
Pct. of revenue from federal funds*URM -581** -452 -136 -156 
 (-2.58) (-1.54) (-0.52) (-0.62) 
Pct. of revenue from federal funds*Foreign-born -497** -415 -181 -393* 
 (-2.12) (-1.57) (-0.82) (-1.74) 
     
Observations 976 976 1,370 1,370 
R-squared 0.538 0.655 0.469 0.681 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same controls at Table 4.4. Full table available in Appendix A.16. Public Institutions column does 
not include Liberal Arts control as there are no Liberal Arts faculty in public institutions. 
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4.3.5 Department Head Discretion Impacts Racial Pay Gaps 
The power to distribute resources is the final hypothesized relationship. The expectation 
here is that pay disadvantages among women and underrepresented minority STEM 
faculty will be greater in institutions that give greater discretion to department heads in 
salary and job incentive decisions. The results do not show a significant effect of 
department head discretion on pay gaps between women and men or URM and white and 
Asian faculty (Table 4.12). However, disaggregation of race refines those results. As 
department head discretion increases, the pay gap between African American faculty and 
comparable white faculty increases as well. Thus, hypothesis 3 receives support for 
certain racial groups, but not by gender. Figure 4.6 displays the growing pay gap between 
African American and white faculty under higher levels of department head discretion.  
The gap reaches significance at discretionary levels of 20 to 25, and about 34 percent of 
faculty in the weighted sample work in institutions with discretionary levels greater than 
20. Finally, foreign-born faculty experience a significant salary disadvantage compared to 
native-born faculty in higher discretionary institutions, but only in simpler models 
controlling for gender, race, years of experience, and field. 
 Although the results on department head discretion are not robust for several 
groups, it is notable how other salary determinants vary under different levels of 
discretion. Years of experience are more important at lower levels of discretion, while 
mobility influences salary more in higher discretion environments (Appendix Table 
A.17). These results support Pfeffer and Ross’s (1990) contention that discretion allows 
individual level characteristics such as additional job offers or mobility, in this case, to 
influence pay.  
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Table 4.12 Effects of Department Head Discretion on STEM Faculty Salaries 
(Abbreviated Model) 
  
VARIABLES  
  
Department head discretion*Female -17.6 
 (-0.059) 
Department head discretion*URM -600 
 (-1.58) 
Department head discretion*Foreign-born -583 
 (-1.59) 
  
Observations 736 
R-squared 0.674 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same control variables as Table 4.4. Full table available in Appendix A.17. This table does not 
control for Carnegie-classification institutional type since the subsample is from research institutions. 
 
 
 
Table 4.13 Effects of Department Head Discretion on STEM Faculty Salaries, 
Disaggregated Race/Ethnicity 
  
VARIABLES  
  
Department head discretion*Female -28.3 
 (-0.093) 
Department head discretion*Asian 151 
 (0.33) 
Department head discretion*African American -1,237** 
 (-2.22) 
Department head discretion*Hispanic 30.7 
 (0.060) 
Department head discretion*Other Race -690 
 (-0.87) 
Department head discretion*Foreign-born -693 
 (-1.55) 
  
Observations 736 
R-squared 0.676 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Same control variables as Table 4.4 plus private status. Full table available in Appendix A.18. This 
table does not control for Carnegie-classification institutional type since the subsample is from research 
institutions. 
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Figure 4.6 Pay Gap between African American and White STEM Faculty as 
Department Head Discretion Increases 
 
Note: The graph displays 95% confidence interval around the estimated salary gap. All other variables are 
held at their means. 
 
 
4.4 Summary of Findings 
The models presented here were designed to test the influence of institutional factors on 
gender and racial pay gaps among STEM faculty. Hypotheses addressed the role of 
institutional identity, organizational resources, and department head discretion in 
explaining discrepancies in faculty salaries among women and underrepresented 
minorities. Overall, the results, which are summarized in Table 4.14, present a mix of 
support. Gender pay gaps show a significant difference based on institutional mission of 
access, total organizational resources, and composition of resources (private institutions 
only), although some of those relationships are in the opposite direction of the hypotheses. 
Composition of organizational resources has conflicting effects on racial pay gaps across 
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private and public institutions, raising the possibility that federal funds act as private 
funds and drive URM salaries farther apart from white and Asian faculty salaries. African 
American faculty have significant pay gaps with white faculty based on total 
organizational resources and department head discretion. The next chapter provides a 
review and interpretation of these results, along with a discussion of the theoretical and 
policy implications.  
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Table 4.14 Summary of Findings 
Hypothesis Support Evidence 
Institutional Identity   
H1a: Pay disparities among 
STEM faculty will be lower in 
institutions with a mission of 
serving underrepresented 
groups. 
Gender: Yes/No 
Race: No 
 
Significant difference in the gender 
salary gap between HBCU/Women’s 
colleges and other institutions. Larger 
gender salary gap in HBCU/Women’s 
colleges; however, it is in the direction 
of advancing underrepresented 
populations. 
 
H1b: Pay disparities among 
STEM faculty will be greater 
in private institutions than in 
public institutions. 
Gender: No 
Race: No 
 
Weak evidence that women earn less 
than comparable men in private 
institutions; however, the difference in 
gender gaps between public and private 
institutions is insignificant.  
Foreign-born faculty earn less than 
comparable native-born faculty in 
public institutions, whereas they do not 
in private institutions. The difference 
in the foreign-born gap for faculty in 
public and private institutions is 
significant. 
Organizational Resources   
H2a: Pay disparities among 
STEM faculty will be higher in 
institutions with greater 
institutional resources. 
Gender: Yes 
Race: Yes 
 
Pay gaps increase with revenues per 
student for women, African-American, 
and Hispanic faculty compared to male 
and white faculty. 
H2b: Pay disparities will be 
higher in institutions that rely 
less on public funding. 
Gender: No 
Race: Partial 
 
Opposite of the hypothesized 
relationship, in private institutions, the 
gender and racial pay gaps widen as 
reliance on public funds increases.  
As hypothesized, the racial pay gap 
shrinks as reliance on public funds 
increases within public institutions. 
Disaggregation of public funds 
suggests that federal funds may act as 
“private” funds and drive salaries 
apart, while state funds may act as the 
hypothesized “public” funds and shrink 
pay gaps. 
Organizational Power   
H3: Pay disparities among 
STEM faculty will be greater 
in institutions with more 
autonomous department heads. 
Gender: No 
Race: Yes 
 
The salary gap between African-
American and comparable white 
faculty increases as discretionary 
authority increases. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This dissertation argued that individual and disciplinary explanations for faculty pay 
equity are not sufficient to understand the conditions of women and underrepresented 
minority STEM faculty. Although individual characteristics, particularly human capital 
and productivity, and discipline have the ability to explain pay gaps among faculty, they 
fail to distinguish important organizational features that alter those results. The analysis 
here supports that argument. Preliminary models mimicked traditional models on pay 
equity, looking to individual and disciplinary explanations. Results showed an 
insignificant pay gap for women and men with similar years of experience and field and 
an insignificant pay gap among racial groups with similar productivity. Additionally, 
traditional comparisons of institutional type based on the Carnegie-classification showed 
gender and racial pay parity, with one exception. 
Going deeper into institutional factors, however, provides evidence that pay 
equity depends on organizational setting. As Stainback and colleagues (2010, p. 242) 
note: “When we recognize the role of organizations as inequality-generating settings, it 
becomes clear that there are as many education returns or gender wage gaps as there are 
workplaces…” In that vein, this dissertation shows that institutions’ missions, resources, 
and decision-making structures influence the level of pay disparity by gender and race. 
This chapter reviews the findings of the dissertation and their contribution to the pay 
equity literature, discussing the implications for theory, policy, and future research as 
well as limitations. 
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5.2 Overview of Findings on Institutional Influence of Salary Equity   
The two primary findings for gender pay equity are that women earn more than 
comparable men in institutions focused on access for underrepresented groups, while men 
receive a salary advantage as institutional resources increase. These findings speak to the 
hypothesized tension of equity and competition within higher education institutions.  On 
the side of equity, female and male STEM faculty working in the HBCU/Women’s 
colleges category earn comparable average salaries. One reason for this equity at the 
mean is that female and male faculty in HBCUs and women’s colleges are similar on 
many important salary determinants. For example, women and men are on par for years 
of experience and administrative experience in HBCUs and women’s colleges, which is 
not the case in other institutional types. The female salary advantage in HBCU/Women’s 
colleges appears in simple models controlling for experience and field and remains with 
the addition of career advancement and human capital controls. This result is surprising 
given the overwhelming consistency of male salary advantages in academia. Institutional 
identity of inclusion does not shrink the gender pay gap to insignificance, but seems to 
rather push the gap significantly in favor of women. The few studies measuring the pay 
gap in these types of institutions have contended that a mission of access relates to a 
focus on equity; however, their results show a smaller gender pay gap at these institutions 
but not a significant female advantage as this dissertation finds (Hirsch & Leppel, 1982; 
Renzulli, et al., 2006). Thus, the results here go further than prior literature in 
demonstrating a different value system in these institutions than in other institutions 
related to rewards across gender. 
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In contrast to the female salary advantage in institutions with a mission of access, 
male STEM faculty appear to benefit from larger organizational resources in keeping 
with the hypothesis on competition. Organizational resources drive up men’s salaries at a 
faster rate than women’s, thereby increasing the pay gap. This result supports Tolbert’s 
findings (1986) on the role of organizational resources in gender pay.  
While those two institutional factors influence the gender pay gap, the other 
hypothesized relationships were weak or nonexistent. Women in private institutions have 
a weak, but significant pay gap with men, whereas women in public institutions do not. 
Those relationships conform to expectations; however, the difference in the gender pay 
gaps between public and private institutions failed to reach significance. The lack of 
significance is interesting given recent findings on average faculty pay in public and 
private institutions. Private institutions are pulling away from public institutions in 
average salary and are in a better position to compete for top faculty (Rippner & 
Toutkoushian, 2015). Results here also show a salary premium for STEM faculty 
working in a private institution. If private institutions continue to increase their pay 
compared to public institutions and compete for top faculty, scholars should attend to 
whether that pay and competition will disproportionately benefit male faculty, who are 
older and more prevalent and prominent in research institutions. 
Two hypotheses were not confirmed for gender—composition of funds and 
department head discretion. In fact, contrary to expectations, the gender salary gap 
increases in private institutions that are more reliant on public funds. This result raises the 
possibility that all public funds are not the same, as federal funds may act in an opposite 
manner to state funds with regards to pay gaps. 
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Although the analysis confirms expectations for gender by institutional identity 
and total resources, the findings on racial pay gaps are less compelling in the aggregate. 
The one significant result for URM faculty is the influence of public resources, which 
diminish pay gaps in public institutions yet increase pay gaps in private institutions. 
Again, this seems to be due to important distinctions between the effects of federal and 
state funds. Other institutional factors do not appear to influence racial pay gaps. 
Disaggregation of race is key, though, in observing additional variation according to 
institutional factors. African American and Hispanic faculty have a growing salary 
disadvantage compared to comparable white faculty with greater revenues per student. 
This finding extends the prior findings by Tolbert (1986) to race, and similar to gender, 
speaks to the possibility that resources exacerbate faculty pay gaps through competition 
for faculty. Finally, African American faculty have a growing gap with white STEM 
faculty with greater department head discretion, confirming expectations that 
discretionary environments can produce differential rewards (Pfeffer & Ross, 1990).  
5.3 Additional Findings  
Gender and racial pay gaps across institutional settings were the focus of this 
dissertation; however, results highlighted additional important findings on the condition 
of women and minorities in STEM and reward structures across academia. The results for 
foreign-born faculty are particularly compelling. In the dissertation’s traditional human 
capital and disciplinary models, foreign-born faculty experience a salary gap with 
comparable native-born faculty—whereas women and minorities do not. Even when 
controlling for academic rank, foreign-born faculty have a salary gap. Using the 2001 
SDR, Corley and Sabharwal (2007) found that foreign-born STEM faculty earned $1,188 
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less than comparable U.S.-born faculty. The foreign-born salary gap here is $5,500, or 
$3,500 when controlling for rank. Thus, human capital and structural theories fail to 
explain the salary gaps based on nativity. For institutional setting, foreign-born faculty 
have a salary disadvantage in research extensive, masters, public, high federal funded, 
and high discretion institutions (models without career advancement traits only).  
 Several common explanations for salary gaps were not supported by the results. 
Number of hours worked, marital status, and parental status did not significantly 
influence salary or show gender or racial patterns related to salary among comparable 
STEM faculty. Number of hours worked is a key feature of current economic 
explanations of gender pay gaps in the labor market broadly (Goldin, 2014); however, the 
results of this dissertation do not offer support for hourly effort driving pay differentials. 
The results on marriage and family support recent findings on academic faculty which 
find similar salaries regardless of marriage and parenthood (Kelly & Grant, 2012), yet go 
against findings in the labor market more broadly. One issue to note is that the data are 
cross-sectional, and thus do not capture those faculty who exited completely or shifted to 
non-tenure-track, part-time positions due to family considerations. As other authors have 
noted, the findings possibly understate the influence of marriage and children on salary 
given these data limitations (Fox, 2005). Two other common explanations—negotiation 
and networks—did increase salary, but similar to hours worked and family status did not 
vary significantly by gender or race in the full models. Interestingly, at the mean, women 
were more likely to have negotiated their first job offer and received all of their request, 
in contrast to findings in the labor market broadly (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). 
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 Looking at the returns to different characteristics across gender and race, female 
STEM faculty have a few interesting advantages. The salary effects of mobility and stop-
the-clock policies are better for women than for men. Women are less mobile; however, 
the salary gain from an additional tenure track position is more for women than for men 
($5,600 versus $2,200). These findings contradict previous findings in which mobility in 
academia broadly did not matter much to faculty earnings and in fact hurt women’s 
earnings in the first job change (Barbezat & Hughes, 2001). The conflicting results point 
to the possibility that mobility is valued differently in STEM disciplines than in academia 
broadly or that mobility has become more important since those previous findings. The 
influence of stop-the-clock policies were likewise surprising, particularly in light of 
recent findings that such policies can help men more than women in promotion (Antecol, 
Bedard, & Stearns, 2016).
24
 Extending the tenure clock did not significantly affect 
women’s pay. In contrast, men who stopped the clock earned $8,600 less than 
comparable men who did not. A study of one research university found that stopping-the-
clock hurt both men and women, but men more so, and argued the decision to stop the 
clock signaled to the department a lower level of commitment on the part of the faculty 
member (Manchester, Leslie, & Kramer, 2013). Future research could explore these 
results on mobility and stop-the-clock policies further to find why they contradict prior 
findings for the academe at large, as well as how they differ across institutional types as 
the prior literature focuses on research institutions.  
5.4 Theoretical Implications 
The findings provide several theoretical insights. First, institutional identity appears to 
influence conditions within an organization. As discussed in Chapter 2, organizational 
                                                          
24
 The study focused on economic faculty in the top research universities in the U.S. 
110 
 
identity is the core feature of an organization (Albert & Whetten, 1985), which in this 
case is inclusion in higher education of formerly excluded populations. Women earn 
more than comparable men in these settings, suggesting support for founding effects in 
which certain values are instilled in the organization at its inception and carried through 
organizational structure and practice (Stinchcombe, 1965). There are other possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. Composition effects, wherein the representation of 
women in higher ranks aids women in lower ranks, could be at work. A higher share of 
women in full professor ranks can lower pay gaps among junior faculty (Lee & Won, 
2014), but has not been found to push the salary advantage in favor of women as is the 
case here. Another possible theoretical lens is gendered organizations, in which 
bureaucratic forms of organization instill inequality throughout work systems (Acker, 
1990). HBCUs and women’s colleges have hierarchical features in both the ranking 
system and the administrative structure similar to other colleges, so again it is difficult to 
say these organizations are less “masculine” than other institutions. Future research could 
compare HBCUs and women’s colleges to predominately black institutions and former 
women’s colleges in order to test more directly these theories of mission and founding 
effects, composition, and gendered organizational structure.    
Second, the results for public ownership and financial “publicness” contradict 
theoretical expectations. Gender and racial pay gaps are insignificant across the 
public/private distinction, while foreign-born faculty are experiencing larger gaps with 
native-born faculty in public compared to private institutions. These results—particularly 
for foreign-born faculty—call into question the public/private dichotomy, which poses 
public institutions as more accessible, transparent, and accountable (Goodsell, 2015; 
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Mandel & Semyonov, 2014). Further, financial publicness appears to be an insufficient 
concept for pay equity in higher education. Reliance on public resources acts in opposing 
manners for public and private institutions—increasing pay gaps in private settings and 
diminishing pay gaps in public settings. Public funds at private institutions are almost 
wholly federal funds, whereas they are a mix of federal and state funds in public 
institutions. The results suggest that there may be important distinctions between federal 
and state funds in the concept of “publicness.” State appropriations, which are associated 
with instruction, may be acting similar to the concept of “publicness,” while federal funds 
act in the direction (albeit not at a statistically significant level) of organizational 
resources—negatively affecting pay equity. Federal funds may be more in line with 
resource dependency theory as external research grants encourage competition and power 
structures (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974).  
Finally, department head discretion showed significant influence for one group in 
the full models—African American faculty compared to white faculty—and a second 
group in simpler models—foreign-born faculty. Moreover, the returns to experience, 
mobility, network ties, and teaching, among others, varied according to the amount of 
power placed in the hands of department heads. These results support theories of 
formalization in pay-setting, in which managerial discretion alters the influence of salary 
determinants and opens the possibility of pay disparities (Pfeffer & Ross, 1990). The pay 
formalization literature typically focuses on consequences for women, which these 
findings do not support, and does not offer evidence on race or nativity. Thus, the 
findings here offer key evidence that discretion influences the conditions of minority and 
foreign-born faculty. 
112 
 
The discussion above highlights important institutional variations in pay equity; 
however, it is interesting how institutions are quite similar in their returns to many other 
characteristics. For the comparison of HBCU/Women’s colleges and other institutions, 
for example, the only significant differences between the two institutional types were the 
influence of gender, experience, liberal arts setting, and private status. All other 
characteristics received similar salary treatments at the two institutional types. Another 
striking example is the negative returns to teaching across institutional categories, 
including liberal arts institutions. Thus, while organizational setting influences pay gaps 
in important ways, the many similarities in reward structures across institutional 
categorizations supports institutional theory’s isomorphism in which organizations mimic 
each other in their structures and practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). The findings on pay gaps thus may be even more surprising as gender and race 
continue to influence pay in spite of the vast similarities in salary determinants across 
organizational settings.   
5.5 Policy Implications 
Higher education institutions are not going to level resources, change their public/private 
status, or become HBCUs or women’s colleges in the name of pay equity; however, 
policy interventions can be attuned to those institutional variations. Currently in the U.S., 
federal and state policy proposals on pay equity in the overall labor force focus on salary 
transparency, compensation panels, paid leave, minimum wage, legal ramifications, and 
enforcement efforts (American Association of University Women, 2016; United States 
Office of Personnel Management, 2014; White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
2016). Recommendations from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for the 
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federal government workforce offer policy proposals that may be more in line with what 
higher education institutions can undertake—more so than minimum wage or new legal 
guidelines. OPM (2014) recommends closing the gender pay gap by enhancing starting-
salary transparency and paying greater attention to salary-setting discretion or flexibility. 
Within higher education, institutions and professional associations have implemented or 
proposed salary committees, negotiation training, salary ratios and caps, and programs to 
aid in the recruitment, retention, and promotion of women and minority faculty. While 
this dissertation did not evaluate the effectiveness of any policy in resolving pay 
disparities, the results provide insight into several of these policies. 
Although it is generally thought that public institutions have greater pay equity, 
the results here do not robustly support that argument. It is notable, then, that the federal 
recommendations have recognized the need for additional salary transparency within the 
federal government, even as prominent policy proposals focus on the need for private 
sector salary transparency (e.g. Paycheck Fairness Act). The results here support the need 
for attention to pay equity in both public and private settings. Policies within the public 
setting need to address the disparities among native-born and foreign-born faculty, in 
particular, as the nativity gap is higher in public than in private institutions, greater as 
federal funding reliance increases, and pronounced in multiple Carnegie-classification 
institutional types. It is worth noting, though, that the reward structures at public and 
private institutions vary with regards to productivity and discipline. Thus, transparency 
alone will likely not bring public and private institutions in line with one another in that 
they place different values on certain faculty characteristics. 
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Public administration scholars have long debated the benefits and drawbacks of 
managerial flexibility (see, for example, Friedrich and Finer in Stillman II, 2010), but the 
results here suggest that institutions need, at a minimum, to recognize how flexibilities 
are used and whether those flexibilities benefit certain groups. Pay-setting flexibility in 
OPM’s recommendations is a similar concept to the discretionary authority modeled in 
this dissertation in that managers go beyond salary scales. OPM recommends that federal 
agencies regularly review their pay-setting flexibilities to identify whether they use these 
flexibilities more often for certain groups. Likewise, higher education institutions could 
review the discretionary authority available to department heads and the use of that 
discretion for faculty salaries by gender and race. Additionally, as higher education 
institutions adopt more flexible budgetary models such as resource-centered budgeting 
and shift additional authority to departments, administrators should be attuned to whether 
such flexibilities will influence pay gaps. Beyond that level of awareness and data 
collection, some institutions have moved to using salary committees, which expands 
faculty involvement in salary-setting. Future research could explore the reward systems 
under a committee structure versus an autonomous department head to identify how 
outcomes vary.  
Many of the existing policies and programs in STEM address how to attract 
women and underrepresented minorities into STEM overall and male-dominated STEM 
fields, in particular, and how to ensure those groups persist and advance. According to 
the results in this dissertation, the issue of persistence and advancement will be key in 
resolving the salary gap over time. Years of experience overwhelmingly explains pay 
gaps compared to other factors—much more so than discipline. Women and 
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underrepresented minorities are younger in PhD years. Further, the payoff for each 
additional year is significantly less for URM faculty compared to white and Asian faculty 
(Appendix A.7). The salary benefit of administrative experience is also substantial, thus 
institutional efforts to advance women and minorities into leadership positions will 
likewise diminish the total salary gap. In terms of recruitment, the National Research 
Council (2010) recommends search committee strategies that can increase female 
applicants and hires, such as women serving on and chairing the search committee. 
Spousal hiring is another recruitment strategy on which the data shed light. Forty percent 
of women in this survey are married to an academic, while 20 percent of male faculty 
have an academic partner. Thus, spousal hiring policies may be more important to female 
academics’ mobility. These policies deserve further research in light of women’s lower 
mobility and higher returns from mobility. Finally, stop-the-clock policies are also related 
to retention and promotion, and the results here show that such policies are not harming 
women’s salary, but are detrimental to male faculty salaries. As noted earlier, future 
research should explore this impact for male faculty, as well as the impact of such 
policies across institutional settings.  
5.6 Implications for Future Research 
Several areas for future research have been noted already, including stop-the-clock 
policies, salary committees, faculty mobility, mission versus composition effects, and 
federal versus state funds effects. This dissertation also raises considerations for pay 
equity research related to organizational setting and race/ethnicity. 
 The central claim of this dissertation is that organizational setting matters to pay 
equity. As shown, organizational mission, resources, and discretionary power relate to the 
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conditions of women and minority STEM faculty. STEM scholarship has often focused 
on research universities since they train future scientists, house the majority of academic 
scientists, and produce more research than other institutions. However, the federal 
government through programs such as the National Science Foundation’s ADVANCE 
has called for additional attention to scientists and engineers in other institutions. This 
dissertation supports that claim and suggests that there are important differences in 
conditions across organizational setting that warrant further research.   
In addition to disaggregating institutions, the results here call for disaggregation 
of race/ethnicity and nativity when possible. As higher education scholars have found, 
disaggregation of race can alter findings on pay gaps (Toutkoushian, 1998a). In this 
dissertation, there were notable differences in pay experiences between African American 
and Hispanic faculty, who are often grouped as underrepresented minority, as well as 
differences between white and Asian faculty, who are likewise grouped together in the 
STEM literature. This dissertation did not examine the intersection of race and gender, 
but such further disaggregation should be explored.  
5.7 Limitations 
There are several limitations in answering the question of organizational influences on 
pay equity among STEM faculty, as well in expanding the interpretations to other 
academic fields or the broader labor force. First, salary is one reward for STEM faculty, 
in addition to equipment, travel, and lab space, among others. It is not possible to 
measure those additional rewards using the NETWISE II Survey dataset. While salary is 
an important overall reward and has been shown to vary systematically by group here, 
these other rewards offer incentives and prestige that may heighten or diminish disparities 
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among STEM faculty. Second, the data are self-reported and cross-sectional. Factors such 
as the influence of marriage and parenthood might be understated, if those factors have 
caused certain faculty to exit the academic workforce entirely. Third, future research 
should explore additional ways of measuring discretionary authority. Here, the measure 
draws from STEM department heads’ responses and creates an institutional average of 
those individual power indices. This institutional-level measure misses the variability 
across departments in levels of discretion. Fourth, the analysis does not account for the 
possibility that certain characteristics lead faculty members to locate in particular 
institutional types. Rather, the study looks to identify how salary gaps vary across 
institutional types. Finally, it is questionable whether these organizational influences are 
consistent across academic fields, or particular to STEM fields. For example, STEM 
fields may respond differently to organizational resources and discretionary authority 
given the prevalence of grants within those fields. 
In spite of these limitations, the research here points to the importance of 
contextual explanations in pay disparities and provides a platform for further exploration 
of organizational influences on the conditions of women and underrepresented minorities 
in STEM. The research makes contributions in several ways. The dissertation examines 
more recent data, which is valuable as pay gaps continue to evolve and women and 
underrepresented minorities grow their shares within STEM. The findings expand our 
understanding of pay gaps across racial groups and among foreign-born faculty—groups 
that have been neglected in the pay equity literature. Finally, the dissertation provides 
insights both theoretically and practically that further awareness of organizational levers 
playing a role in pay disparities among STEM faculty.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
FULL MODELS 
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Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics for Subsample in Research Institutions, Weighted 
 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable 
    Salary       $101,895  $36,779  $43,000  $300,000  
Key independent variables 
    Female 27% 45% 0 1 
Underrepresented minority 8% 28% 0 1 
Department head discretion 17.80 6.68 1.46 40.63 
Control variables: Personal characteristics 
   Married or living in a marriage-like 
relationship 
88% 33% 
0 1 
Divorced/separated/widowed 7% 25% 0 1 
Single 6% 23% 0 1 
Cared for children 52% 50% 0 1 
Native-born U.S. citizen 66% 47% 0 1 
Control variables: Human capital 
    Years since PhD 22.61 11.69 2 51 
Years since PhD squared 647.90 589.38 4         2,601  
Postdoctoral appointment 73% 45% 0 1 
Worked in government 18% 39% 0 1 
Worked in private industry 22% 41% 0 1 
Worked in nonprofit organization 5% 23% 0 1 
Control variables: Career advancement 
   Mobility 1.41 0.93 0 30 
12 month contract 15% 36% 0 1 
Journal articles 6.36 6.44 0 80 
Grant funds awarded (‘000s) $639 $1,540 0 $33,500 
Percent of time on teaching 32% 18% 0 100 
Average weekly hours worked 55.45 11.17 5 100 
Network ties 9.84 3.95 1 26 
Negotiation ability 10% 31% 0 1 
Current or past chair/dean 20% 40% 0 1 
Chaired professorship 9% 28% 0 1 
Research director 8% 27% 0 1 
Assistant 20% 40% 0 1 
Associate 30% 46% 0 1 
Full 50% 50% 0 1 
Extended tenure clock 10% 29% 0 1 
Control variables: Department 
    Civil Engineering 24% 43% 0 1 
Biology 40% 49% 0 1 
Biochemistry 13% 34% 0 1 
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Table A.1 (continued)     
Math 23% 42% 0 1 
Department size 34.00 21.60 3 139 
Control variable: Institution 
    Private 22% 41% 0 1 
Observations 736 
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Table A.2 Difference of Means by Gender, Weighted 
 
Full Sample 
 
Subsample 
 
 
Male Female Difference 
 
Male Female Difference 
 Salary  $    96,696   $    81,862   $      14,834  **  $   107,138   $   87,885   $   19,252  ** 
Underrepresented minority 8% 9% -1% 
 
8% 9% -1% 
 HBCU or women's college 4% 7% -3% ** 
    Private 31% 36% -6% * 22% 21% 1% 
 Revenue per FTE  $    42,007   $    44,104   $     (2,097) 
     Percent of revenue from public sources 43% 39% 4% ** 
    Department head discretion 
    
17.90 17.50 0.40 
 Married/marriage-like relationship 90% 79% 11% ** 90% 80% 10% ** 
Divorced/separated/widowed 5% 8% -3% 
 
6% 10% -4% 
 Single 4% 12% -8% ** 4% 10% -6% ** 
Cared for children 51% 60% -8% ** 49% 62% -13% * 
Foreign-born 31% 23% 8% ** 36% 28% 7% 
 Years since PhD 23 17 6 ** 25 17 7 ** 
Years since PhD squared 661 366 295 ** 746 385 361 ** 
Postdoctoral appointment 65% 70% -5% * 69% 81% -11% ** 
Worked in government 18% 15% 3% 
 
19% 17% 2% 
 Worked in private industry 24% 15% 9% ** 26% 12% 14% ** 
Worked in nonprofit organization 5% 7% -1% 
 
5% 7% -2% 
 Mobility 1.43 1.18 0.25 ** 1.49 1.19 0.31 ** 
12 month contract 15% 12% 3% 
 
16% 15% 1% 
 Journal articles 5.42 4.13 1.29 ** 6.64 5.63 1.01 
 Grant funds awarded (000s)  $         514   $         385   $          129  
 
 $          648   $        616   $          32  
 Percent of time on teaching 41% 45% -4% ** 32% 33% -1% 
 Average weekly hours worked 54.05 54.84 -0.79 
 
55.45 55.45 0.00 
 Network ties 9.39 9.81 -0.42 
 
9.81 9.92 -0.11 
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Table A.2 (continued)         
Negotiation ability 8% 13% -4% * 9% 15% -6% 
 Current or past chair/dean 28% 18% 10% ** 23% 10% 13% ** 
Chaired professorship 9% 4% 5% ** 11% 3% 8% ** 
Research director 9% 3% 6% ** 10% 2% 8% ** 
Assistant 17% 33% -16% ** 15% 34% -19% ** 
Associate 30% 38% -8% ** 27% 37% -10% * 
Full 54% 29% 24% ** 58% 29% 29% ** 
Extended tenure clock 6% 19% -13% ** 6% 19% -13% ** 
Civil Engineering 21% 13% 8% ** 27% 17% 10% ** 
Biology 38% 53% -15% ** 34% 55% -22% ** 
Biochemistry 13% 13% -1% 
 
14% 12% 2% 
 Math 28% 21% 7% ** 26% 16% 10% * 
Department size 26.48 25.21 1.27 
 
33.92 34.20 -0.28 
 Research Extensive 53% 48% 5% 
     Research Intensive 18% 18% 1% 
     Liberal Arts 8% 14% -6% ** 
    Masters 21% 21% 0%           
Observations  1321 1031 
  
372 364 
   ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A.3 Difference of Means by URM Status, Weighted 
 
Full Sample Subsample 
 
White or 
Asian URM Difference 
 
White or Asian URM Difference 
 Salary  $      93,293   $   81,911   $       11,383  **  $         103,161   $             88,201   $    14,960  ** 
Female 29% 32% -3% 
 
27% 29% -2% 
 HBCU or women's college 4% 19% -15% ** 
    Private 32% 34% -1% 
 
21% 29% -8% 
 Revenue per FTE  $      42,046   $   48,970   $       (6,924) 
     Percent of revenue from public 
sources 42% 45% -3% 
     Department head discretion 
    
17.70 18.80 -1.10 
 Married/marriage-like relationship 88% 81% 6% 
 
88% 88% 0% 
 Divorced/separated/widowed 6% 10% -4% 
 
7% 9% -2% 
 Single 7% 8% -2% 
 
6% 4% 2% 
 Cared for children 54% 54% -1% 
 
52% 54% -2% 
 Foreign-born 27% 46% -19% ** 32% 52% -20% * 
Years since PhD 21.48 17.83 3.65 ** 23.03 18.08 4.95 * 
Years since PhD squared 588.00 424.90 163.10 * 667.30 437.80 229.50 * 
Postdoctoral appointment 66% 70% -4% 
 
72% 75% -3% 
 Worked in government 17% 13% 4% 
 
19% 9% 10% * 
Worked in private industry 21% 22% 0% 
 
22% 19% 3% 
 Worked in nonprofit organization 6% 3% 3% ** 6% 1% 5% ** 
Mobility 1.35 1.44 -0.09 
 
1.40 1.57 -0.18 
 12 month contract 14% 10% 5% 
 
16% 9% 7% 
 Journal articles 5.14 3.96 1.18 ** 6.45 5.43 1.02 
 Grant funds awarded (000s)  $   474   $     502   $    (27) 
 
 $    633  $        706   $     (73) 
 Percent of time on teaching 42% 42% 0% 
 
32% 29% 3% 
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Table A.3 (continued)         
Average weekly hours worked 54.23 54.92 -0.69 
 
55.30 57.06 -1.76 
 Network ties 9.47 10.03 -0.56 
 
9.77 10.67 -0.90 
 Negotiation ability 10% 7% 3% 
 
11% 6% 5% 
 Current or past chair/dean 25% 18% 8% * 21% 6% 14% ** 
Chaired professorship 8% 3% 5% ** 9% 2% 8% ** 
Research director 7% 3% 5% ** 9% 1% 7% ** 
Assistant 20% 32% -12% * 19% 34% -15% 
 Associate 31% 39% -7% 
 
29% 38% -9% 
 Full 48% 29% 19% ** 52% 28% 24% ** 
Extended tenure clock 9% 13% -4% 
 
9% 15% -6% 
 Civil Engineering 18% 18% 0% 
 
24% 24% 0% 
 Biology 42% 51% -9% 
 
39% 49% -10% 
 Biochemistry 13% 10% 3% 
 
13% 11% 2% 
 Math 27% 21% 5% 
 
24% 16% 8% 
 Department size 26.15 25.61 0.54 
 
33.96 34.41 -0.45 
 Research Extensive 52% 53% -1% 
     Research Intensive 19% 13% 5% 
     Liberal Arts 10% 9% 0% 
     Masters 20% 25% -4% 
     Observations 2071 281     632 104     
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A.4 Traditional Human Capital and Disciplinary Models with Disaggregated 
Race/Ethnicity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Demographics Plus 
Experience & 
Field 
Plus Other 
Human Capital 
& Career 
Advancement 
Plus 
Departmental 
     
Female -14,944*** -2,034 104 24.9 
 (-7.70) (-1.38) (0.087) (0.021) 
Asian -3,687 874 3,585 3,643 
 (-0.73) (0.22) (1.14) (1.15) 
Black/African American -11,796*** -5,254** -1,815 -1,131 
 (-3.77) (-2.04) (-0.81) (-0.52) 
Hispanic -10,772*** -811 242 462 
 (-3.71) (-0.29) (0.099) (0.19) 
Other race -8,993* -16,163*** -11,456*** -12,877*** 
 (-1.72) (-2.93) (-2.81) (-2.63) 
Foreign-born -2,182 781 -5,268** -5,521** 
 (-0.58) (0.26) (-2.17) (-2.29) 
Years since PhD  1,795*** 1,202*** 1,169*** 
  (15.7) (11.7) (11.4) 
Postdoctoral appointment   4,763** 4,747** 
   (2.35) (2.34) 
Mobility   2,736*** 2,696*** 
   (2.91) (2.86) 
12 month contract   8,640*** 9,022*** 
   (3.04) (3.21) 
Journal articles   197 196 
   (1.00) (1.01) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s)   1.90** 1.69* 
   (2.00) (1.85) 
Percent of time on teaching   -382*** -360*** 
   (-7.46) (-6.81) 
Network ties   573*** 550*** 
   (2.81) (2.68) 
Negotiation ability   5,030* 5,233* 
   (1.73) (1.79) 
Extended tenure clock   -3,740** -3,738** 
   (-2.43) (-2.43) 
Current or past chair/dean   10,237*** 11,445*** 
   (3.84) (4.11) 
Chaired professorship   25,724*** 25,994*** 
   (5.90) (5.99) 
Research director   10,127*** 10,402*** 
   (2.79) (2.84) 
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Table A.4 (continued)     
Biology  -18,996*** -18,808*** -18,541*** 
  (-7.12) (-8.41) (-8.22) 
Biochemistry  -9,679*** -11,439*** -10,559*** 
  (-3.22) (-4.42) (-4.11) 
Math  -19,468*** -11,875*** -11,747*** 
  (-7.64) (-5.38) (-5.36) 
Department size    123** 
    (2.43) 
     
Constant 98,722*** 69,408*** 75,959*** 72,302*** 
 (51.5) (25.3) (18.3) (16.3) 
     
Observations 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 
R-squared 0.049 0.389 0.592 0.596 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5 Salary Determinants with Faculty Rank 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Demographics Plus Experience 
& Field 
Plus Other Human 
Capital & Career 
Advancement 
Plus 
Departmental 
Plus 
Institutional 
      
Female -15,008*** -888 525 439 -507 
 (-7.74) (-0.66) (0.47) (0.40) (-0.48) 
Underrepresented minority -10,348*** -2,940 -1,712 -1,577 -2,610 
 (-4.97) (-1.46) (-1.05) (-0.92) (-1.56) 
Foreign-born -3,354 1,978 -3,277* -3,515** -2,774 
 (-1.24) (0.94) (-1.83) (-1.97) (-1.61) 
Assistant  -25,578*** -17,398*** -17,063*** -17,371*** 
  (-9.32) (-7.31) (-7.15) (-7.72) 
Associate  -24,498*** -16,578*** -16,571*** -16,695*** 
  (-10.4) (-9.12) (-9.13) (-9.29) 
Years since PhD  1,030*** 740*** 714*** 714*** 
  (6.93) (5.77) (5.57) (5.82) 
Postdoctoral appointment   4,890*** 4,889*** 2,699 
   (2.66) (2.65) (1.47) 
Mobility   2,567*** 2,531*** 2,870*** 
   (2.72) (2.66) (2.91) 
12 month contract   9,108*** 9,458*** 9,155*** 
   (3.35) (3.52) (3.47) 
Journal articles   142 142 131 
   (0.77) (0.77) (0.81) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s)   1.80** 1.61* 1.82** 
   (1.99) (1.87) (2.18) 
Percent of time on teaching   -352*** -331*** -288*** 
   (-7.32) (-6.75) (-5.49) 
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Table A.5 (continued)      
Network ties   417** 394* 266 
   (2.09) (1.96) (1.29) 
Negotiation ability   4,948* 5,140* 5,573* 
   (1.66) (1.72) (1.83) 
Extended tenure clock   -1,670 -1,699 -2,388 
   (-1.08) (-1.10) (-1.61) 
Current or past chair/dean   8,314*** 9,460*** 8,384*** 
   (3.19) (3.47) (3.08) 
Chaired professorship   24,867*** 25,103*** 22,995*** 
   (5.80) (5.87) (5.46) 
Research director   8,942** 9,222** 8,742** 
   (2.44) (2.50) (2.54) 
Biology  -16,825*** -17,600*** -17,379*** -14,819*** 
  (-6.75) (-8.58) (-8.39) (-6.80) 
Biochemistry  -8,370*** -10,908*** -10,118*** -8,741*** 
  (-2.89) (-4.36) (-4.06) (-3.40) 
Math  -19,295*** -12,594*** -12,496*** -12,051*** 
  (-8.23) (-6.13) (-6.06) (-5.65) 
Department size    114** 96.1* 
    (2.29) (1.76) 
Research Intensive     -5,548*** 
     (-2.80) 
Liberal Arts     36.8 
     (0.014) 
Masters     -3,203 
     (-1.60) 
Private     2,266 
     (0.68) 
HBCU or Women's College     -1,505 
     (-0.90) 
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Table A.5 (continued)      
Revenue per FTE     0.13*** 
     (3.72) 
Percent of public revenue     -43.9 
     (-0.68) 
Constant 98,573*** 97,068*** 95,119*** 91,590*** 89,246*** 
 (51.1) (23.7) (20.5) (18.5) (14.8) 
      
Observations 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 
R-squared 0.048 0.455 0.619 0.623 0.651 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.6 Salary Determinants by Gender with Marital and Parental Status 
 (1) (2)  
VARIABLES Male Female Difference 
    
Underrepresented minority -2,419 -366 2,053 
 (-1.03) (-0.14) (0.60) 
Foreign-born -5,265** -1,217 4,048 
 (-2.14) (-0.74) (1.37) 
Years since PhD 1,148*** 1,164*** 16.1 
 (8.95) (9.47) (0.091) 
Postdoctoral appointment 5,937** 1,553 -4,384 
 (2.20) (1.00) (-1.41) 
Mobility 2,199** 5,622*** 3,423* 
 (2.22) (3.54) (1.83) 
12 month contract 8,330** 12,863*** 4,533 
 (2.39) (4.28) (0.99) 
Journal articles 129 471** 342 
 (0.62) (2.27) (1.16) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) 1.72 1.86* 0.14 
 (1.64) (1.71) (0.095) 
Percent of time on teaching -427*** -200*** 227*** 
 (-6.02) (-4.80) (2.76) 
Network ties 531* 393** -138 
 (1.90) (2.22) (-0.42) 
Negotiation ability 5,356 4,337* -1,019 
 (1.25) (1.85) (-0.21) 
Extended tenure clock -8,646*** 278 8,924*** 
 (-3.75) (0.14) (2.94) 
Current or past chair/dean 12,900*** 7,096*** -5,804 
 (3.81) (3.02) (-1.41) 
Chaired professorship 25,738*** 25,273*** -464 
 (5.14) (4.60) (-0.062) 
Research director 9,908** 5,268 -4,640 
 (2.37) (1.15) (-0.75) 
Biology -19,072*** -19,420*** -347 
 (-6.80) (-7.89) (-0.093) 
Biochemistry -10,593*** -12,572*** -1,979 
 (-3.15) (-4.46) (-0.45) 
Math -12,620*** -14,081*** -1,461 
 (-4.57) (-6.05) (-0.40) 
Department size 100 148*** 47.9 
 (1.61) (3.30) (0.63) 
Cared for children 740 -201 -942 
 (0.35) (-0.14) (-0.36) 
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Table A.6 (continued) 
   
Divorced/separated/widowed -1,483 2,661 4,145 
 (-0.31) (0.87) (0.72) 
Single -1,183 1,966 3,150 
 (-0.32) (0.78) (0.70) 
Constant 77,239*** 63,756*** 77,239*** 
 (12.9) (15.7) (12.9) 
    
Observations 1,321 1,031 2,352 
R-squared 0.593 0.558 0.603 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.7 Salary Determinants by URM Status 
VARIABLES White/Asian Underrepresented 
Minority 
Difference 
Female 140 -1,466 -1,605 
 (0.11) (-0.50) (-0.51) 
Foreign-born -4,742** -2,790 1,952 
 (-2.39) (-0.93) (0.54) 
Years since PhD 1,181*** 661*** -520*** 
 (10.7) (4.28) (-2.74) 
Postdoctoral appointment 4,773** 4,238 -535 
 (2.24) (1.52) (-0.15) 
Mobility 3,428*** 1,660* -1,768 
 (2.61) (1.65) (-1.07) 
12 month contract 8,844*** 12,355** 3,511 
 (3.01) (2.10) (0.53) 
Journal articles 173 1,107* 934 
 (0.92) (1.92) (1.54) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) 1.78* -0.021 -1.80 
 (1.77) (-0.022) (-1.29) 
Percent of time on teaching -365*** -324*** 40.6 
 (-6.37) (-3.93) (0.40) 
Network ties 526** 403 -124 
 (2.35) (1.19) (-0.31) 
Negotiation ability 4,749 7,891 3,143 
 (1.53) (1.32) (0.47) 
Extended tenure clock -3,844** -781 3,063 
 (-2.40) (-0.19) (0.71) 
Current or past chair/dean 11,158*** 13,258*** 2,100 
 (3.82) (3.43) (0.43) 
Chaired professorship 25,531*** 20,019* -5,512 
 (5.74) (1.91) (-0.48) 
Research director 10,562*** 6,800 -3,763 
 (2.80) (0.74) (-0.38) 
Biology -18,886*** -15,537*** 3,349 
 (-7.94) (-4.48) (0.80) 
Biochemistry -10,426*** -15,201*** -4,775 
 (-3.86) (-3.10) (-0.85) 
Math -12,011*** -9,357*** 2,654 
 (-5.11) (-2.66) (0.63) 
Department size 128** 64.7 -63.0 
 (2.39) (0.77) (-0.64) 
Constant 72,053*** 76,771*** 72,053*** 
 (15.0) (11.1) (15.0) 
    
Observations 2,071 281 2,352 
R-squared 0.599 0.509 0.599 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.8 Salary Determinants by Carnegie-classification Institutional Type 
VARIABLES Research 
Extensive 
Research 
Intensive 
Masters Liberal Arts 
Female -1,688 -1,099 901 90.9 
 (-0.76) (-0.56) (0.68) (0.045) 
Underrepresented minority -3,321 -12,189*** 859 4,449 
 (-1.12) (-3.57) (0.54) (0.94) 
Foreign-born -5,235** -2,563 -2,894* -1,062 
 (-1.98) (-1.07) (-1.70) (-0.40) 
Years since PhD 1,254*** 897*** 997*** 1,609*** 
 (7.51) (6.22) (10.8) (11.4) 
Postdoctoral appointment 8,825** -1,310 -479 4,405** 
 (2.08) (-0.45) (-0.28) (2.44) 
Mobility 3,526** 1,353 111 3,093 
 (2.34) (0.80) (0.087) (1.21) 
12 month contract 10,479** 10,092** 8,317 3,384 
 (2.55) (2.11) (1.61) (0.91) 
Journal articles 609*** -63.5 10.1 899* 
 (2.83) (-1.10) (0.068) (1.71) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) 2.85** 1.47 0.23 0.047 
 (2.23) (1.34) (0.47) (0.083) 
Percent of time on teaching -457*** -109 -267*** -277*** 
 (-4.91) (-0.91) (-3.84) (-3.71) 
Network ties 162 405 870** 385* 
 (0.48) (1.12) (2.54) (1.70) 
Negotiation ability 5,231 3,629 796 4,323 
 (1.16) (0.98) (0.30) (1.20) 
Current or past chair/dean 17,816*** 14,634*** 4,516*** 3,892* 
 (3.33) (3.30) (2.63) (1.73) 
Chaired professorship 23,130*** 28,406** 29,395* 13,484*** 
 (4.07) (2.49) (1.94) (4.09) 
Research director 11,802** 9,568** 3,675 1,182 
 (2.34) (2.47) (0.82) (0.24) 
Biology -18,776*** -24,153*** -15,811*** -22,882*** 
 (-5.15) (-6.75) (-7.45) (-5.92) 
Biochemistry -10,515** -20,143*** -10,450*** -23,900*** 
 (-2.36) (-5.93) (-4.66) (-5.97) 
Math -12,537*** -21,597*** -9,667*** -18,497*** 
 (-2.71) (-5.11) (-3.44) (-4.71) 
Department size 95.8 594*** 230** 686*** 
 (1.48) (3.46) (2.41) (2.87) 
Private 6,342* 9,611*** 3,403  
 (1.72) (2.71) (1.57)  
Constant 70,473*** 63,836*** 68,862*** 70,210*** 
 (9.67) (6.52) (17.4) (9.37) 
Observations 698 498 656 500 
R-squared 0.647 0.485 0.548 0.582 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.9 Comparison of Salary Determinants at HBCU/Women’s Colleges and 
Other Institutions 
 (1) (2)  
VARIABLES HBCU/Women's Other Difference 
    
Female 5,765** -655 6,420** 
 (2.01) (-0.53) (2.06) 
Underrepresented minority -832 -3,258 2,425 
 (-0.28) (-1.60) (0.68) 
Foreign-born 891 -3,788** 4,679 
 (0.33) (-2.03) (1.42) 
Years since PhD 829*** 1,160*** -331* 
 (5.76) (11.1) (-1.86) 
Postdoctoral appointment 2,647 3,686* -1,039 
 (0.98) (1.68) (-0.30) 
Mobility 2,963 2,784*** 178 
 (1.25) (2.78) (0.069) 
12 month contract 20,776** 8,379*** 12,397 
 (2.07) (2.90) (1.19) 
Journal articles 158 226 -67.5 
 (0.85) (1.14) (-0.25) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) -1.84 1.83** -3.67 
 (-0.80) (2.02) (-1.49) 
Percent of time on teaching -358*** -351*** -7.64 
 (-3.92) (-5.77) (-0.070) 
Network ties 340 434** -93.1 
 (0.87) (1.98) (-0.21) 
Negotiation ability 13,998 4,408 9,591 
 (1.56) (1.45) (1.01) 
Extended tenure clock 334 -4,616*** 4,951 
 (0.096) (-2.96) (1.30) 
Current or past chair/dean 7,946*** 11,101*** -3,155 
 (2.70) (3.76) (-0.76) 
Chaired professorship 25,031*** 24,319*** 712 
 (2.74) (5.37) (0.070) 
Research director 3,096 10,440*** -7,344 
 (0.49) (2.81) (-1.00) 
Biology -10,444*** -17,758*** 7,314 
 (-2.68) (-7.12) (1.58) 
Biochemistry -12,127** -10,708*** -1,419 
 (-2.41) (-3.82) (-0.25) 
Math -9,947*** -12,100*** 2,153 
 (-2.72) (-4.99) (0.49) 
Department size 335* 109* 225 
 (1.66) (1.86) (1.07) 
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Table A.9 (continued)    
Research Intensive 2,686 -7,584*** 10,270 
 (0.36) (-3.48) (1.34) 
Liberal Arts 17,756** -1,913 19,669** 
 (2.34) (-0.64) (2.41) 
Masters 4,501 -4,900** 9,400 
 (0.62) (-2.11) (1.24) 
Private -1,350 6,832*** -8,182** 
 (-0.42) (2.90) (-2.04) 
Constant 61,033*** 74,898*** 74,898*** 
 (5.85) (15.0) (15.0) 
    
Observations 267 2,085 2,352 
R-squared 0.527 0.611 0.612 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.10 Additive Model of Salary Determinants at HBCU/Women’s Colleges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Demographics Plus 
Experience 
& Field 
Plus Other 
Human Capital & 
Career 
Advancement 
Plus 
Departmental 
Plus 
Institutional 
      
Female 2,160 6,217* 5,722* 5,737** 5,765** 
 (0.55) (1.72) (1.93) (1.99) (2.01) 
Underrepresented minority -1,729 -1,101 -2,978 -3,005 -832 
 (-0.40) (-0.30) (-1.16) (-1.14) (-0.28) 
Foreign-born -4,335 -47.7 -96.6 -123 891 
 (-1.24) (-0.016) (-0.034) (-0.044) (0.33) 
Years since PhD  1,371*** 771*** 770*** 829*** 
  (8.97) (5.29) (5.35) (5.76) 
Postdoctoral appointment   3,439 3,431 2,647 
   (1.25) (1.25) (0.98) 
Mobility   1,658 1,668 2,963 
   (0.75) (0.76) (1.25) 
12 month contract   21,383** 21,355** 20,776** 
   (2.20) (2.17) (2.07) 
Journal articles   129 130 158 
   (0.70) (0.72) (0.85) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s)   -2.44 -2.46 -1.84 
   (-1.00) (-1.01) (-0.80) 
Percent of time on teaching   -346*** -346*** -358*** 
   (-3.93) (-3.85) (-3.92) 
Network ties   636* 638* 340 
   (1.79) (1.77) (0.87) 
Negotiation ability   13,796 13,804 13,998 
   (1.46) (1.47) (1.56) 
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Table A.10 (continued)      
Extended tenure clock   1,845 1,880 334 
   (0.49) (0.50) (0.096) 
Current or past chair/dean   8,851*** 8,915*** 7,946*** 
   (2.77) (2.99) (2.70) 
Chaired professorship   29,728*** 29,775*** 25,031*** 
   (3.17) (3.19) (2.74) 
Research director   2,647 2,654 3,096 
   (0.43) (0.43) (0.49) 
Biology  -7,369** -8,037** -8,157** -10,444*** 
  (-2.15) (-2.15) (-2.09) (-2.68) 
Biochemistry  -2,171 -5,137 -5,258 -12,127** 
  (-0.51) (-1.06) (-1.14) (-2.41) 
Math  -9,683*** -7,365** -7,502** -9,947*** 
  (-2.82) (-1.99) (-2.04) (-2.72) 
Department size    19.0 335* 
    (0.090) (1.66) 
Research Intensive     2,686 
     (0.36) 
Liberal Arts     17,756** 
     (2.34) 
Masters     4,501 
     (0.62) 
Private     -1,350 
     (-0.42) 
Constant 78,511*** 55,346*** 70,539*** 70,359*** 61,033*** 
 (28.4) (12.3) (9.94) (8.76) (5.85) 
      
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.009 0.272 0.503 0.503 0.527 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A.11 Comparison of Salary Determinants in Public and Private Institutions 
 (1) (2)  
VARIABLES Private Public Difference 
    
Female -3,131* 562 -3,693 
 (-1.68) (0.36) (-1.53) 
Underrepresented minority -4,374 -2,606 -1,768 
 (-1.41) (-1.22) (-0.47) 
Foreign-born 1,136 -5,702*** 6,838* 
 (0.41) (-2.65) (1.95) 
Years since PhD 1,142*** 1,122*** 20.6 
 (7.97) (9.18) (0.11) 
Postdoctoral appointment 5,700** 2,678 3,023 
 (2.14) (0.99) (0.80) 
Mobility 2,734 2,855** -122 
 (1.41) (2.51) (-0.054) 
12 month contract 8,628** 9,632*** -1,003 
 (2.02) (2.70) (-0.18) 
Journal articles 1,041*** 124 917** 
 (3.14) (0.75) (2.47) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) 3.31* 1.75* 1.57 
 (1.81) (1.87) (0.76) 
Percent of time on teaching -216** -360*** 144 
 (-1.99) (-5.30) (1.12) 
Network ties 756** 227 529 
 (2.18) (0.86) (1.22) 
Negotiation ability -1,125 6,590* -7,715 
 (-0.31) (1.71) (-1.45) 
Extended tenure clock -3,237* -5,963*** 2,726 
 (-1.74) (-2.72) (0.95) 
Current or past chair/dean 10,973*** 12,720*** -1,746 
 (2.79) (3.65) (-0.33) 
Chaired professorship 19,188*** 27,577*** -8,389 
 (3.70) (4.67) (-1.07) 
Research director 4,701 11,623*** -6,922 
 (0.84) (2.61) (-0.97) 
Biology -20,251*** -18,511*** -1,741 
 (-6.39) (-6.06) (-0.40) 
Biochemistry -19,609*** -7,597** -12,011** 
 (-5.25) (-2.21) (-2.37) 
Math -18,294*** -10,749*** -7,545 
 (-4.65) (-3.51) (-1.51) 
Department size 593*** 55.1 538** 
 (2.94) (1.00) (2.57) 
Research Intensive -1,037 -8,624*** 7,587 
 (-0.24) (-3.62) (1.53) 
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Table A.11 (continued)    
Masters 1,299 -5,229** 6,528 
 (0.26) (-2.14) (1.16) 
Liberal Arts 8,330** -8,464 16,794* 
 (2.02) (-0.93) (1.68) 
Constant 58,831*** 80,091*** 80,091*** 
 (6.14) (14.4) (14.4) 
    
Observations 976 1,376 2,352 
R-squared 0.586 0.648 0.628 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.12 Influence of Organizational Revenues on Salary Determinants 
  
VARIABLES  
  
Female 2,687 
 (1.50) 
Underrepresented minority -702 
 (-0.29) 
Foreign-born -5,727** 
 (-2.11) 
Years since PhD 879*** 
 (5.76) 
Postdoctoral appointment -146 
 (-0.047) 
Mobility 1,453 
 (0.78) 
12 month contract 1,444 
 (0.34) 
Journal articles 114 
 (0.53) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) 0.23 
 (0.19) 
Percent of time on teaching -298*** 
 (-3.29) 
Network ties 250 
 (0.81) 
Negotiation ability 7,292 
 (1.38) 
Extended tenure clock -4,713** 
 (-2.00) 
Current or past chair/dean 7,415** 
 (2.30) 
Chaired professorship 23,591*** 
 (3.70) 
Research director 12,754** 
 (2.51) 
Biology -20,055*** 
 (-5.60) 
Biochemistry -14,327*** 
 (-3.41) 
Math -13,704*** 
 (-4.10) 
Department size -81.0 
 (-0.92) 
Research Intensive -11,590*** 
 (-3.00) 
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Table A.12 (continued)  
Liberal Arts -36,922*** 
 (-6.41) 
Masters -8,196 
 (-1.54) 
Private 5,649* 
 (1.93) 
Revenue per FTE -0.27* 
 (-1.66) 
Revenue per FTE*Female -0.12*** 
 (-2.63) 
Revenue per FTE*URM -0.073 
 (-1.46) 
Revenue per FTE*Foreign-born 0.051 
 (1.08) 
Revenue per FTE*Years since PhD 0.0067** 
 (2.16) 
Revenue per FTE*Postdoctoral apt. 0.078 
 (1.07) 
Revenue per FTE*Mobility 0.040 
 (0.90) 
Revenue per FTE*12 month contract 0.16** 
 (2.08) 
Revenue per FTE*Journal publications 0.00043 
 (0.15) 
Revenue per FTE*Grant awards 0.000059* 
 (1.88) 
Revenue per FTE*Time on teaching -0.0013 
 (-0.56) 
Revenue per FTE*Network ties 0.00082 
 (0.15) 
Revenue per FTE*Negotiation ability -0.049 
 (-0.52) 
Revenue per FTE*Extended tenure clock 0.0034 
 (0.061) 
Revenue per FTE*Chair/dean 0.085 
 (1.30) 
Revenue per FTE*Chaired professorship -0.034 
 (-0.31) 
Revenue per FTE*Research director -0.081 
 (-0.83) 
Revenue per FTE*Biology 0.095 
 (1.36) 
Revenue per FTE*Biochemistry 0.052 
 (0.58) 
Revenue per FTE*Math 0.033 
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Table A.12 (continued)  
 (0.47) 
Revenue per FTE*Department Size 0.0046** 
 (2.28) 
Revenue per FTE*Research Intensive 0.21** 
 (2.00) 
Revenue per FTE*Liberal Arts 1.12*** 
 (7.66) 
Revenue per FTE*Masters 0.23 
 (1.05) 
Revenue per FTE*Private -0.083 
 (-1.51) 
Constant 87,391*** 
 (11.4) 
  
Observations 2,352 
R-squared 0.657 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.13 Influence of Organizational Revenues on Salary Determinants, 
Disaggregated Race/Ethnicity 
 (1) 
VARIABLES All Interactions 
  
Female 2,800 
 (1.53) 
Asian 9,355* 
 (1.78) 
Black/African American 9,217** 
 (2.07) 
Hispanic 2,932 
 (0.95) 
Other race -16,800** 
 (-2.16) 
Foreign-born -8,713** 
 (-2.39) 
Years since PhD 898*** 
 (5.94) 
Postdoctoral appointment 308 
 (0.10) 
Mobility 1,332 
 (0.73) 
12 month contract 1,240 
 (0.29) 
Journal articles 105 
 (0.49) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) 0.15 
 (0.13) 
Percent of time on teaching -299*** 
 (-3.34) 
Network ties 383 
 (1.21) 
Negotiation ability 7,971 
 (1.53) 
Extended tenure clock -4,322* 
 (-1.73) 
Current or past chair/dean 7,139** 
 (2.24) 
Chaired professorship 24,311*** 
 (3.80) 
Research director 13,112*** 
 (2.60) 
Biology -20,224*** 
 (-5.56) 
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Table A.13 (continued)  
Biochemistry -14,077*** 
 (-3.37) 
Math -12,649*** 
 (-3.78) 
Department size -77.7 
 (-0.88) 
Research Intensive -11,490*** 
 (-3.02) 
Liberal Arts -37,878*** 
 (-6.66) 
Masters -8,603 
 (-1.62) 
Private 5,921** 
 (2.03) 
Revenue per FTE -0.24 
 (-1.57) 
Revenue per FTE*Female -0.12*** 
 (-2.63) 
Revenue per FTE*Asian -0.14 
 (-1.36) 
Revenue per FTE*African American -0.29** 
 (-2.39) 
Revenue per FTE*Hispanic -0.11* 
 (-1.86) 
Revenue per FTE*Other race 0.14 
 (0.94) 
Revenue per FTE*Foreign-born 0.088 
 (1.60) 
Revenue per FTE*Years since PhD 0.0065** 
 (2.14) 
Revenue per FTE*Postdoctoral appt. 0.062 
 (0.89) 
Revenue per FTE*Mobility 0.048 
 (1.11) 
Revenue per FTE*12 month contract 0.16** 
 (2.16) 
Revenue per FTE*Journal publications 0.00049 
 (0.17) 
Revenue per FTE*Grant awards 0.000063* 
 (1.93) 
Revenue per FTE*Time on teaching -0.0010 
 (-0.46) 
Revenue per FTE*Network ties -0.0016 
 (-0.27) 
Revenue per FTE*Negotiation ability -0.066 
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Table A.13 (continued)  
  (-0.69) 
Revenue per FTE*Extended tenure clock -0.0071 
 (-0.12) 
Revenue per FTE*Chair/dean 0.094 
 (1.42) 
Revenue per FTE*Chaired professorship -0.051 
 (-0.46) 
Revenue per FTE*Research director -0.094 
 (-0.96) 
Revenue per FTE*Biology 0.11 
 (1.47) 
Revenue per FTE*Biochemistry 0.056 
 (0.62) 
Revenue per FTE*Math 0.014 
 (0.20) 
Revenue per FTE*Department size 0.0046** 
 (2.31) 
Revenue per FTE*Research Intensive 0.21** 
 (2.02) 
Revenue per FTE*Liberal Arts 1.13*** 
 (7.85) 
Revenue per FTE*Masters 0.23 
 (1.05) 
Revenue per FTE*Private -0.083 
 (-1.50) 
Constant 84,835*** 
 (11.5) 
  
Observations 2,352 
R-squared 0.661 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.14 Influence of Reliance on Public Revenue on Salary Determinants in 
Public and Private Institutions 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Private Public 
   
Female 672 3,204 
 (0.35) (0.61) 
Underrepresented minority 2,304 -18,504** 
 (0.54) (-2.55) 
Foreign-born 3,165 -6,733 
 (1.12) (-1.01) 
Years since PhD 993*** 1,383*** 
 (6.35) (3.92) 
Postdoctoral appointment 166 -19,329** 
 (0.062) (-2.53) 
Mobility 781 -5,977 
 (0.44) (-1.23) 
12 month contract 6,296 -15,716 
 (1.37) (-1.51) 
Journal articles 576 1,580** 
 (1.27) (2.23) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) -0.42 -1.04 
 (-0.24) (-0.28) 
Percent of time on teaching -330** 112 
 (-2.58) (0.61) 
Network ties 654 928 
 (1.40) (1.14) 
Negotiation ability 3,177 -6,823 
 (0.97) (-0.47) 
Extended tenure clock -1,542 -982 
 (-0.78) (-0.11) 
Current or past chair/dean 8,282*** -22,361** 
 (2.90) (-2.45) 
Chaired professorship 16,167*** 59,083** 
 (4.04) (2.26) 
Research director -4,981 19,458 
 (-0.78) (1.20) 
Biology -24,446*** -10,898 
 (-6.03) (-1.15) 
Biochemistry -28,201*** -16,145 
 (-6.55) (-1.50) 
Math -20,393*** -7,138 
 (-3.90) (-0.83) 
Department size 203 -33.7 
 (0.95) (-0.14) 
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Table A.14 (continued)   
Research Intensive -5,680 -4,584 
 (-0.90) (-0.61) 
Liberal Arts 10,195*  
 (1.75)  
Masters 3,128 -6,600 
 (0.46) (-0.91) 
Percent of revenue from public sources -1,473*** 56.5 
 (-2.63) (0.17) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Female -335** -59.2 
 (-2.22) (-0.57) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*URM -451** 292** 
 (-2.08) (2.34) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Foreign-born -32.7 21.3 
 (-0.21) (0.16) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Years since PhD 6.57 -5.39 
 (0.70) (-0.79) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Postdoctoral appoint 598*** 388*** 
 (3.03) (2.58) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Mobility 276** 161* 
 (2.12) (1.67) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*12 month contract 125 431** 
 (0.49) (2.28) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Journal publications -8.46 -23.8** 
 (-0.60) (-2.18) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Grant awards 0.19* 0.051 
 (1.68) (0.74) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Time on teaching 8.26 -8.40** 
 (1.26) (-2.30) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Network ties -8.74 -15.1 
 (-0.37) (-0.96) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Negotiation ability -186 247 
 (-0.63) (0.84) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Extended tenure clock -92.5 -90.3 
 (-0.58) (-0.51) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Chair/dean 274 617*** 
 (1.04) (3.36) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Chaired professorship 40.9 -517 
 (0.11) (-1.10) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Research director 251 -133 
 (1.23) (-0.42) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Biology 334 -126 
 (1.58) (-0.70) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Biochemistry 1,022*** 129 
 (2.85) (0.61) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Math 43.3 -87.7 
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Table A.14 (continued)   
  (0.17) (-0.50) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Department size 15.6 1.87 
 (1.36) (0.44) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Research Intensive 403 -69.4 
 (1.37) (-0.49) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Masters -433 34.0 
 (-1.31) (0.24) 
Pct. of revenue from public sources*Liberal Arts -137  
 (-0.37)  
Constant 83,059*** 77,207*** 
 (7.47) (4.45) 
   
Observations 976 1,370 
R-squared 0.642 0.681 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.15 Influence of State Appropriations Share on Salary Determinants in 
Public Institutions  
 
  
VARIABLES  
  
Female -3,417 
 (-0.84) 
Underrepresented minority -8,505 
 (-1.46) 
Foreign-born -4,421 
 (-1.03) 
Years since PhD 1,426*** 
 (5.97) 
Postdoctoral appointment -4,385 
 (-0.80) 
Mobility 4,663 
 (1.45) 
12 month contract 13,726* 
 (1.72) 
Journal articles 917* 
 (1.70) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) 5.30** 
 (2.25) 
Percent of time on teaching -444*** 
 (-3.09) 
Network ties 0.0046 
 (8.41e-06) 
Negotiation ability 3,063 
 (0.43) 
Extended tenure clock -3,736 
 (-0.47) 
Current or past chair/dean 6,787 
 (1.03) 
Chaired professorship 28,092** 
 (2.26) 
Research director 21,686** 
 (2.31) 
Biology -7,937 
 (-1.17) 
Biochemistry 3,087 
 (0.33) 
Math 7,305 
 (1.15) 
Department size -188 
 (-1.22) 
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Table A.15 (continued)  
Research Intensive -21,598*** 
 (-3.76) 
Masters -20,521*** 
 (-2.93) 
Percent of revenue from state funds -350 
 (-0.78) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Female 160 
 (0.99) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*URM 206 
 (1.03) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Foreign-born 0.33 
 (0.0019) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Years since PhD -11.8 
 (-1.35) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Postdoctoral apt. 268 
 (1.28) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Mobility -67.2 
 (-0.57) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*12 month contract -151 
 (-0.47) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Publications -36.4* 
 (-1.85) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Grant awards -0.13 
 (-1.48) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Time on teaching 3.39 
 (0.64) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Network ties 9.56 
 (0.44) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Negotiation ability 161 
 (0.40) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Extended tenure clock -30.0 
 (-0.10) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Chair/dean 279 
 (1.12) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Chaired professorship -87.2 
 (-0.14) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Research director -458 
 (-1.42) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Biology -458* 
 (-1.67) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Biochemistry -451 
 (-1.15) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Math -737*** 
 (-2.75) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Department size 9.19 
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Table A.15 (continued)  
 (1.37) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Research Intensive 629** 
 (2.50) 
Percent of revenue from state funds*Masters 704** 
 (2.46) 
Constant 86,739*** 
 (8.01) 
  
Observations 1,350 
R-squared 0.680 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.16 Influence of Federal Revenue Share on Salary Determinants in Public 
and Private Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Private Private plus 
career 
advancement 
Public Public plus career 
advancement 
     
Female -889 303 -333 1,770 
 (-0.44) (0.15) (-0.14) (0.84) 
Underrepresented minority 1,088 1,175 -2,475 54.9 
 (0.26) (0.27) (-0.83) (0.019) 
Foreign-born 7,939** 7,484** 2,730 -15.3 
 (2.20) (2.54) (0.88) (-0.0056) 
Years since PhD 1,349*** 951*** 1,330*** 1,105*** 
 (10.0) (6.07) (8.85) (7.84) 
Postdoctoral appointment  -966  -3,034 
  (-0.34)  (-1.03) 
Mobility  274  -3,795* 
  (0.16)  (-1.92) 
12 month contract  8,475*  12,050** 
  (1.79)  (2.42) 
Journal articles  191  472** 
  (0.41)  (2.18) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s)  2.01  0.81 
  (0.87)  (0.60) 
Percent of time on teaching  -376***  -179** 
  (-2.81)  (-2.43) 
Network ties  900*  736** 
  (1.73)  (2.21) 
Negotiation ability  1,780  -267 
  (0.52)  (-0.063) 
Extended tenure clock  -1,911  -2,189 
  (-0.85)  (-0.59) 
Current or past chair/dean  4,598  4,765 
  (1.48)  (1.21) 
Chaired professorship  19,168***  21,780 
  (3.99)  (1.52) 
Research director  2,063  10,988* 
  (0.31)  (1.70) 
Biology -27,497*** -23,839*** -15,012*** -17,009*** 
 (-5.37) (-5.48) (-3.67) (-4.43) 
Biochemistry -27,457*** -26,143*** -12,396** -8,119* 
 (-5.16) (-5.80) (-2.29) (-1.80) 
Math -23,852*** -19,801*** -15,755*** -10,291*** 
 (-3.80) (-3.59) (-3.94) (-2.89) 
Department size 259 187 147 30.3 
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Table A.16 (continued)     
  (1.47) (0.89) (1.17) (0.30) 
Research Intensive -11,337 -4,711 -5,066 -3,417 
 (-1.51) (-0.68) (-1.07) (-0.90) 
Liberal Arts 7,738 10,563   
 (1.13) (1.60)   
Masters -1,611 3,738 -3,547 186 
 (-0.21) (0.49) (-0.77) (0.048) 
Percent of revenue from federal -490 -2,257*** 479 301 
     funds (-0.83) (-2.99) (0.95) (0.46) 
Pct. of revenue from federal -424* -288 -79.0 -53.1 
     funds*Female (-1.93) (-1.41) (-0.42) (-0.32) 
Pct. of revenue from federal -581** -452 -136 -156 
     funds*URM (-2.58) (-1.54) (-0.52) (-0.62) 
Pct. of revenue from federal -497** -415 -181 -393* 
     funds*Foreign-born (-2.12) (-1.57) (-0.82) (-1.74) 
Pct. of revenue from federal 23.1* 12.3 28.7** 2.86 
     funds*Years since PhD (1.72) (1.01) (2.12) (0.19) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  921***  503* 
     funds*Postdoctoral apt.  (3.21)  (1.73) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  474**  575*** 
     funds*Mobility  (2.53)  (3.38) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  196  -234 
     funds*12 month contract  (0.59)  (-0.82) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  20.2  -16.8*** 
     funds*Publications  (0.86)  (-2.88) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  0.046  0.074 
     funds*Grant awards  (0.30)  (0.80) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  16.1*  -13.7* 
     funds*Time on teaching  (1.81)  (-1.96) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  -36.4  -46.3* 
     funds*Network ties  (-0.96)  (-1.75) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  -65.2  553 
     funds*Negotiation ability  (-0.18)  (1.34) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  -188  -191 
     funds*Extended tenure clock  (-0.64)  (-0.63) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  809**  702* 
     funds*Chair/dean  (2.06)  (1.80) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  -108  246 
     funds*Chaired professorship  (-0.17)  (0.31) 
Pct. of revenue from federal  201  339 
     funds*Research director  (0.54)  (0.60) 
Pct. of revenue from federal 706** 366 -281 -116 
     funds*Biology (2.11) (1.17) (-0.92) (-0.40) 
Pct. of revenue from federal 1,448** 1,006** 375 -143 
     funds*Biochemistry (2.31) (2.24) (0.99) (-0.46) 
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Table A.16 (continued)     
Pct. of revenue from federal 19.5 82.1 -88.3 -95.6 
     funds*Math (0.053) (0.24) (-0.26) (-0.29) 
Pct. of revenue from federal 20.4* 19.3 -10.3 1.08 
     funds*Dept. size (1.90) (1.39) (-1.04) (0.16) 
Pct. of revenue from federal 891* 448 -528 -258 
     funds*Research Intensive (1.65) (0.96) (-1.61) (-0.88) 
Pct. of revenue from federal -796** -690 -733** -517 
     funds*Masters (-2.21) (-1.38) (-2.10) (-1.49) 
Pct. of revenue from federal -165 -180   
     funds*Liberal Arts (-0.40) (-0.34)   
Constant 75,253*** 85,258*** 66,214*** 72,872*** 
 (7.95) (7.34) (11.6) (9.93) 
     
Observations 976 976 1,370 1,370 
R-squared 0.538 0.655 0.469 0.681 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.17 Influence of Department Head Discretion on Salary Determinants 
  
VARIABLES  
  
Female -1,720 
 (-0.29) 
Underrepresented minority 7,024 
 (0.88) 
Foreign-born 3,741 
 (0.54) 
Years since PhD 2,057*** 
 (6.13) 
Postdoctoral appointment 7,084 
 (0.78) 
Mobility -11,624** 
 (-2.12) 
12 month contract 17,255 
 (1.49) 
Journal articles 1,093 
 (1.54) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) 1.24 
 (0.45) 
Percent of time on teaching -853*** 
 (-3.96) 
Network ties 1,350* 
 (1.84) 
Negotiation ability 12,296 
 (1.38) 
Extended tenure clock 11,605 
 (1.42) 
Current or past chair/dean 4,935 
 (0.44) 
Chaired professorship 28,527* 
 (1.95) 
Research director 24,070** 
 (2.15) 
Biology -17,046* 
 (-1.76) 
Biochemistry -11,368 
 (-1.02) 
Math 6,361 
 (0.54) 
Department size 72.6 
 (0.43) 
Private -8,757 
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Table A.17 (continued)  
 (-1.15) 
Department head discretion 289 
 (0.32) 
Department head discretion*Female -17.6 
 (-0.059) 
Department head discretion*URM -600 
 (-1.58) 
Department head discretion*Foreign-born -583 
 (-1.59) 
Department head discretion*Years since PhD -41.5** 
 (-2.33) 
Department head discretion*Postdoctoral apt. 25.3 
 (0.052) 
Department head discretion*Mobility 815*** 
 (2.75) 
Department head discretion*12 month contract -290 
 (-0.48) 
Department head discretion*Publications -23.8 
 (-0.72) 
Department head discretion*Grant awards 0.029 
 (0.19) 
Department head discretion*Time on teaching 19.5* 
 (1.90) 
Department head discretion*Network ties -77.5* 
 (-1.83) 
Department head discretion*Negotiation ability -516 
 (-1.17) 
Department head discretion*Extended tenure clock -916** 
 (-2.25) 
Department head discretion*Chair/dean 539 
 (0.83) 
Department head discretion*Chaired professorship -378 
 (-0.55) 
Department head discretion*Research director -865 
 (-1.36) 
Department head discretion*Biology -87.3 
 (-0.17) 
Department head discretion*Biochemistry -29.6 
 (-0.052) 
Department head discretion*Math -1,042* 
 (-1.65) 
Department head discretion*Department size 2.76 
 (0.32) 
Department head discretion*Private 881** 
 (2.09) 
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Table A.17 (continued)  
Constant 70,839*** 
 (4.12) 
  
Observations 736 
R-squared 0.674 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.18 Influence of Department Head Discretion on Salary Determinants, 
Disaggregated Race/Ethnicity 
  
VARIABLES  
  
Female -1,505 
 (-0.25) 
Asian 1,004 
 (0.10) 
Black/African American 19,191* 
 (1.74) 
Hispanic -1,842 
 (-0.17) 
Other race 10,200 
 (0.74) 
Foreign-born 4,686 
 (0.56) 
Years since PhD 2,025*** 
 (5.87) 
Postdoctoral appointment 7,026 
 (0.75) 
Mobility -11,561** 
 (-2.05) 
12 month contract 16,221 
 (1.39) 
Journal articles 1,090 
 (1.52) 
Grant funds awarded ('000s) 1.23 
 (0.46) 
Percent of time on teaching -828*** 
 (-3.86) 
Network ties 1,406* 
 (1.88) 
Negotiation ability 12,419 
 (1.39) 
Extended tenure clock 12,917 
 (1.56) 
Current or past chair/dean 4,688 
 (0.41) 
Chaired professorship 27,740* 
 (1.87) 
Research director 25,245** 
 (2.28) 
Biology -17,711* 
 (-1.80) 
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Table A.18 (continued)  
Biochemistry -11,314 
 (-1.01) 
Math 5,584 
 (0.48) 
Department size 87.0 
 (0.52) 
Private -9,481 
 (-1.25) 
Department head discretion 283 
 (0.31) 
Department head discretion*Female -28.3 
 (-0.093) 
Department head discretion*Asian 151 
 (0.33) 
Department head discretion*African American -1,237** 
 (-2.22) 
Department head discretion*Hispanic 30.7 
 (0.060) 
Department head discretion*Other race -690 
 (-0.87) 
Department head discretion*Foreign-born -693 
 (-1.55) 
Department head discretion*Years since PhD -39.4** 
 (-2.09) 
Department head discretion*Postdoctoral apt. 39.9 
 (0.078) 
Department head discretion*Mobility 816*** 
 (2.66) 
Department head discretion*12 month contract -243 
 (-0.40) 
Department head discretion*Publications -24.6 
 (-0.74) 
Department head discretion*Grant awards 0.035 
 (0.24) 
Department head discretion*Time on teaching 18.5* 
 (1.75) 
Department head discretion*Network ties -79.2* 
 (-1.81) 
Department head discretion*Negotiation ability -528 
 (-1.20) 
Department head discretion*Extended tenure clock -980** 
 (-2.37) 
Department head discretion*Chair/dean 562 
 (0.85) 
Department head discretion*Chaired professorship -315 
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Table A.18 (continued)  
  (-0.45) 
Department head discretion*Research director -924 
 (-1.46) 
Department head discretion*Biology -39.7 
 (-0.074) 
Department head discretion*Biochemistry -16.1 
 (-0.028) 
Department head discretion*Math -969 
 (-1.54) 
Department head discretion*Department size 1.91 
 (0.23) 
Department head discretion*Private 935** 
 (2.23) 
Constant 69,749*** 
 (4.01) 
  
Observations 736 
R-squared 0.676 
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